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Price snapshot: 2026-11-03 · Research: 2026-10-22 · Saved analysis, not live market data
Ratings and fair values are independent, dated research opinions—not personalized investment advice. Disclaimer
The reference price is below the probability-weighted fair value.
Dashed marker: reference price $8.12. Scenario values are present fair values, not dated price targets.
2028 revenue $520M; exit EV/Sales 2.0x; net cash $250M; 300M shares; 15% discount rate
Weaker program execution, modest revenue growth, further cash consumption and continuing dilution2028 revenue $700M; exit EV/Sales 3.5x; net cash $400M; 280M shares; 13% discount rate
Successful Edge scaling, recovery in Space growth and improving consolidated economics2028 revenue $900M; exit EV/Sales 5.0x; net cash $500M; 275M shares; 12% discount rate
Substantial defense-autonomy expansion, higher margins and a re-rating toward stronger growth peersFolioFacts zones calculated from the saved fair and bear values at the dated reference price. Live zones can change with research.
Redwire sells essential components and systems rather than attempting to control every layer of the space and defense industries. It supplies solar arrays, spacecraft electronics, docking systems, drones, sensors and other equipment that larger defense contractors, space agencies and commercial operators need.
Reported FY totals, current FY quarters and cumulative YTD are grouped separately.
Scale within group: $340M
Scale within group: $120M
Scale within group: $340M
Completed FY, standalone current-year quarters and cumulative YTD. No TTM figures.
Each row covers a completed fiscal year. Scale within this group: $200M.
Each row covers an independent quarter; derived cash flow is labeled. Scale within this group: $66M.
YTD totals overlap the quarters above and must not be added to them. Scale within this group: $120M.
Each annual, quarter and YTD group uses a separate scale. SBC / FCF is a same-period comparison, not a literal employee cash payment. N/M means FCF is zero or negative (or SBC is negative); missing is not zero. Issuer FCF definitions may vary.
Only completed fiscal years and currently open fiscal-year quarters/YTD appear in charts. Standalone quarters and cumulative YTD are separate; missing is never zero. Legacy TTM rows remain in archival source text. The full financial profile below preserves definitions, accounting caveats, and period-end balance details.
This score uses the saved price and research fundamentals. Creator Watchlist calculates the current score and rank using verified market prices.
Watch the evidence behind the thesis, not just the ticker.
Sustained double-digit organic growth
Further contraction or major program losses
Affects: Organic revenue, consolidated multipleRepeat drone orders, successful product launches, stronger segment profit
Slower orders, margin deterioration or manufacturing problems
Affects: Revenue, competitive moat, base/bull valuationSustained mid-to-high-20% margins
Renewed contract overruns and adverse cost-estimate changes
Affects: Margin credibility and profitabilityPositive recurring cash flow without equity issuance
Cash consumption persists despite higher revenue
Affects: Equity value, dilution assumptions, confidenceStable share count and successful remediation
More dilution without corresponding per-share improvement
Affects: Per-share fair value and risk confidenceRedwire sells essential components and systems rather than attempting to control every layer of the space and defense industries. It supplies solar arrays, spacecraft electronics, docking systems, drones, sensors and other equipment that larger defense contractors, space agencies and commercial operators need.
There are three reasons this model could become attractive.
First, space missions require highly reliable components, and suppliers with flight heritage can gain durable competitive advantages. Second, militaries are accelerating investment in relatively inexpensive autonomous aircraft and intelligence systems. Third, Redwire may be able to combine its space electronics and sensing capabilities with Edge Autonomy's established drone platforms to sell more integrated products.
The counterargument is equally important. Redwire operates in contract-driven markets where growth can be uneven, large customers have bargaining power, and scaling production consumes cash. Its acquisition-led expansion and substantial increases in shares outstanding make per-share returns materially less certain than the growth narrative suggests.
The most compelling version of the thesis is not simply that the space economy will become enormous. It is that Redwire could eventually operate a profitable, diversified aerospace and defense manufacturing business with better margins, stronger recurring program revenue and less dependence on financing.
Redwire now operates through two business segments. Their economics and growth drivers are different enough that they should be valued separately before applying a consolidated multiple.
| Segment | What it sells | Primary customers | Q2 2026 revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
| Space | Solar arrays, power systems, docking and deployable structures, spacecraft avionics, cameras, sensors, and microgravity infrastructure | NASA, ESA, defense agencies, spacecraft manufacturers and commercial space operators | $55.2M |
| Defense Tech | Stalker and Penguin uncrewed aircraft, Octopus electro-optical/infrared sensors, communications and autonomous systems | U.S. military, NATO allies and other government customers | $61.9M |
Q2 revenue mix: Space 47.1%; Defense Tech 52.9%.
Space systems are complex assemblies in which reliability can matter more than the component's cost. A satellite or spacecraft mission may depend on a solar array, avionics package or docking mechanism operating correctly for years after launch.
Redwire benefits from this requirement because flight qualification creates barriers for new entrants. It is also involved in attractive programs such as NASA's lunar exploration efforts, orbital power generation and commercial space infrastructure.
However, Redwire's space business is not yet demonstrating consistent organic expansion. Revenue in the first half of 2026 was approximately $107.9 million, slightly below the corresponding $108.8 million in 2025.
That stagnation matters. I would not apply a premium space-growth multiple to the entire company based only on the industry's long-term potential when the existing space operation is struggling to generate growth.
The June 2025 Edge Autonomy acquisition changed Redwire's growth profile. Edge brought established uncrewed aerial systems and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment.
Its Stalker and Penguin aircraft support reconnaissance and military operations. The Octopus sensor family provides imaging and surveillance payloads. Unlike an early-stage developer still hoping to win its first military program, Edge has operational products and government customers.
This business could have a stronger near-term growth trajectory than Redwire's original space operations because of expanding demand for unmanned systems. However, a defense equipment contract is not a subscription: orders can be large, irregular and dependent on procurement cycles.
Redwire's defense business provides most of the recent growth and positive segment-level adjusted EBITDA. Its space business provides valuable expertise and strategic optionality but currently weaker economics.
Redwire participates in multiple markets rather than one clearly defined addressable market. Adding together all global defense spending, satellite spending, launch spending and orbital-infrastructure forecasts would overstate the revenue realistically available to the company.
The more relevant opportunities are the portions it can actually supply: military small-UAS platforms and sensors, spacecraft power systems, avionics, deployable structures and mission-specific hardware.
The structural growth drivers are favorable. Governments are increasing investment in uncrewed systems; satellite constellations require more spacecraft components; and commercial operators are exploring additional orbital infrastructure.
Redwire's opportunity is nevertheless constrained by qualification schedules, defense procurement, manufacturing capacity, mission delays and competition from vertically integrated aerospace companies.
I did not find sufficiently comparable product-level market-share figures covering Redwire and its major competitors. A quantitative market-share table would therefore create false precision. Contract awards, backlog conversion, program participation and segment growth are better competitive-position indicators.
| Company / Platform | Primary Position | Relative Scale | Growth Direction | Investment Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Redwire | Specialist space components plus defense UAS | Smaller diversified platform | Acquisition-led growth; Space flat recently | Needs organic growth and profitable backlog conversion |
| AeroVironment | Defense uncrewed systems | Larger established defense-UAS platform | Growth exposure to military autonomy | Direct defense operating benchmark |
| Kratos Defense | Defense technology and unmanned systems | Broader defense manufacturing and programs | Expanding defense autonomy exposure | Direct defense operating benchmark |
| Rocket Lab | Space systems and launch | More integrated space business | Expanding space-systems exposure | Space operating benchmark, not a whole-company match |
Redwire has access to attractive long-run demand, but prospective industry growth should not be mistaken for directly addressable contracted revenue or assured per-share value creation.
| Competitor | Market Share | Positioning | Advantages vs. Company | Disadvantages vs. Company | Current Direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AeroVironment (AVAV) | Not comparably available | Direct segment: tactical reconnaissance UAS | Larger defense-UAS platform and established program scale | Less broad space-electronics and infrastructure exposure | Relevant defense competitor |
| Kratos Defense (KTOS) | Not comparably available | Adjacent/program-specific unmanned defense; not all tactical UAV requirements | Broader defense programs and manufacturing experience | Less broad space technologies exposure | Relevant defense competitor |
| Anduril (private) | Not comparably available | Direct segment: military autonomy and selected UAS procurements | Integrated software-led military technology ecosystem | Less established space-hardware capability | Competitive pressure in autonomy |
| Northrop Grumman (NOC) | Not comparably available | Segment-specific: spacecraft components; may also buy supplier products | Scale, prime-contractor relationships and engineering resources | Less focus on Redwire's specialist niches and flexibility | Mature prime contractor |
| Voyager Technologies (VOYG) | Not comparably available | Selected space-hardware/program overlap; not all station-development activity | Different exposure to large space-development opportunities | Less mature drone hardware revenue | Adjacent space competitor |
| Rocket Lab (RKLB) | Not comparably available | Direct segment: spacecraft components; launch is outside Redwire scope | Integrated launch-and-space-systems capabilities | Redwire has defense-UAS diversification and no dependence on developing its own launch vehicle | Adjacent space competitor |
Redwire's most meaningful moat comes from specialized engineering, flight heritage, qualification requirements, mission-specific intellectual property and established government relationships.
These advantages can protect individual programs. They do not automatically grant company-wide pricing power, however. Defense agencies often negotiate aggressively, larger prime contractors can control purchasing decisions, and Redwire must continue investing in its technologies.
Moat direction: Stable to strengthening in selected product niches, but not yet proven at the consolidated-company level.
Edge Autonomy adds credible qualifications and customers; sustained margin improvement would provide stronger evidence that these advantages are economically valuable.
Financial reporting periods follow the issuer's fiscal year: completed FY rows plus standalone current-year quarters and cumulative H1/9M for FY2026. Revenue, FCF and SBC are flows; cash is a period-end balance. FCF = operating cash flow minus property/equipment capex from SEC company facts; quarterly FCF after Q1 and any quarterly SBC derived from YTD are visibly marked. Missing values are N/D, not zero. Unit: USD millions. Data extracted from SEC-tagged filings as of 2026-11-07. Company-specific FCF definitions and acquisition effects may require further reconciliation.
| Period | Revenue | Growth | Gross Margin | Operating Margin | FCF | FCF Margin | SBC | Diluted Shares | Cash | Debt |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | $243.8M | — | 23.8% | -6.4% | -$4.4M | -1.8% | $8.7M | 64.7M | — | — |
| FY2024 | $304.1M | 24.7% | 14.6% | -13.9% | -$23.7M | -7.8% | $11.3M | 66.1M | $49.1M | $125.7M |
| FY2025 | $335.4M | 10.3% | 5.2% | -68.5% | -$190.8M | -56.9% | $59.0M | 119.5M | $95.2M | $85.2M |
| Q1 FY2026 | $96.972 | N/D | 26.6% | -71.9% | −$11.421 (derived: CFO - capex) | -11.8% | $46.735 | 193.672 | $144.506 | N/D |
| Q2 FY2026 | $117.074 | N/D | 27.8% | -18.9% | −$33.468 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | -28.6% | $3.9 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | 220.467 | $556.967 | N/D |
| H1 FY2026 | $214.046 | N/D | 27.3% | -42.9% | −$44.889 (derived: CFO - capex) | -21.0% | $50.635 | 207.143 | $556.967 | N/D |
| Q3 FY2026 | $109.035 | N/D | 32.3% | -24.1% | −$65.343 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | -59.9% | $6.31 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | 250.051 | $488.121 | N/D |
| 9M FY2026 | $323.081 | N/D | 29.0% | -36.5% | −$110.232 (derived: CFO - capex) | -34.1% | $56.945 | 221.603 | $488.121 | N/D |
Cash figures above include restricted cash; debt reflects net carrying value.
The first half of 2026 shows a meaningful operational improvement over the severe margin problems of 2025. Nevertheless, historical operating losses, negative free cash flow and unusually high stock-based compensation remain major issues.
Latest-quarter operating indicators:
| Metric | Q2 2026 |
|---|---|
| Revenue | $117.1M (+89.6% year over year) |
| Contracted backlog | $542.1M (+32% vs. Dec 2025) |
| Gross margin | 27.8% |
| Adjusted EBITDA | -$3.2M |
1. Reported growth is largely acquisition-driven. Revenue grew nearly 90% year over year in Q2, but Edge Autonomy was acquired in June 2025. Redwire's original Space segment declined slightly in the first half of 2026. Management expects double-digit future growth in both segments, with faster growth in Defense Tech, but that has not yet been demonstrated on a sustained comparable basis.
2. The balance sheet was repaired through equity issuance. Redwire received approximately $566.2 million in gross proceeds from common-stock issuance during H1 2026, before issuance costs. Its large June cash balance is real and greatly reduces near-term financing risk, but investors paid for that improvement through dilution.
Shares outstanding rose from roughly 191.9 million at December 2025 to 249.2 million at June 2026, an increase of approximately 30% in six months. Per-share growth has a much higher hurdle when the share count expands that quickly.
3. Orders have not yet become dependable free cash flow. H1 operating cash outflow improved to $31.6 million from $132.7 million a year earlier. After capital spending, free cash flow was still negative $44.9 million.
There is a credible path toward better economics as Edge scales. Defense Tech earned approximately $14.1 million in segment adjusted EBITDA in Q2, but the Space segment lost $4.2 million on the same measure, and corporate overhead consumed the remaining earnings.
Management's near-term normalized gross-margin expectation of the low-to-mid-20% range is also important. Extrapolating Q2's 27.8% indefinitely would be aggressive.
Financial direction: Improving, but still unproven. The improvement is material; sustainable positive cash generation and acceptable dilution have not yet been established.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Price Snapshot | $8.12 — 2026-11-03 regular-session close, America/New_York |
| Market Capitalization | $2.03B |
| Enterprise Value | $1.56B |
| Trailing 12-month revenue | $426.3M |
| Trailing EV / Revenue | 3.66x |
| EV / 2026 guidance midpoint | ~3.28x |
| Price / Free Cash Flow | Not meaningful |
Redwire is no longer priced like an exceptionally expensive speculative space stock. However, an enterprise-value multiple around 3.3 times guided revenue is not obviously cheap for a manufacturer that has yet to establish positive consolidated free cash flow.
EV / trailing revenue, StockAnalysis market-data snapshot, October 22, 2026. Multiples are comparable by measurement convention, not necessarily by business quality.
| Company | Relevance | Public / Private | EV / Trailing Revenue | EV / 2026 Guidance | Growth / Margin / Risk Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Redwire (RDW) | Subject company | Public | 3.66x | ~3.28x | Negative consolidated FCF; defense segment profitable on adjusted EBITDA basis |
| AeroVironment (AVAV) | Direct defense-UAS operating peer | Public | 3.11x | — | Established larger defense-UAS platform |
| Kratos (KTOS) | Adjacent unmanned-defense anchor; procurement classes differ | Public | 3.90x | — | Broader defense programs |
| Anduril | Direct autonomy competitor | Private | N/A — private | N/A — private | Integrated software-led military autonomy |
| Voyager (VOYG) | Selected space-hardware/program overlap; station economics differ | Public | 9.02x | — | Different capital needs and space infrastructure exposure |
| Intuitive Machines (LUNR) | Space contracting valuation anchor | Public | 5.11x | — | Contract-intensive space programs |
| Rocket Lab (RKLB) | Direct spacecraft-component overlap; consolidated launch multiple differs | Public | 36.92x | — | Integrated launch and spacecraft exposure |
AeroVironment and Kratos are more useful starting points than Rocket Lab. They have meaningful exposure to defense programs and unmanned systems, although their product mixes and profitability differ.
Redwire's multiple sits between those two defense peers. That is hard to call a large discount given Redwire's weaker consolidated cash generation and financial controls. The much higher valuations assigned to some space companies reflect different assumptions and should not automatically be transferred to Redwire.
For a company with negative free cash flow and rapidly changing capital structure, I favor a forward enterprise-value approach over assigning a terminal free-cash-flow margin that is not yet observable.
The model values RDW at the end of 2028 using revenue, an EV/revenue multiple, projected net cash, fully diluted shares and a two-year discount back to October 2026. These are independent analyst assumptions, not management guidance.
| Scenario | Key Assumptions | Fair Value | Probability | Probability Rationale | Return From Price Snapshot |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 2028 revenue $520M; exit EV/Sales 2.0x; net cash $250M; 300M shares; 15% discount rate | $3.25 | 25% | Weaker program execution, modest revenue growth, further cash consumption and continuing dilution | -60.0% |
| Base | 2028 revenue $700M; exit EV/Sales 3.5x; net cash $400M; 280M shares; 13% discount rate | $7.97 | 50% | Successful Edge scaling, recovery in Space growth and improving consolidated economics | -1.8% |
| Bull | 2028 revenue $900M; exit EV/Sales 5.0x; net cash $500M; 275M shares; 12% discount rate | $14.49 | 25% | Substantial defense-autonomy expansion, higher margins and a re-rating toward stronger growth peers | +78.4% |
| Probability-Weighted | Weighted three-scenario fair value | $8.42 | 100% | Probability assumptions above | +3.7% |
Fair value = (2028 revenue × exit multiple + projected net cash) ÷ projected shares ÷ (1 + discount rate)². Net cash means cash less debt. The share forecasts incorporate additional potential dilution and are not earnings-per-share forecasts.
Investment zones:
| Zone | Price Range |
|---|---|
| Strong Buy | ≤ $3.58 |
| Buy | Above $3.58 to $6.74 |
| Hold / Watch | Above $6.74 to $9.36 |
| Avoid chasing | Above $9.36 |
The strong-buy threshold is unusually low because the modeled bear case is so adverse. This is intentional: a company with significant downside and uncertain cash generation should require a deeper margin of safety than a mature compounder.
The model is especially sensitive to 2028 revenue, the market's willingness to pay a growth multiple, future financing decisions and cash consumption. A material acquisition would also require rebuilding the valuation.
CEO Peter Cannito has pursued a roll-up strategy, bringing together specialized space and defense companies under one public platform. The Edge Autonomy acquisition gives the strategy more industrial scale and a stronger market position in uncrewed defense systems.
The capital-allocation record is more mixed. Redwire has acquired valuable technology and customers, but it has also accumulated losses, recorded asset impairments and repeatedly relied on financing. Management is discussing further acquisitions despite the fact that consolidated free cash flow remains negative.
There is another concern that should not be minimized: Redwire reported material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting at June 30, 2026. These included weaknesses across U.S. operations and its European and acquired defense operations. Management stated that the reported financial statements nevertheless fairly presented results, but the remediation process remains unfinished.
This is not evidence of fraudulent reporting. It does mean that Redwire warrants a larger governance and valuation discount than a comparably sized company with mature financial controls.
Management assessment: Strong strategic ambition and meaningful progress on liquidity, offset by an insufficient record of profitable integration, shareholder-friendly financing and financial-reporting controls.
Analyzed call: Q2 2026, August 2026 · Research snapshot: 2026-10-22
The August earnings call was particularly useful because analysts challenged the durability of margins, the company's guidance, inventory investment and future acquisition strategy.
| Analyst / Firm | Core Question | Management Response | Research Read-Through |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brian Kinstlinger / Alliance Global Partners | Can 27.8% gross margin persist? What is the current share count? | CFO indicated low-to-mid-20% margins are a better near-term assumption. Management confirmed approximately 250M shares. | The record margin should not be extrapolated; dilution needs careful modeling. |
| Sujeeva De Silva / ROTH | What growth remains when the Edge acquisition comparison normalizes? | CEO expects double-digit opportunities in both segments, with Defense Tech faster. | Organic growth becomes a much more important test in H2 2026 and 2027. |
| Alexandra Mandery / Truist | How durable are bookings? | Awards are inherently lumpy; management highlighted roughly 1.5x trailing book-to-bill. | Backlog is encouraging, but quarter-to-quarter bookings can mislead. |
| Adam Samuelson team / Jefferies | Why maintain such a wide revenue guidance range? | Management cited scaling and approximately 90% visibility to the midpoint. | Good midpoint visibility, but limited clarity on reaching the high end. |
| Colin Canfield / Cantor | Is management planning more acquisitions? | CEO emphasized that M&A remains central and that Edge integration is progressing. | Potential growth accelerator, but another financing or integration risk. |
| Michael Leshock / KeyBanc | Why is inventory increasing so rapidly? | Management is stocking UAS components to reduce delivery lead times and expects further inventory investment. | Cash conversion could lag revenue even during strong demand. |
| Austin Moeller / Canaccord | How large is the international drone opportunity, and what about export controls? | Management cited U.S. and Latvian production, international demand and established export-compliance capabilities; it did not disclose pipeline counts. | International opportunity is credible but difficult to quantify. |
| Griffin Boss / B. Riley | Where are R&D dollars going, and how much additional capital spending is needed? | CEO identified platforms, sensors, microgravity and other strategic priorities without detailed capital-spending figures. | Capital allocation remains broad, and future investment requirements need monitoring. |
| Andrew Steinhart / Bank of America | Which new defense products drive growth? | CEO highlighted Stalker Block 40, Penguin Mk3, new Octopus sensors and potential radio-frequency payload integration. | Cross-selling and product upgrades could strengthen the acquisition thesis, but incremental profitability is not established. |
The biggest unresolved issue is not whether customers want Redwire's products. It is how much capital the company must deploy to fulfill that demand, and how much of the resulting value will accrue to existing shareholders.
| Source | Type | Date / Period | What It Supports |
|---|---|---|---|
| Redwire Q2 2026 financial results | Company IR | August 2026 | Revenue, segment results, gross margin, backlog, guidance |
| Q2 2026 Form 10-Q | Regulatory filing | June 2026 | Financial statements, cash flow, equity issuance, dilution, internal controls |
| 2025 Form 10-K | Regulatory filing | FY2023–FY2025 | Historical financials, Edge acquisition, governance and business economics |
| Q2 2026 earnings-call transcript | Transcript | August 2026 | Full analyst Q&A, guidance, operating outlook and management commentary |
| RDW valuation statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 | Share price, enterprise value, market capitalization, shares, valuation multiples |
| AVAV valuation statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 | Direct defense peer multiple |
| KTOS valuation statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 | Direct defense peer multiple |
| VOYG valuation statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 | Space-sector valuation anchor |
| LUNR valuation statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 | Space-sector valuation anchor |
| RKLB valuation statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 | Space-sector valuation anchor |
| Stalker National Guard orders | Company IR | October 2026 | Recent funded demand indicators |
| EnduroSat MOU | Company IR | October 2026 | European space partnership |
| NITE-STAR IDIQ selection | Company release | September 2026 | Contract opportunity versus guaranteed revenue |
| SEC XBRL company facts — RDW | Regulatory filing (as tagged) | FY2026, through 2026-09-30 | Current-year standalone-quarter and year-to-date source facts for FCF, SBC, revenue and other reported metrics |
Current Review: 2026-10-28
Previous Review: 2026-10-22
Update Trigger: Competitor relevance and analyst-Q&A correction
| Area | Previous View | Current View | Investment Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Competition | Preceding operating and comparable-company classifications | Product/customer/geographic boundaries corrected; direct rivals separated from substitutes, partners and valuation anchors | Corrects the competitive comparison; does not by itself re-underwrite the valuation |
| Analyst questions | Prior source-linked Q&A summaries | Complete questions and sentence-form management answers; all 9 existing rows retained | Improves readability while preserving the recorded exchange meaning |
| Valuation and scores | Approved operating/price snapshots, scenarios, scores and decisions | Preserved | No price refresh, rerank or change to valuation assumptions in this correction pass |
Thesis: No new fundamental thesis determination is made in this correction pass. The prior investment decision is preserved; the corrected competitive scope should govern the next substantive review.
| Metric | Current View |
|---|---|
| Price Snapshot | $8.12 — 2026-11-03 regular-session close, America/New_York |
| Rating / Zone Status | Hold / Watch |
| Bear / Base / Bull Fair Value | $3.25 / $7.97 / $14.49 |
| Scenario Probabilities | 25% / 50% / 25% |
| Probability-Weighted Fair Value | $8.42 |
| Probability-Weighted Expected Return | +3.7% |
| Bear-Case Return | -60.0% |
| Strong Buy Zone | ≤ $3.58 |
| Buy Zone | Above $3.58 to $6.74 |
| Avoid Chasing Above | $9.36 |
| Quality Score / Tier | 59.4 / C |
| Opportunity Score / Rank | 43.6 / #53 of 76 |
| Risk Level | High |
| Tracking / Ownership | On the Radar / No (not recorded in repository portfolio snapshot) |
Decision rationale: Redwire is an interesting way to invest in two expanding industries: space infrastructure and military drone technology. Its acquisition of Edge Autonomy transformed the company from primarily a space-hardware supplier into a broader aerospace and defense contractor. Demand is encouraging, but the company has relied heavily on equity financing, and its original space business has recently struggled to grow. At $8.14 the modeled probability-weighted upside of 3.5% provides little compensation for severe bear-case downside.
Redwire sells essential components and systems rather than attempting to control every layer of the space and defense industries. It supplies solar arrays, spacecraft electronics, docking systems, drones, sensors and other equipment that larger defense contractors, space agencies and commercial operators need.
There are three reasons this model could become attractive.
First, space missions require highly reliable components, and suppliers with flight heritage can gain durable competitive advantages. Second, militaries are accelerating investment in relatively inexpensive autonomous aircraft and intelligence systems. Third, Redwire may be able to combine its space electronics and sensing capabilities with Edge Autonomy's established drone platforms to sell more integrated products.
The counterargument is equally important. Redwire operates in contract-driven markets where growth can be uneven, large customers have bargaining power, and scaling production consumes cash. Its acquisition-led expansion and substantial increases in shares outstanding make per-share returns materially less certain than the growth narrative suggests.
The most compelling version of the thesis is not simply that the space economy will become enormous. It is that Redwire could eventually operate a profitable, diversified aerospace and defense manufacturing business with better margins, stronger recurring program revenue and less dependence on financing.
Redwire now operates through two business segments. Their economics and growth drivers are different enough that they should be valued separately before applying a consolidated multiple.
| Segment | What it sells | Primary customers | Q2 2026 revenue |
|---|---|---|---|
| Space | Solar arrays, power systems, docking and deployable structures, spacecraft avionics, cameras, sensors, and microgravity infrastructure | NASA, ESA, defense agencies, spacecraft manufacturers and commercial space operators | $55.2M |
| Defense Tech | Stalker and Penguin uncrewed aircraft, Octopus electro-optical/infrared sensors, communications and autonomous systems | U.S. military, NATO allies and other government customers | $61.9M |
Q2 revenue mix: Space 47.1%; Defense Tech 52.9%.
Space systems are complex assemblies in which reliability can matter more than the component's cost. A satellite or spacecraft mission may depend on a solar array, avionics package or docking mechanism operating correctly for years after launch.
Redwire benefits from this requirement because flight qualification creates barriers for new entrants. It is also involved in attractive programs such as NASA's lunar exploration efforts, orbital power generation and commercial space infrastructure.
However, Redwire's space business is not yet demonstrating consistent organic expansion. Revenue in the first half of 2026 was approximately $107.9 million, slightly below the corresponding $108.8 million in 2025.
That stagnation matters. I would not apply a premium space-growth multiple to the entire company based only on the industry's long-term potential when the existing space operation is struggling to generate growth.
The June 2025 Edge Autonomy acquisition changed Redwire's growth profile. Edge brought established uncrewed aerial systems and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment.
Its Stalker and Penguin aircraft support reconnaissance and military operations. The Octopus sensor family provides imaging and surveillance payloads. Unlike an early-stage developer still hoping to win its first military program, Edge has operational products and government customers.
This business could have a stronger near-term growth trajectory than Redwire's original space operations because of expanding demand for unmanned systems. However, a defense equipment contract is not a subscription: orders can be large, irregular and dependent on procurement cycles.
Redwire's defense business provides most of the recent growth and positive segment-level adjusted EBITDA. Its space business provides valuable expertise and strategic optionality but currently weaker economics.
Redwire participates in multiple markets rather than one clearly defined addressable market. Adding together all global defense spending, satellite spending, launch spending and orbital-infrastructure forecasts would overstate the revenue realistically available to the company.
The more relevant opportunities are the portions it can actually supply: military small-UAS platforms and sensors, spacecraft power systems, avionics, deployable structures and mission-specific hardware.
The structural growth drivers are favorable. Governments are increasing investment in uncrewed systems; satellite constellations require more spacecraft components; and commercial operators are exploring additional orbital infrastructure.
Redwire's opportunity is nevertheless constrained by qualification schedules, defense procurement, manufacturing capacity, mission delays and competition from vertically integrated aerospace companies.
I did not find sufficiently comparable product-level market-share figures covering Redwire and its major competitors. A quantitative market-share table would therefore create false precision. Contract awards, backlog conversion, program participation and segment growth are better competitive-position indicators.
| Company / Platform | Primary Position | Relative Scale | Growth Direction | Investment Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Redwire | Specialist space components plus defense UAS | Smaller diversified platform | Acquisition-led growth; Space flat recently | Needs organic growth and profitable backlog conversion |
| AeroVironment | Defense uncrewed systems | Larger established defense-UAS platform | Growth exposure to military autonomy | Direct defense operating benchmark |
| Kratos Defense | Defense technology and unmanned systems | Broader defense manufacturing and programs | Expanding defense autonomy exposure | Direct defense operating benchmark |
| Rocket Lab | Space systems and launch | More integrated space business | Expanding space-systems exposure | Space operating benchmark, not a whole-company match |
Redwire has access to attractive long-run demand, but prospective industry growth should not be mistaken for directly addressable contracted revenue or assured per-share value creation.
For Redwire, customer economics are best evaluated through program margins, repeat orders, working-capital requirements and cash conversion rather than conventional customer-acquisition-cost metrics.
A successful aerospace qualification can lead to repeat orders over a long program life. Redwire's subsequent solar-array awards and new Stalker orders support that possibility.
But customer concentration, variable contract profitability and inventory requirements complicate the model. In the defense business, higher orders may initially require more investment in production and components before generating cash receipts.
The key question is whether each additional dollar of backlog eventually produces incremental operating profit and cash flow, rather than merely requiring additional engineering expenditure, inventory or financing.
| Competitor | Market Share | Positioning | Advantages vs. Company | Disadvantages vs. Company | Current Direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| AeroVironment (AVAV) | Not comparably available | Direct segment: tactical reconnaissance UAS | Larger defense-UAS platform and established program scale | Less broad space-electronics and infrastructure exposure | Relevant defense competitor |
| Kratos Defense (KTOS) | Not comparably available | Adjacent/program-specific unmanned defense; not all tactical UAV requirements | Broader defense programs and manufacturing experience | Less broad space technologies exposure | Relevant defense competitor |
| Anduril (private) | Not comparably available | Direct segment: military autonomy and selected UAS procurements | Integrated software-led military technology ecosystem | Less established space-hardware capability | Competitive pressure in autonomy |
| Northrop Grumman (NOC) | Not comparably available | Segment-specific: spacecraft components; may also buy supplier products | Scale, prime-contractor relationships and engineering resources | Less focus on Redwire's specialist niches and flexibility | Mature prime contractor |
| Voyager Technologies (VOYG) | Not comparably available | Selected space-hardware/program overlap; not all station-development activity | Different exposure to large space-development opportunities | Less mature drone hardware revenue | Adjacent space competitor |
| Rocket Lab (RKLB) | Not comparably available | Direct segment: spacecraft components; launch is outside Redwire scope | Integrated launch-and-space-systems capabilities | Redwire has defense-UAS diversification and no dependence on developing its own launch vehicle | Adjacent space competitor |
Redwire's most meaningful moat comes from specialized engineering, flight heritage, qualification requirements, mission-specific intellectual property and established government relationships.
These advantages can protect individual programs. They do not automatically grant company-wide pricing power, however. Defense agencies often negotiate aggressively, larger prime contractors can control purchasing decisions, and Redwire must continue investing in its technologies.
Moat direction: Stable to strengthening in selected product niches, but not yet proven at the consolidated-company level.
Edge Autonomy adds credible qualifications and customers; sustained margin improvement would provide stronger evidence that these advantages are economically valuable.
Financial reporting periods follow the issuer's fiscal year: completed FY rows plus standalone current-year quarters and cumulative H1/9M for FY2026. Revenue, FCF and SBC are flows; cash is a period-end balance. FCF = operating cash flow minus property/equipment capex from SEC company facts; quarterly FCF after Q1 and any quarterly SBC derived from YTD are visibly marked. Missing values are N/D, not zero. Unit: USD millions. Data extracted from SEC-tagged filings as of 2026-11-07. Company-specific FCF definitions and acquisition effects may require further reconciliation.
| Period | Revenue | Growth | Gross Margin | Operating Margin | FCF | FCF Margin | SBC | Diluted Shares | Cash | Debt |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | $243.8M | — | 23.8% | -6.4% | -$4.4M | -1.8% | $8.7M | 64.7M | — | — |
| FY2024 | $304.1M | 24.7% | 14.6% | -13.9% | -$23.7M | -7.8% | $11.3M | 66.1M | $49.1M | $125.7M |
| FY2025 | $335.4M | 10.3% | 5.2% | -68.5% | -$190.8M | -56.9% | $59.0M | 119.5M | $95.2M | $85.2M |
| Q1 FY2026 | $96.972 | N/D | 26.6% | -71.9% | −$11.421 (derived: CFO - capex) | -11.8% | $46.735 | 193.672 | $144.506 | N/D |
| Q2 FY2026 | $117.074 | N/D | 27.8% | -18.9% | −$33.468 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | -28.6% | $3.9 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | 220.467 | $556.967 | N/D |
| H1 FY2026 | $214.046 | N/D | 27.3% | -42.9% | −$44.889 (derived: CFO - capex) | -21.0% | $50.635 | 207.143 | $556.967 | N/D |
| Q3 FY2026 | $109.035 | N/D | 32.3% | -24.1% | −$65.343 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | -59.9% | $6.31 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | 250.051 | $488.121 | N/D |
| 9M FY2026 | $323.081 | N/D | 29.0% | -36.5% | −$110.232 (derived: CFO - capex) | -34.1% | $56.945 | 221.603 | $488.121 | N/D |
Cash figures above include restricted cash; debt reflects net carrying value.
The first half of 2026 shows a meaningful operational improvement over the severe margin problems of 2025. Nevertheless, historical operating losses, negative free cash flow and unusually high stock-based compensation remain major issues.
Latest-quarter operating indicators:
| Metric | Q2 2026 |
|---|---|
| Revenue | $117.1M (+89.6% year over year) |
| Contracted backlog | $542.1M (+32% vs. Dec 2025) |
| Gross margin | 27.8% |
| Adjusted EBITDA | -$3.2M |
1. Reported growth is largely acquisition-driven. Revenue grew nearly 90% year over year in Q2, but Edge Autonomy was acquired in June 2025. Redwire's original Space segment declined slightly in the first half of 2026. Management expects double-digit future growth in both segments, with faster growth in Defense Tech, but that has not yet been demonstrated on a sustained comparable basis.
2. The balance sheet was repaired through equity issuance. Redwire received approximately $566.2 million in gross proceeds from common-stock issuance during H1 2026, before issuance costs. Its large June cash balance is real and greatly reduces near-term financing risk, but investors paid for that improvement through dilution.
Shares outstanding rose from roughly 191.9 million at December 2025 to 249.2 million at June 2026, an increase of approximately 30% in six months. Per-share growth has a much higher hurdle when the share count expands that quickly.
3. Orders have not yet become dependable free cash flow. H1 operating cash outflow improved to $31.6 million from $132.7 million a year earlier. After capital spending, free cash flow was still negative $44.9 million.
There is a credible path toward better economics as Edge scales. Defense Tech earned approximately $14.1 million in segment adjusted EBITDA in Q2, but the Space segment lost $4.2 million on the same measure, and corporate overhead consumed the remaining earnings.
Management's near-term normalized gross-margin expectation of the low-to-mid-20% range is also important. Extrapolating Q2's 27.8% indefinitely would be aggressive.
Financial direction: Improving, but still unproven. The improvement is material; sustainable positive cash generation and acceptable dilution have not yet been established.
CEO Peter Cannito has pursued a roll-up strategy, bringing together specialized space and defense companies under one public platform. The Edge Autonomy acquisition gives the strategy more industrial scale and a stronger market position in uncrewed defense systems.
The capital-allocation record is more mixed. Redwire has acquired valuable technology and customers, but it has also accumulated losses, recorded asset impairments and repeatedly relied on financing. Management is discussing further acquisitions despite the fact that consolidated free cash flow remains negative.
There is another concern that should not be minimized: Redwire reported material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting at June 30, 2026. These included weaknesses across U.S. operations and its European and acquired defense operations. Management stated that the reported financial statements nevertheless fairly presented results, but the remediation process remains unfinished.
This is not evidence of fraudulent reporting. It does mean that Redwire warrants a larger governance and valuation discount than a comparably sized company with mature financial controls.
Management assessment: Strong strategic ambition and meaningful progress on liquidity, offset by an insufficient record of profitable integration, shareholder-friendly financing and financial-reporting controls.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Price Snapshot | $8.12 — 2026-11-03 regular-session close, America/New_York |
| Market Capitalization | $2.03B |
| Enterprise Value | $1.56B |
| Trailing 12-month revenue | $426.3M |
| Trailing EV / Revenue | 3.66x |
| EV / 2026 guidance midpoint | ~3.28x |
| Price / Free Cash Flow | Not meaningful |
Redwire is no longer priced like an exceptionally expensive speculative space stock. However, an enterprise-value multiple around 3.3 times guided revenue is not obviously cheap for a manufacturer that has yet to establish positive consolidated free cash flow.
EV / trailing revenue, StockAnalysis market-data snapshot, October 22, 2026. Multiples are comparable by measurement convention, not necessarily by business quality.
| Company | Relevance | Public / Private | EV / Trailing Revenue | EV / 2026 Guidance | Growth / Margin / Risk Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Redwire (RDW) | Subject company | Public | 3.66x | ~3.28x | Negative consolidated FCF; defense segment profitable on adjusted EBITDA basis |
| AeroVironment (AVAV) | Direct defense-UAS operating peer | Public | 3.11x | — | Established larger defense-UAS platform |
| Kratos (KTOS) | Adjacent unmanned-defense anchor; procurement classes differ | Public | 3.90x | — | Broader defense programs |
| Anduril | Direct autonomy competitor | Private | N/A — private | N/A — private | Integrated software-led military autonomy |
| Voyager (VOYG) | Selected space-hardware/program overlap; station economics differ | Public | 9.02x | — | Different capital needs and space infrastructure exposure |
| Intuitive Machines (LUNR) | Space contracting valuation anchor | Public | 5.11x | — | Contract-intensive space programs |
| Rocket Lab (RKLB) | Direct spacecraft-component overlap; consolidated launch multiple differs | Public | 36.92x | — | Integrated launch and spacecraft exposure |
AeroVironment and Kratos are more useful starting points than Rocket Lab. They have meaningful exposure to defense programs and unmanned systems, although their product mixes and profitability differ.
Redwire's multiple sits between those two defense peers. That is hard to call a large discount given Redwire's weaker consolidated cash generation and financial controls. The much higher valuations assigned to some space companies reflect different assumptions and should not automatically be transferred to Redwire.
For a company with negative free cash flow and rapidly changing capital structure, I favor a forward enterprise-value approach over assigning a terminal free-cash-flow margin that is not yet observable.
The model values RDW at the end of 2028 using revenue, an EV/revenue multiple, projected net cash, fully diluted shares and a two-year discount back to October 2026. These are independent analyst assumptions, not management guidance.
| Scenario | Key Assumptions | Fair Value | Probability | Probability Rationale | Return From Price Snapshot |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 2028 revenue $520M; exit EV/Sales 2.0x; net cash $250M; 300M shares; 15% discount rate | $3.25 | 25% | Weaker program execution, modest revenue growth, further cash consumption and continuing dilution | -60.0% |
| Base | 2028 revenue $700M; exit EV/Sales 3.5x; net cash $400M; 280M shares; 13% discount rate | $7.97 | 50% | Successful Edge scaling, recovery in Space growth and improving consolidated economics | -1.8% |
| Bull | 2028 revenue $900M; exit EV/Sales 5.0x; net cash $500M; 275M shares; 12% discount rate | $14.49 | 25% | Substantial defense-autonomy expansion, higher margins and a re-rating toward stronger growth peers | +78.4% |
| Probability-Weighted | Weighted three-scenario fair value | $8.42 | 100% | Probability assumptions above | +3.7% |
Fair value = (2028 revenue × exit multiple + projected net cash) ÷ projected shares ÷ (1 + discount rate)². Net cash means cash less debt. The share forecasts incorporate additional potential dilution and are not earnings-per-share forecasts.
Investment zones:
| Zone | Price Range |
|---|---|
| Strong Buy | ≤ $3.58 |
| Buy | Above $3.58 to $6.74 |
| Hold / Watch | Above $6.74 to $9.36 |
| Avoid chasing | Above $9.36 |
The strong-buy threshold is unusually low because the modeled bear case is so adverse. This is intentional: a company with significant downside and uncertain cash generation should require a deeper margin of safety than a mature compounder.
The model is especially sensitive to 2028 revenue, the market's willingness to pay a growth multiple, future financing decisions and cash consumption. A material acquisition would also require rebuilding the valuation.
The August earnings call was particularly useful because analysts challenged the durability of margins, the company's guidance, inventory investment and future acquisition strategy.
| Analyst / Firm | Core Question | Management Response | Research Read-Through |
|---|---|---|---|
| Brian Kinstlinger / Alliance Global Partners | Can 27.8% gross margin persist? What is the current share count? | CFO indicated low-to-mid-20% margins are a better near-term assumption. Management confirmed approximately 250M shares. | The record margin should not be extrapolated; dilution needs careful modeling. |
| Sujeeva De Silva / ROTH | What growth remains when the Edge acquisition comparison normalizes? | CEO expects double-digit opportunities in both segments, with Defense Tech faster. | Organic growth becomes a much more important test in H2 2026 and 2027. |
| Alexandra Mandery / Truist | How durable are bookings? | Awards are inherently lumpy; management highlighted roughly 1.5x trailing book-to-bill. | Backlog is encouraging, but quarter-to-quarter bookings can mislead. |
| Adam Samuelson team / Jefferies | Why maintain such a wide revenue guidance range? | Management cited scaling and approximately 90% visibility to the midpoint. | Good midpoint visibility, but limited clarity on reaching the high end. |
| Colin Canfield / Cantor | Is management planning more acquisitions? | CEO emphasized that M&A remains central and that Edge integration is progressing. | Potential growth accelerator, but another financing or integration risk. |
| Michael Leshock / KeyBanc | Why is inventory increasing so rapidly? | Management is stocking UAS components to reduce delivery lead times and expects further inventory investment. | Cash conversion could lag revenue even during strong demand. |
| Austin Moeller / Canaccord | How large is the international drone opportunity, and what about export controls? | Management cited U.S. and Latvian production, international demand and established export-compliance capabilities; it did not disclose pipeline counts. | International opportunity is credible but difficult to quantify. |
| Griffin Boss / B. Riley | Where are R&D dollars going, and how much additional capital spending is needed? | CEO identified platforms, sensors, microgravity and other strategic priorities without detailed capital-spending figures. | Capital allocation remains broad, and future investment requirements need monitoring. |
| Andrew Steinhart / Bank of America | Which new defense products drive growth? | CEO highlighted Stalker Block 40, Penguin Mk3, new Octopus sensors and potential radio-frequency payload integration. | Cross-selling and product upgrades could strengthen the acquisition thesis, but incremental profitability is not established. |
The biggest unresolved issue is not whether customers want Redwire's products. It is how much capital the company must deploy to fulfill that demand, and how much of the resulting value will accrue to existing shareholders.
The company's announcements since the Q2 earnings release add evidence of demand but have different economic significance.
On October 15, Redwire announced approximately $13.8 million of additional Stalker UAS orders for the U.S. National Guard. These are more tangible than a broad strategic partnership announcement because they have a specified order value.
On October 21, Redwire announced an agreement in principle with EnduroSat to pursue European space infrastructure opportunities. This may expand access to future programs, but an MOU is not equivalent to booked revenue.
Similarly, Redwire's September 24 selection as one of 15 contractors for the $980 million NITE-STAR IDIQ program should not be interpreted as a $980 million order for Redwire. The company expressly stated that the selection carries no guaranteed revenue.
These developments strengthen the evidence of customer interest, especially for Defense Tech. They do not yet justify raising the valuation scenarios without corresponding orders, revenue and margins.
| Driver | Current State | Positive Trigger / Catalyst | Negative Trigger / Falsifier | What It Changes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Space growth | Flat to slightly negative H1 revenue | Sustained double-digit organic growth | Further contraction or major program losses | Organic revenue, consolidated multiple |
| Defense Tech demand | Rapid growth and larger backlog | Repeat drone orders, successful product launches, stronger segment profit | Slower orders, margin deterioration or manufacturing problems | Revenue, competitive moat, base/bull valuation |
| Gross margin | Strong Q2, normalized guidance lower | Sustained mid-to-high-20% margins | Renewed contract overruns and adverse cost-estimate changes | Margin credibility and profitability |
| Free cash flow | Negative but improving | Positive recurring cash flow without equity issuance | Cash consumption persists despite higher revenue | Equity value, dilution assumptions, confidence |
| Dilution and governance | Larger cash balance, substantial historical dilution, material control weaknesses | Stable share count and successful remediation | More dilution without corresponding per-share improvement | Per-share fair value and risk confidence |
The next major checkpoint is the Q3 2026 earnings release, currently estimated for November 4, 2026. I would focus particularly on organic segment growth, inventory, gross-margin normalization and operating cash flow.
| Component | Score | Weight | Weighted Contribution | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Business durability and economics | 55 | 25% | 13.75 | Government programs and mission-critical hardware, but contract volatility and unproven FCF |
| Moat and competitive position | 60 | 25% | 15.00 | Flight heritage, program qualification, specialized technology and Edge products |
| Growth runway and durability | 82 | 20% | 16.40 | Large space and military-UAS opportunity; organic Space growth currently weak |
| Financial quality and balance sheet | 43 | 15% | 6.45 | Improved liquidity, significant dilution, negative FCF and material controls weakness |
| Management, governance and capital allocation | 52 | 15% | 7.80 | Strategic acquisitions but unresolved integration, dilution and controls concerns |
| Quality Score | 59.4 | 100% | 59.40 | High growth potential offset by financial execution risk |
| Component | Raw Input | Normalized Score | Weight | Weighted Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Quality | 59.4 | 59.4 | 30% | 17.8 |
| Probability-weighted upside | +3.7% | 57.4 | 35% | 20.1 |
| Bear-case downside | -60.0% | 0.0 | 20% | 0.0 |
| Risk / valuation confidence | High risk / low confidence | 38.0 | 15% | 5.7 |
| Opportunity Score | 43.6 | 100% | 43.6 |
The main constraint is downside protection. The expected return is slightly positive, but it is insufficient to offset the possibility of a much more adverse outcome.
| Timestamp | Price | Rating | Zone Status | Buy Zone | Strong Buy Zone | Avoid Chasing Above | Base FV | P/W FV | P/W Return | Quality | Opportunity / Rank | Change / Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-22 16:00 EDT | $8.14 | Hold / Watch | Hold / Watch | > $3.58–$6.74 | ≤ $3.58 | > $9.36 | $7.97 | $8.42 | +3.5% | 59.4 / C | 43.4 / provisional #45 | Initial analysis |
I would not initiate a substantial position at $8.14 based on the current evidence. Redwire has valuable products and a promising defense business, but its valuation does not yet provide enough margin of safety for uncertain cash flows, possible dilution and execution risk.
Below approximately $6.75, I would reconsider it as a speculative investment, assuming fundamentals remain intact. A better financial report could also justify a higher fair value and entry zone. The price target is not a prediction that the stock will trade there.
Redwire is worth following. Edge Autonomy materially improved its product portfolio, and the company now has greater financial flexibility and exposure to compelling defense demand. However, the business opportunity looks more attractive than the current stock opportunity. The investment case will be substantially stronger when growth is accompanied by sustainable margins, positive cash flow and a stable share count.
| Source | Type | Date / Period | What It Supports |
|---|---|---|---|
| Redwire Q2 2026 financial results | Company IR | August 2026 | Revenue, segment results, gross margin, backlog, guidance |
| Q2 2026 Form 10-Q | Regulatory filing | June 2026 | Financial statements, cash flow, equity issuance, dilution, internal controls |
| 2025 Form 10-K | Regulatory filing | FY2023–FY2025 | Historical financials, Edge acquisition, governance and business economics |
| Q2 2026 earnings-call transcript | Transcript | August 2026 | Full analyst Q&A, guidance, operating outlook and management commentary |
| RDW valuation statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 | Share price, enterprise value, market capitalization, shares, valuation multiples |
| AVAV valuation statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 | Direct defense peer multiple |
| KTOS valuation statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 | Direct defense peer multiple |
| VOYG valuation statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 | Space-sector valuation anchor |
| LUNR valuation statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 | Space-sector valuation anchor |
| RKLB valuation statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 | Space-sector valuation anchor |
| Stalker National Guard orders | Company IR | October 2026 | Recent funded demand indicators |
| EnduroSat MOU | Company IR | October 2026 | European space partnership |
| NITE-STAR IDIQ selection | Company release | September 2026 | Contract opportunity versus guaranteed revenue |
| SEC XBRL company facts — RDW | Regulatory filing (as tagged) | FY2026, through 2026-09-30 | Current-year standalone-quarter and year-to-date source facts for FCF, SBC, revenue and other reported metrics |
This page presents the saved RDW analysis. Ratings, zones, and opportunity scores shown above are recalculated at its dated reference price using FolioFacts rules; the live Creator Watchlist uses current market prices and can differ. Missing financial data is not estimated.
This publication reflects my personal investment research, thoughts, and opinions only. It is intended strictly for informational and educational purposes and does not constitute personalized investment, legal, tax, or financial advice. Any ratings or views expressed are general analytical opinions, not recommendations tailored to any reader or offers or solicitations to buy or sell any security or financial instrument.
I am not a registered investment adviser, broker-dealer, or financial planner. This content does not take into account your specific investment objectives, financial situation, or risk tolerance. All investments involve substantial risk, including the potential loss of all principal capital. Past performance is never indicative of future results.
While I endeavor to provide accurate information, all data and analysis are provided "as is" without any warranty of accuracy, completeness, or timeliness. You must conduct your own independent due diligence and/or consult with a licensed professional before making any financial decisions. I may hold long or short positions in any of the securities or assets discussed herein at any time without notice.
Quality is price independent. Opportunity combines that quality with scenario-based upside, bear-case protection, and confidence. Ownership and cost basis do not affect these scores. Watchlist rank compares the scored companies in that Watchlist.
Model scores, valuation estimates, and price zones are based on assumptions, not guarantees of future performance or individualized advice. Read our Disclaimer.
25% business durability
25% moat and competitive position
20% growth runway
15% financial quality
15% management and capital allocation
30% Quality Score
35% normalized probability-weighted upside
20% normalized bear-case return
15% risk and valuation confidence
At least 50% upside to P/W fair value, with price no more than 10% above bear-case fair value.
At least 25% upside to P/W fair value, above the Strong Buy boundary.
Modeled return from approximately −10% to below +25%.
More than 10% downside to P/W fair value.
Risk-adjusted view. This framework balances expected upside, downside risk and valuation confidence. Zones may be less reliable for companies priced mainly on future potential rather than current fundamentals.
These prompt a review of the research and Opportunity Score. Watchlist ranks are calculated automatically from the scores currently displayed.