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Price snapshot: 2026-11-04 · Research: 2026-11-04 · Saved analysis, not live market data
Ratings and fair values are independent, dated research opinions—not personalized investment advice. Disclaimer
The reference price is below the probability-weighted fair value.
Dashed marker: reference price $3.95. Scenario values are present fair values, not dated price targets.
3Y revenue CAGR 10%; sustainable 2029 EPS $0.55; 7× P/E; 15% discount; persistent credit losses and weaker BRL
Private-payroll seasoning and weaker capital/FX outcomes remain credible3Y revenue CAGR 22%; sustainable 2029 EPS $1.05; 10× P/E; 15% discount; better monetization and progressing ROE
Improving profitability with controlled provisioning, but still requires proof3Y revenue CAGR 30%; sustainable 2029 EPS $1.45; 13× P/E; 15% discount; stronger primary-bank adoption and sustainable ROE >20%
Durable higher ROE and re-rating are possible but not establishedFolioFacts zones calculated from the saved fair and bear values at the dated reference price. Live zones can change with research.
Inter is already a profitable Brazilian digital bank with meaningful deposit funding, customers and payment activity. Its low-cost distribution and integrated account, cards, credit, investments and insurance can drive revenue per active customer and incremental earnings without proportionate servicing expenses. However, a broad super-app is not a proprietary network, and the bank lacks evidence of an unassailable underwriting or switching-cost moat. It does not need to overtake Nubank or Itaú to compound per-share value: it must grow deposits and loans while producing returns above the true cost of equity.
Reported FY totals, current FY quarters and cumulative YTD are grouped separately.
Scale within group: R$6,000M
Completed FY, standalone current-year quarters and cumulative YTD. No TTM figures.
Each row covers a completed fiscal year. Scale within this group: R$6,600M.
Each annual, quarter and YTD group uses a separate scale. SBC / FCF is a same-period comparison, not a literal employee cash payment. N/M means FCF is zero or negative (or SBC is negative); missing is not zero. Issuer FCF definitions may vary.
Only completed fiscal years and currently open fiscal-year quarters/YTD appear in charts. Standalone quarters and cumulative YTD are separate; missing is never zero. Legacy TTM rows remain in archival source text. The full financial profile below preserves definitions, accounting caveats, and period-end balance details.
This score uses the saved price and research fundamentals. Creator Watchlist calculates the current score and rank using verified market prices.
Watch the evidence behind the thesis, not just the ticker.
Sustained ROE ~18–20%+ with repeatable customer contribution and capital efficiency
ROE settles below required equity returns despite nominal revenue growth
Affects: Long-run justified P/B, EPS and base-case multipleVintage collections and realized loss formation improve without mechanical reporting changes
Further credit cost escalation consumes yield gains or capital
Affects: Bear probability and sustainable EPSDeposit funding stays cheap and sticky through rate cycles; regulatory ratios remain resilient
Rate-sensitive deposit flight, weaker capital or repeated equity dilution
Affects: Moat, confidence and discount rateGreater primary-bank usage and cross-sell at stable service/credit costs
Customer activity fails to translate into earnings or incumbents erase funding advantage
Affects: Moat quality, normalized earnings and multiplesConfirmed facility completion and credit results that support the thesis
Higher-than-feared sales overhang or poor Q3 underwriting indicators
Affects: Near-term volatility, confidence and scenario probabilitiesStrong USD earnings despite FX, acquisition returns above capital cost
Weaker BRL or costly growth/capital deployment dilutes owners
Affects: Per-share USD earnings and capital assumptionsInter is already a profitable Brazilian digital bank with meaningful deposit funding, customers and payment activity. Its low-cost distribution and integrated account, cards, credit, investments and insurance can drive revenue per active customer and incremental earnings without proportionate servicing expenses. However, a broad super-app is not a proprietary network, and the bank lacks evidence of an unassailable underwriting or switching-cost moat. It does not need to overtake Nubank or Itaú to compound per-share value: it must grow deposits and loans while producing returns above the true cost of equity.
The investment debate is whether stronger underlying returns on equity (currently 16.3% for Q2) can emerge as customers mature, or whether rapidly growing private-payroll and credit-card exposures consume the apparent operating leverage through future loss recognition. A significant recent equity selloff also coincides with the October 19–November 17 BDR sales facility; a temporary supply imbalance is plausible but cannot be quantified from the filings.
| Debate | Research judgment |
|---|---|
| Credit-seasoned ROE | Improving customer economics are real but 18–20%+ sustainable ROE is not yet demonstrated |
| Below-book share price | At ~0.85× book, the bank could be fairly priced if persistent ROE falls short of required equity returns; book value is not a liquidation floor |
| BDR conversion selling | Official sales facility is confirmed, but neither the exact stock-price impact nor eventual total sales is known |
| Competitive advantage | 66%-of-CDI funding cost and low-cost payments distribution offer a moderate advantage; Nubank has much higher scale and efficiency |
| Risk and dilution | Private-payroll loss seasoning, capital requirements, BRL depreciation, family voting control and acquisition cash needs could reduce USD per-share returns |
Inter provides digital banking, lending, investments, insurance distribution and related services, primarily in Brazil. Deposits fund a growing credit portfolio, while cards, payments and distribution fees broaden monetization. The platform seeks to become customers' primary financial relationship. Reported gross revenue, net interest income and net revenue have different definitions; deposits and funding liabilities are operating inputs rather than ordinary industrial-company debt.
Inter provides digital banking, lending, investments, insurance distribution and related services, primarily in Brazil. Primary-customer engagement, risk-adjusted NIM, ARPAC, cost to serve, nonperforming loans and return on equity are the key metrics.
Brazil offers a large banking profit pool and substantial digital adoption. Incumbent banks, Nubank and other fintechs compete intensely. Inter's transactional customer reach exceeds its lending penetration, but capturing more credit exposure also means accepting more credit and funding risk. FX matters directly to U.S.-listed shareholders.
Comparable same-definition share data for the subject and its principal rivals were not established. TAM estimates and company-specific volume measures are not treated as directly comparable market shares. The positioning analysis below is more reliable than a table of unmatched percentages.
| Company / Platform | Primary Position | Relative Scale | Growth Direction | Investment Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nu (NU) | Direct in Brazil: digital deposits, cards and consumer credit | Product scope; no matched operating-scale series | Competes for primary banking relationships | Customer choice in the stated segment only |
| Itaú Unibanco (ITUB) | Direct in Brazil: deposits, lending and financial services | Product scope; no matched operating-scale series | Competes for Brazilian financial relationships | Customer choice in the stated segment only |
| Banco do Brasil; Bradesco; Santander Brasil | Direct in Brazil: retail banking and credit | Product scope; no matched operating-scale series | Incumbent alternatives in the same geography | Customer choice in the stated segment only |
FX matters directly to U.S.-listed shareholders. The base case requires evidence of profitable adoption within that market.
Brazilian deposits and lending determine the operating peer set. SoFi is excluded from direct competition because its U.S. franchise does not serve the same core market.
| Competitor | Market Share | Positioning | Advantages vs. Company | Disadvantages vs. Company | Current Direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nu (NU) | No consistent comparable series | Direct in Brazil: digital deposits, cards and consumer credit | Large digital banking customer network | Country mix and credit seasoning differ | Competes for primary banking relationships |
| Itaú Unibanco (ITUB) | No consistent comparable series | Direct in Brazil: deposits, lending and financial services | Established funding, product breadth and distribution | Branch-based cost structure differs from digital Inter | Competes for Brazilian financial relationships |
| Banco do Brasil; Bradesco; Santander Brasil | No consistent comparable series | Direct in Brazil: retail banking and credit | Existing deposit and borrower relationships | Different channel costs and portfolio mixes | Incumbent alternatives in the same geography |
Overall moat: Moderate at best; direction: developing, not yet proven through a full credit cycle. Inter's strongest defensible asset is low-cost deposit funding: funding expense near 66% of CDI at Q2 2026 suggests a useful spread advantage, provided deposits remain sticky as competitors adjust rates. Digital distribution and approximately 9% company-reported Pix transaction share signal meaningful engagement, but Pix is shared payment infrastructure, not an exclusive Inter network effect. The app combines banking, payments, credit, investing and insurance; cross-sell may create modest customer friction, but product features can be copied.
| Potential moat | Assessment | Test |
|---|---|---|
| Deposit funding cost | Moderate | Persistently low cost of funds without unstable rate-sensitive deposits |
| Digital distribution | Moderate | Greater primary-bank engagement at stable acquisition and servicing cost |
| Switching costs | Low–moderate | More recurring multi-product relationships and durable balances |
| Brand | Moderate | Retained transaction share despite Nubank and incumbent responses |
| Underwriting and data | Unproven | Risk-adjusted NIM and through-cycle loss rates across seasoned cohorts |
| Network effects | Weak | Pix is a common Brazilian rail rather than Inter-owned infrastructure |
| Product differentiation | Low–moderate | Better customer economics, not just a wider menu of products |
Nubank's Q2 2026 consolidated ROE (~33%) and efficiency ratio (~19.5%) exceed Inter's 16.3% and 42.1%. Customer and geographic definitions are not directly interchangeable. This gap is a reason not to assume Inter deserves Nubank's valuation multiple. Itaú's broader funding and credit franchise adds a separate incumbent hurdle.
A useful integrated platform and low service costs support a moderate advantage. The direct rivals determine commercial pressure; diversified or sector anchors provide valuation context and are not substitutes for direct competition.
Standardized period history (reviewed 2026-11-07): Completed issuer fiscal years only, plus actually disclosed standalone quarters and cumulative YTD for the latest open FY. Currency BRL, flows in millions, with fiscal dates defined by the issuer. Values marked derived come from disclosed period differences/sums, not TTM. Missing = N/D (not zero). The issuer reports net banking revenue and net income but industrial FCF is not an appropriate distributable-cash metric. The release reports Q2 net income R$421M. Issuer net revenue was R$2,441M in Q1 and approximately R$2,637M in Q2 (H1 approximately R$5,078M), but the historical standardized revenue is a different bank-income definition; these net revenues are excluded from the comparable history table. Standalone revenue and SBC remain N/D pending same-definition reconciliation; no fabricated FCF.
| Period | Revenue | Growth | Gross Margin | Operating Margin | FCF | FCF Margin | SBC | Diluted Shares | Cash | Debt |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2024 | 4,601 | 43.28% | N/A | N/A | -6,475 | N/A | N/D | 439 | 983.2 | 11,929 |
| FY2025 | 5,985 | 30.08% | N/A | N/A | -4,460 | N/A | N/D | 444 | 3,138 | 18,141 |
| Q1 FY2026 | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D |
| Q2 FY2026 | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D |
| H1 FY2026 | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D |
Q2 2026 reported net revenue was ~R$2.64B (+31.7% year over year), net income ~R$421M (+34%), ROE 16.3%, 45.3M total customers and 26.4M active customers. Funding reached ~R$77.2B, with bank-level Basel capital near 14.4%, and risk-adjusted NIM was 5.86%. Net ARPAC of R$35.5 less cost to serve of R$13.2 gives ~R$22.2 of monthly customer contribution before all credit losses and corporate expenses.
The major offset is deteriorating credit quality: 90-day-plus NPLs were about 5.1% versus 4.4% a year earlier; cost of risk ~5.9% versus ~5.0%. Private payroll grew from ~R$0.7B to ~R$2.8B in twelve months. Earlier credit-card write-offs mechanically lowered reported NPLs by ~30 basis points without reducing the underlying economic loss. Do not extrapolate interest yields into permanent profitability before the loan books season.
Industrial FCF and EV/revenue are poor banking valuation measures because loan growth and funding dominate cash flow. The model therefore uses sustainable USD EPS after credit losses and required reinvestment, with Brazil and FX risk reflected in discount-rate and scenario choices.
Bank revenue, cash, debt and operating cash flow follow banking accounting. Industrial EV and CFO-minus-capex multiples are not used. The net revenue series is after financial costs; evaluate credit provisions, capital, funding and sustainable earnings together.
Financial direction: Improving — assess the reported trend alongside dilution and the balance sheet.
Market-data snapshot: 2026-11-04 regular-session close, USD. The total share count, rather than only the publicly floated Class A share count, is used for economic market capitalization. Bank funding and loan-book liabilities make conventional enterprise valuation inappropriate for the investment thesis.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Price Snapshot | $3.95 — 2026-11-04 regular-session close, America/New_York |
| Economic shares outstanding | 441.51M (Class A + other economic classes; provider estimate) |
| Market Capitalization | ~$1.74B ($3.95 × 441.51M) |
| Enterprise Value | N/A — not used for bank equity valuation |
| Trailing P/E | 5.98× |
| Provider forward P/E | 4.86× |
| P/B | 0.85× |
| Price / tangible book | ~1.00× |
| Latest quarterly ROE | 16.3% (Q2 2026) |
Consistent provider and November 4 closing snapshot; consolidated bank ratios are not matched segment profitability. Peer forward earnings use provider estimates, not our independent Inter model.
| Company | Relevance | Public / Private | Trailing P/E | Forward P/E | P/B | Growth / Margin / Risk Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INTR — Inter & Co | Subject: Brazilian accounts, loans, payments | Public | 5.98× | 4.86× | 0.85× | Emerging digital bank; improving ARPAC but payroll credit seasoning |
| NU — Nubank | Direct competitor in Brazilian deposits, cards and consumer lending; larger Latin American footprint | Public | 16.33× | 12.27× | 4.23× | Much higher reported ROE and efficiency; different geography and scale |
| ITUB — Itaú Unibanco | Direct incumbent in Brazilian retail deposits and lending; diversified established bank | Public | 9.30× | 7.67× | 1.76× | Stronger scale, mature distribution and underwriting; different funding mix |
| BBD — Bradesco | Direct incumbent in Brazilian retail accounts, loans and insurance | Public | 5.71× | 4.64× | 0.66× | Lower-priced incumbent proves that below-book alone is not a bargain |
| Banco do Brasil; Santander Brasil | Direct incumbent Brazilian retail credit and deposit alternatives | Public subsidiaries / bank groups | N/D — no matched set | N/D — no matched set | N/D — no matched set | Operating competitors; no unmatched consolidated multiple imputed |
Comparable takeaway: Inter is substantially cheaper than Nubank and Itaú but not than Bradesco. A sustained ROE advantage is required for a deserved premium; a low P/B without returns above the cost of equity is not a margin of safety. As an illustrative Gordon-growth cross-check, P/B = (ROE - g)/(Ke - g); with Ke 18% and long-run g 4%, 16% steady-state ROE implies ~0.86× book, whereas 20% implies ~1.14×. This differs from the separate 15% discount rate in the 2029 scenario valuation and is a sensitivity illustration, not a second independent fair value.
Present equity value is normalized 2029 USD EPS × terminal P/E divided by 1.15^3; no interim dividends included. Revenue-path assumptions and 454.9M forecast economic shares remain from the prior model as transparent scenario scaffolding; EPS and terminal multiples were independently reduced after reassessing credit risk and peer valuations. No 2029 scenario is management guidance or consensus.
| Scenario | Key Assumptions | Fair Value | Probability | Probability Rationale | Return From Price Snapshot |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 3Y revenue CAGR 10%; sustainable 2029 EPS $0.55; 7× P/E; 15% discount; persistent credit losses and weaker BRL | $2.53 | 30% | Private-payroll seasoning and weaker capital/FX outcomes remain credible | -35.9% |
| Base | 3Y revenue CAGR 22%; sustainable 2029 EPS $1.05; 10× P/E; 15% discount; better monetization and progressing ROE | $6.90 | 50% | Improving profitability with controlled provisioning, but still requires proof | +74.7% |
| Bull | 3Y revenue CAGR 30%; sustainable 2029 EPS $1.45; 13× P/E; 15% discount; stronger primary-bank adoption and sustainable ROE >20% | $12.39 | 20% | Durable higher ROE and re-rating are possible but not established | +213.7% |
| Probability-Weighted | 30% × $2.53 + 50% × $6.90 + 20% × $12.39 | $6.69 | 100% | Judgmental scenario mix, no assumed dividend | +69.4% |
Management has improved monetization and efficiency, but confidence in payroll lending must be tested against actual loss emergence rather than projected loan yields. On October 13, Inter announced that Francisco Santos was expected to take the Chief Growth Officer role and Alexandre Riccio's group-level operations responsibilities would include credit and collections; the potential control benefit is not yet measurable. On October 19, an agreement was reported for Banco Inter to acquire Wiz's remaining 39.75% interest in Inter Seguros for approximately R$409.5M, subject to adjustments and approvals. Greater ownership could enhance insurance economics but consumes capital.
Inter's dual-class / controlling-shareholder voting structure limits public shareholders' influence. Continue to monitor effective underwriting controls, risk appetite, capital ratios, funding resilience, acquisition returns and dilution.
The organizational changes may improve execution, but neither appointment nor insurance acquisition establishes superior underwriting performance. Sustained, risk-adjusted ROE and capital discipline matter more than headline loan origination growth.
Analyzed call: Q2 2026, complete material Q&A · Research snapshot: 2026-11-04
The following are original paraphrases of the complete Q2 2026 earnings-call's four material analyst question groups and management responses, not verbatim transcript excerpts. No newer quarterly earnings call was available as of this review.
| Analyst / Firm | Core Question | Management Response | Research Read-Through |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eduardo Rosman / BTG Pactual | Was Q2's improvement in NIM partly due to temporary inflation or indexation timing rather than recurring spread gains? What could happen to NIM and loan-loss provisions as early-stage arrears increase? | Management identified an inflation-linked accounting timing effect and suggested adjusting reported Q1 and Q2 NIM by roughly 15 bps in opposite directions to compare underlying trends. It maintained an expectation for about 40 bps of annual improvement and cost of risk around 6%, subject to loan mix. | Normalize funding and indexation timing and do not extrapolate a single-quarter margin before provisions. |
| Mario Pierry / Bank of America | Can Inter continue near-30% credit growth despite household indebtedness, high rates and the macro cycle, and has government-backed renegotiation substantially improved collection outcomes? | Management pointed to small current lending penetration relative to its customer base and Brazilian market, arguing it can select better borrowers. Its discussion of renegotiation indicated approximately R$100M of program volume and a modest incremental pretax effect, not a broad credit cure. | Long-run loan growth only adds value if mature cohorts earn adequate returns after credit losses. |
| Labarta / Goldman Sachs | How should securities, FX and derivatives income be reconciled with sustainable NIM, and why has the coverage ratio fallen while credit risks are still elevated? | Management described offsetting hedges and reclassifications between securities/derivatives and underlying portfolios. It attributed part of coverage movement toward the mid-130% area to seasonality and payroll-loan loss emergence and indicated an approximate 130–135% band depending on portfolio evolution. | Evaluate consolidated NIM and the coverage/credit-loss trend together, not isolated financial statement lines. |
| Neha Agarwala / HSBC | Why was the credit-card write-off period shortened and how does this affect reported NPLs? Which collection and repricing changes could repair private-payroll credit quality? | Management explained that moving the write-off date from 360 to 330 days mechanically reduced reported consolidated NPLs by about 30 bps, without a corresponding reduction in provisions. It discussed borrower-employer relinking, renegotiation, insurance and tighter origination standards; rate caps restricted some loans. | Apparent NPL improvement may reflect accounting timing rather than real improvement in borrower performance. |
Q2 inflation-linked NIM timing and earlier write-offs both complicate the headline improvements. For Q3, prioritize vintage-level private-payroll collections, risk-adjusted margins, loan-loss coverage and the impact of tighter origination, rather than management confidence alone.
| Source | Type | Date / Period | What It Supports |
|---|---|---|---|
| www.sec.gov | Company IR / earnings filing | Q2 2026 | Latest operating results, guidance, products and financial supplement |
| INTR complete earnings-call transcript | Transcript | Q2 2026 | Prepared remarks and all material Q&A exchanges |
| INTR regular-session historical price | Market data | 2026-10-20 original snapshot | Historical initial ranking price; superseded by November 4 market snapshot |
| INTR valuation statistics | Market data | 2026-10-20 original snapshot | Historical initial comparable ratios; November 4 source row supersedes these values |
| INTR historical income statement | Standardized financial statements | Latest reported period and two preceding fiscal years | Historical income statement; source-native currency and definitions |
| INTR historical balance sheet | Standardized financial statements | Latest reported period and two preceding fiscal years | Historical balance sheet; source-native currency and definitions |
| INTR historical cash flows | Standardized financial statements | Latest reported period and two preceding fiscal years | Historical cash flows; source-native currency and definitions |
| Nu Holdings Ltd. statistics | Comparable-company market data | 2026-10-20 regular close | Peer multiples and financial context; public quote basis |
| Itaú Unibanco statistics | Comparable-company market data | 2026-10-20 regular close | Peer multiples and financial context; public quote basis |
| SoFi Technologies, Inc. statistics | Comparable-company market data | 2026-10-20 regular close | Peer multiples and financial context; public quote basis |
| Inter&Co BDR program notice | Company investor relations | September–November 2026 | BDR options and October 19–November 17 sales-facility period | | BDR sales-facility SEC notice | Regulatory filing | 2026-10-19 | Sales facility mechanism; liquidation timing and unresolved share quantity | | Inter leadership SEC announcement | Regulatory filing | 2026-10-13 | Growth and operations leadership responsibilities | | Wiz / Inter Seguros transaction report | Transaction report | 2026-10-19 | 39.75% minority insurance stake purchase; price and conditions | | NU Q2 2026 earnings release | Peer company results | Q2 2026 | Scale, activity, ROE and efficiency comparison (different geographic bases) | | INTR November 4 statistics | Market data | 2026-11-04 close | Price, 441.51M economic shares, market capitalization, earnings and book multiples | | NU November 4 statistics | Comparable-company market data | 2026-11-04 close | Quoted peer valuation metrics; consolidated Latin American mix | | ITUB November 4 statistics | Comparable-company market data | 2026-11-04 close | Quoted Brazilian bank valuation metrics | | BBD November 4 statistics | Comparable-company market data | 2026-11-04 close | Quoted Brazilian incumbent valuation metrics |
Company: Inter & Co, Inc.
Ticker: INTR
Exchange: Nasdaq
Sector / Industry: Financials / Brazilian digital banking
Template version: 2.7
Research date: 2026-11-04
Valuation / score price snapshot: $3.95 — 2026-11-04 regular-session close, America/New_York
Valuation refresh date: 2026-11-04
Tracking tier: Primary Watchlist
Owned: No
Primary operating period reviewed: Q2 2026
Historical period reviewed: completed FY2024-FY2025; Q1 FY2026, Q2 FY2026, H1 FY2026
Latest investor presentation reviewed: Results release and associated financial tables; no separate slide deck materially used
Latest earnings call reviewed: Q2 2026, complete material Q&A
Latest post-earnings management commentary reviewed: October 13 leadership reorganization; October 19 BDR sales facility and Inter Seguros agreement
Price snapshot date: 2026-11-04
Price snapshot time / timezone: Regular-session close, America/New_York (including exchange half-days)
Competitor / analyst-Q&A audit: 2026-10-28 historical scope correction; 2026-11-04 operating context, valuation and Q&A read-through refreshed.
Company: Inter & Co, Inc.
Ticker: INTR
Exchange: Nasdaq
Sector / Industry: Financials / Brazilian digital banking
Template version: 2.7
Research date: 2026-11-04
Valuation / score price snapshot: $3.95 — 2026-11-04 regular-session close, America/New_York
Valuation refresh date: 2026-11-04
Tracking tier: Primary Watchlist
Owned: No
Primary operating period reviewed: Q2 2026
Historical period reviewed: completed FY2024-FY2025; Q1 FY2026, Q2 FY2026, H1 FY2026
Latest investor presentation reviewed: Results release and associated financial tables; no separate slide deck materially used
Latest earnings call reviewed: Q2 2026, complete material Q&A
Latest post-earnings management commentary reviewed: October 13 leadership reorganization; October 19 BDR sales facility and Inter Seguros agreement
Price snapshot date: 2026-11-04
Price snapshot time / timezone: Regular-session close, America/New_York (including exchange half-days)
Competitor / analyst-Q&A audit: 2026-10-28 historical scope correction; 2026-11-04 operating context, valuation and Q&A read-through refreshed.
Current Review: 2026-11-04
Previous Review: 2026-10-28 (competitor and Q&A audit; original operating assumptions were dated October 21)
Update Trigger: Comprehensive investment and valuation reassessment after the October BDR dislocation; new leadership and insurance developments; revised bank-moat and ROE underwriting.
| Area | Previous View | Current View | Investment Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating fundamentals | Q2 2026 revenue, ARPAC and net income improving, with payroll delinquencies elevated | Same latest quarter; no Q3 earnings available as of November 4 | Business trends unchanged; credit risk receives greater weight |
| Competition and moat | Moderate digital distribution and product moat; stable | Low-cost deposits and distribution are useful, but network effects and switching costs are limited; Nubank substantially more efficient | Higher hurdle to justify a terminal valuation premium |
| Capital and events | General capital/credit monitoring | BDR program conversion creates potential forced supply through November 17; new operations leadership and agreement to acquire insurance minority | Technical dislocation may be temporary, while underwriting and acquisition cash use require monitoring |
| Fair values | Bear $3.42 / Base $9.07 / Bull $17.88; weighted $9.14 | Bear $2.53 / Base $6.90 / Bull $12.39; weighted $6.69 | Central weighted FV declines 26.8% on more conservative EPS and terminal multiples |
| Valuation confidence and risk | 48/100, Medium-High | 42/100, High | Credit seasoning, currency, governance and outcome dispersion warrant additional caution |
| Quality and ranking | 70.9 / B; Opportunity 71.0 / #4 at November 3 close | Quality retained at 70.9 / B; Opportunity 65.4 / #16 after valuation reassessment | Rank is provisional because INTR uses November 4 close while other companies use November 3 closes |
Thesis determination: More conservatively underwritten / weaker valuation confidence, not a newly evidenced decline in Q2 operating performance. No claim is made that the BDR sales facility caused any exact percentage of the stock-price decline. Q3 earnings remain scheduled for November 12.
Substantive valuation refresh (2026-11-04): INTR's November 4 close is updated, and its scenarios, confidence, zones, Opportunity Score and rank are independently reassessed. Other tracked names retain November 3 price snapshots, so the shared rank is provisional until the next complete-universe refresh.
| Metric | Current View |
|---|---|
| Price Snapshot | $3.95 — 2026-11-04 regular-session close, America/New_York |
| Rating / Zone Status | Buy — speculative |
| Bear / Base / Bull Fair Value | $2.53 / $6.90 / $12.39 |
| Scenario Probabilities | 30% / 50% / 20% |
| Probability-Weighted Fair Value | $6.69 |
| Probability-Weighted Expected Return | +69.4% |
| Bear-Case Return | -35.9% |
| Strong Buy Zone | ≤ $2.78 |
| Buy Zone | >$2.78–$5.35 |
| Avoid Chasing Above | > $7.43 |
| Quality Score / Tier | 70.9 / Tier B |
| Opportunity Score / Rank | 65.4 / #16 of 76 (provisional shared rank) |
| Risk Level | High |
| Tracking / Ownership | Primary Watchlist / Not Owned |
Decision rationale: Speculative Buy at $3.95 because cheaper deposits and improving monetization could generate materially higher future ROE, while near-term forced BDR sales may be amplifying price pressure. The discount to reported book value is not a bargain by itself: underwriting must establish higher through-cycle ROE and seasoned credit quality. Confidence is only 42/100, so avoid treating the sharp selloff as a standalone investment catalyst.
Inter is already a profitable Brazilian digital bank with meaningful deposit funding, customers and payment activity. Its low-cost distribution and integrated account, cards, credit, investments and insurance can drive revenue per active customer and incremental earnings without proportionate servicing expenses. However, a broad super-app is not a proprietary network, and the bank lacks evidence of an unassailable underwriting or switching-cost moat. It does not need to overtake Nubank or Itaú to compound per-share value: it must grow deposits and loans while producing returns above the true cost of equity.
The investment debate is whether stronger underlying returns on equity (currently 16.3% for Q2) can emerge as customers mature, or whether rapidly growing private-payroll and credit-card exposures consume the apparent operating leverage through future loss recognition. A significant recent equity selloff also coincides with the October 19–November 17 BDR sales facility; a temporary supply imbalance is plausible but cannot be quantified from the filings.
| Debate | Research judgment |
|---|---|
| Credit-seasoned ROE | Improving customer economics are real but 18–20%+ sustainable ROE is not yet demonstrated |
| Below-book share price | At ~0.85× book, the bank could be fairly priced if persistent ROE falls short of required equity returns; book value is not a liquidation floor |
| BDR conversion selling | Official sales facility is confirmed, but neither the exact stock-price impact nor eventual total sales is known |
| Competitive advantage | 66%-of-CDI funding cost and low-cost payments distribution offer a moderate advantage; Nubank has much higher scale and efficiency |
| Risk and dilution | Private-payroll loss seasoning, capital requirements, BRL depreciation, family voting control and acquisition cash needs could reduce USD per-share returns |
Inter provides digital banking, lending, investments, insurance distribution and related services, primarily in Brazil. Deposits fund a growing credit portfolio, while cards, payments and distribution fees broaden monetization. The platform seeks to become customers' primary financial relationship. Reported gross revenue, net interest income and net revenue have different definitions; deposits and funding liabilities are operating inputs rather than ordinary industrial-company debt.
Inter provides digital banking, lending, investments, insurance distribution and related services, primarily in Brazil. Primary-customer engagement, risk-adjusted NIM, ARPAC, cost to serve, nonperforming loans and return on equity are the key metrics.
Brazil offers a large banking profit pool and substantial digital adoption. Incumbent banks, Nubank and other fintechs compete intensely. Inter's transactional customer reach exceeds its lending penetration, but capturing more credit exposure also means accepting more credit and funding risk. FX matters directly to U.S.-listed shareholders.
Comparable same-definition share data for the subject and its principal rivals were not established. TAM estimates and company-specific volume measures are not treated as directly comparable market shares. The positioning analysis below is more reliable than a table of unmatched percentages.
| Company / Platform | Primary Position | Relative Scale | Growth Direction | Investment Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nu (NU) | Direct in Brazil: digital deposits, cards and consumer credit | Product scope; no matched operating-scale series | Competes for primary banking relationships | Customer choice in the stated segment only |
| Itaú Unibanco (ITUB) | Direct in Brazil: deposits, lending and financial services | Product scope; no matched operating-scale series | Competes for Brazilian financial relationships | Customer choice in the stated segment only |
| Banco do Brasil; Bradesco; Santander Brasil | Direct in Brazil: retail banking and credit | Product scope; no matched operating-scale series | Incumbent alternatives in the same geography | Customer choice in the stated segment only |
FX matters directly to U.S.-listed shareholders. The base case requires evidence of profitable adoption within that market.
Primary-customer engagement, risk-adjusted NIM, ARPAC, cost to serve, nonperforming loans and return on equity are the key metrics. Low acquisition costs are useful only if deposits are durable and lifetime credit losses remain controlled. Do not infer customer profitability from gross ARPAC before provisions and funding expenses.
The economic test is Deposit funding, capital adequacy and FX. Do not infer customer profitability from gross ARPAC before provisions and funding expenses.
Brazilian deposits and lending determine the operating peer set. SoFi is excluded from direct competition because its U.S. franchise does not serve the same core market.
| Competitor | Market Share | Positioning | Advantages vs. Company | Disadvantages vs. Company | Current Direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nu (NU) | No consistent comparable series | Direct in Brazil: digital deposits, cards and consumer credit | Large digital banking customer network | Country mix and credit seasoning differ | Competes for primary banking relationships |
| Itaú Unibanco (ITUB) | No consistent comparable series | Direct in Brazil: deposits, lending and financial services | Established funding, product breadth and distribution | Branch-based cost structure differs from digital Inter | Competes for Brazilian financial relationships |
| Banco do Brasil; Bradesco; Santander Brasil | No consistent comparable series | Direct in Brazil: retail banking and credit | Existing deposit and borrower relationships | Different channel costs and portfolio mixes | Incumbent alternatives in the same geography |
Overall moat: Moderate at best; direction: developing, not yet proven through a full credit cycle. Inter's strongest defensible asset is low-cost deposit funding: funding expense near 66% of CDI at Q2 2026 suggests a useful spread advantage, provided deposits remain sticky as competitors adjust rates. Digital distribution and approximately 9% company-reported Pix transaction share signal meaningful engagement, but Pix is shared payment infrastructure, not an exclusive Inter network effect. The app combines banking, payments, credit, investing and insurance; cross-sell may create modest customer friction, but product features can be copied.
| Potential moat | Assessment | Test |
|---|---|---|
| Deposit funding cost | Moderate | Persistently low cost of funds without unstable rate-sensitive deposits |
| Digital distribution | Moderate | Greater primary-bank engagement at stable acquisition and servicing cost |
| Switching costs | Low–moderate | More recurring multi-product relationships and durable balances |
| Brand | Moderate | Retained transaction share despite Nubank and incumbent responses |
| Underwriting and data | Unproven | Risk-adjusted NIM and through-cycle loss rates across seasoned cohorts |
| Network effects | Weak | Pix is a common Brazilian rail rather than Inter-owned infrastructure |
| Product differentiation | Low–moderate | Better customer economics, not just a wider menu of products |
Nubank's Q2 2026 consolidated ROE (~33%) and efficiency ratio (~19.5%) exceed Inter's 16.3% and 42.1%. Customer and geographic definitions are not directly interchangeable. This gap is a reason not to assume Inter deserves Nubank's valuation multiple. Itaú's broader funding and credit franchise adds a separate incumbent hurdle.
A useful integrated platform and low service costs support a moderate advantage. The direct rivals determine commercial pressure; diversified or sector anchors provide valuation context and are not substitutes for direct competition.
Standardized period history (reviewed 2026-11-07): Completed issuer fiscal years only, plus actually disclosed standalone quarters and cumulative YTD for the latest open FY. Currency BRL, flows in millions, with fiscal dates defined by the issuer. Values marked derived come from disclosed period differences/sums, not TTM. Missing = N/D (not zero). The issuer reports net banking revenue and net income but industrial FCF is not an appropriate distributable-cash metric. The release reports Q2 net income R$421M. Issuer net revenue was R$2,441M in Q1 and approximately R$2,637M in Q2 (H1 approximately R$5,078M), but the historical standardized revenue is a different bank-income definition; these net revenues are excluded from the comparable history table. Standalone revenue and SBC remain N/D pending same-definition reconciliation; no fabricated FCF.
| Period | Revenue | Growth | Gross Margin | Operating Margin | FCF | FCF Margin | SBC | Diluted Shares | Cash | Debt |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2024 | 4,601 | 43.28% | N/A | N/A | -6,475 | N/A | N/D | 439 | 983.2 | 11,929 |
| FY2025 | 5,985 | 30.08% | N/A | N/A | -4,460 | N/A | N/D | 444 | 3,138 | 18,141 |
| Q1 FY2026 | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D |
| Q2 FY2026 | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D |
| H1 FY2026 | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D | N/D |
Q2 2026 reported net revenue was ~R$2.64B (+31.7% year over year), net income ~R$421M (+34%), ROE 16.3%, 45.3M total customers and 26.4M active customers. Funding reached ~R$77.2B, with bank-level Basel capital near 14.4%, and risk-adjusted NIM was 5.86%. Net ARPAC of R$35.5 less cost to serve of R$13.2 gives ~R$22.2 of monthly customer contribution before all credit losses and corporate expenses.
The major offset is deteriorating credit quality: 90-day-plus NPLs were about 5.1% versus 4.4% a year earlier; cost of risk ~5.9% versus ~5.0%. Private payroll grew from ~R$0.7B to ~R$2.8B in twelve months. Earlier credit-card write-offs mechanically lowered reported NPLs by ~30 basis points without reducing the underlying economic loss. Do not extrapolate interest yields into permanent profitability before the loan books season.
Industrial FCF and EV/revenue are poor banking valuation measures because loan growth and funding dominate cash flow. The model therefore uses sustainable USD EPS after credit losses and required reinvestment, with Brazil and FX risk reflected in discount-rate and scenario choices.
Bank revenue, cash, debt and operating cash flow follow banking accounting. Industrial EV and CFO-minus-capex multiples are not used. The net revenue series is after financial costs; evaluate credit provisions, capital, funding and sustainable earnings together.
Financial direction: Improving — assess the reported trend alongside dilution and the balance sheet.
Management has improved monetization and efficiency, but confidence in payroll lending must be tested against actual loss emergence rather than projected loan yields. On October 13, Inter announced that Francisco Santos was expected to take the Chief Growth Officer role and Alexandre Riccio's group-level operations responsibilities would include credit and collections; the potential control benefit is not yet measurable. On October 19, an agreement was reported for Banco Inter to acquire Wiz's remaining 39.75% interest in Inter Seguros for approximately R$409.5M, subject to adjustments and approvals. Greater ownership could enhance insurance economics but consumes capital.
Inter's dual-class / controlling-shareholder voting structure limits public shareholders' influence. Continue to monitor effective underwriting controls, risk appetite, capital ratios, funding resilience, acquisition returns and dilution.
The organizational changes may improve execution, but neither appointment nor insurance acquisition establishes superior underwriting performance. Sustained, risk-adjusted ROE and capital discipline matter more than headline loan origination growth.
Market-data snapshot: 2026-11-04 regular-session close, USD. The total share count, rather than only the publicly floated Class A share count, is used for economic market capitalization. Bank funding and loan-book liabilities make conventional enterprise valuation inappropriate for the investment thesis.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Price Snapshot | $3.95 — 2026-11-04 regular-session close, America/New_York |
| Economic shares outstanding | 441.51M (Class A + other economic classes; provider estimate) |
| Market Capitalization | ~$1.74B ($3.95 × 441.51M) |
| Enterprise Value | N/A — not used for bank equity valuation |
| Trailing P/E | 5.98× |
| Provider forward P/E | 4.86× |
| P/B | 0.85× |
| Price / tangible book | ~1.00× |
| Latest quarterly ROE | 16.3% (Q2 2026) |
Consistent provider and November 4 closing snapshot; consolidated bank ratios are not matched segment profitability. Peer forward earnings use provider estimates, not our independent Inter model.
| Company | Relevance | Public / Private | Trailing P/E | Forward P/E | P/B | Growth / Margin / Risk Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| INTR — Inter & Co | Subject: Brazilian accounts, loans, payments | Public | 5.98× | 4.86× | 0.85× | Emerging digital bank; improving ARPAC but payroll credit seasoning |
| NU — Nubank | Direct competitor in Brazilian deposits, cards and consumer lending; larger Latin American footprint | Public | 16.33× | 12.27× | 4.23× | Much higher reported ROE and efficiency; different geography and scale |
| ITUB — Itaú Unibanco | Direct incumbent in Brazilian retail deposits and lending; diversified established bank | Public | 9.30× | 7.67× | 1.76× | Stronger scale, mature distribution and underwriting; different funding mix |
| BBD — Bradesco | Direct incumbent in Brazilian retail accounts, loans and insurance | Public | 5.71× | 4.64× | 0.66× | Lower-priced incumbent proves that below-book alone is not a bargain |
| Banco do Brasil; Santander Brasil | Direct incumbent Brazilian retail credit and deposit alternatives | Public subsidiaries / bank groups | N/D — no matched set | N/D — no matched set | N/D — no matched set | Operating competitors; no unmatched consolidated multiple imputed |
Comparable takeaway: Inter is substantially cheaper than Nubank and Itaú but not than Bradesco. A sustained ROE advantage is required for a deserved premium; a low P/B without returns above the cost of equity is not a margin of safety. As an illustrative Gordon-growth cross-check, P/B = (ROE - g)/(Ke - g); with Ke 18% and long-run g 4%, 16% steady-state ROE implies ~0.86× book, whereas 20% implies ~1.14×. This differs from the separate 15% discount rate in the 2029 scenario valuation and is a sensitivity illustration, not a second independent fair value.
Present equity value is normalized 2029 USD EPS × terminal P/E divided by 1.15^3; no interim dividends included. Revenue-path assumptions and 454.9M forecast economic shares remain from the prior model as transparent scenario scaffolding; EPS and terminal multiples were independently reduced after reassessing credit risk and peer valuations. No 2029 scenario is management guidance or consensus.
| Scenario | Key Assumptions | Fair Value | Probability | Probability Rationale | Return From Price Snapshot |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | 3Y revenue CAGR 10%; sustainable 2029 EPS $0.55; 7× P/E; 15% discount; persistent credit losses and weaker BRL | $2.53 | 30% | Private-payroll seasoning and weaker capital/FX outcomes remain credible | -35.9% |
| Base | 3Y revenue CAGR 22%; sustainable 2029 EPS $1.05; 10× P/E; 15% discount; better monetization and progressing ROE | $6.90 | 50% | Improving profitability with controlled provisioning, but still requires proof | +74.7% |
| Bull | 3Y revenue CAGR 30%; sustainable 2029 EPS $1.45; 13× P/E; 15% discount; stronger primary-bank adoption and sustainable ROE >20% | $12.39 | 20% | Durable higher ROE and re-rating are possible but not established | +213.7% |
| Probability-Weighted | 30% × $2.53 + 50% × $6.90 + 20% × $12.39 | $6.69 | 100% | Judgmental scenario mix, no assumed dividend | +69.4% |
The following are original paraphrases of the complete Q2 2026 earnings-call's four material analyst question groups and management responses, not verbatim transcript excerpts. No newer quarterly earnings call was available as of this review.
| Analyst / Firm | Core Question | Management Response | Research Read-Through |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eduardo Rosman / BTG Pactual | Was Q2's improvement in NIM partly due to temporary inflation or indexation timing rather than recurring spread gains? What could happen to NIM and loan-loss provisions as early-stage arrears increase? | Management identified an inflation-linked accounting timing effect and suggested adjusting reported Q1 and Q2 NIM by roughly 15 bps in opposite directions to compare underlying trends. It maintained an expectation for about 40 bps of annual improvement and cost of risk around 6%, subject to loan mix. | Normalize funding and indexation timing and do not extrapolate a single-quarter margin before provisions. |
| Mario Pierry / Bank of America | Can Inter continue near-30% credit growth despite household indebtedness, high rates and the macro cycle, and has government-backed renegotiation substantially improved collection outcomes? | Management pointed to small current lending penetration relative to its customer base and Brazilian market, arguing it can select better borrowers. Its discussion of renegotiation indicated approximately R$100M of program volume and a modest incremental pretax effect, not a broad credit cure. | Long-run loan growth only adds value if mature cohorts earn adequate returns after credit losses. |
| Labarta / Goldman Sachs | How should securities, FX and derivatives income be reconciled with sustainable NIM, and why has the coverage ratio fallen while credit risks are still elevated? | Management described offsetting hedges and reclassifications between securities/derivatives and underlying portfolios. It attributed part of coverage movement toward the mid-130% area to seasonality and payroll-loan loss emergence and indicated an approximate 130–135% band depending on portfolio evolution. | Evaluate consolidated NIM and the coverage/credit-loss trend together, not isolated financial statement lines. |
| Neha Agarwala / HSBC | Why was the credit-card write-off period shortened and how does this affect reported NPLs? Which collection and repricing changes could repair private-payroll credit quality? | Management explained that moving the write-off date from 360 to 330 days mechanically reduced reported consolidated NPLs by about 30 bps, without a corresponding reduction in provisions. It discussed borrower-employer relinking, renegotiation, insurance and tighter origination standards; rate caps restricted some loans. | Apparent NPL improvement may reflect accounting timing rather than real improvement in borrower performance. |
Q2 inflation-linked NIM timing and earlier write-offs both complicate the headline improvements. For Q3, prioritize vintage-level private-payroll collections, risk-adjusted margins, loan-loss coverage and the impact of tighter origination, rather than management confidence alone.
| Driver | Current State | Positive Trigger / Catalyst | Negative Trigger / Falsifier | What It Changes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sustainable ROE and ARPAC | Q2 ROE 16.3%; net ARPAC R$35.5 and cost to serve R$13.2 | Sustained ROE ~18–20%+ with repeatable customer contribution and capital efficiency | ROE settles below required equity returns despite nominal revenue growth | Long-run justified P/B, EPS and base-case multiple |
| Payroll and credit-card loan seasoning | NPL 90+ ~5.1%; cost of risk ~5.9%; payroll delinquencies elevated; card write-offs moved earlier | Vintage collections and realized loss formation improve without mechanical reporting changes | Further credit cost escalation consumes yield gains or capital | Bear probability and sustainable EPS |
| Funding quality and capitalization | Funding ~R$77.2B; cost ~66% of CDI; Basel ratio ~14.4% | Deposit funding stays cheap and sticky through rate cycles; regulatory ratios remain resilient | Rate-sensitive deposit flight, weaker capital or repeated equity dilution | Moat, confidence and discount rate |
| Competitive advantage | Moderate funding/distribution moat; much smaller and less efficient than Nubank | Greater primary-bank usage and cross-sell at stable service/credit costs | Customer activity fails to translate into earnings or incumbents erase funding advantage | Moat quality, normalized earnings and multiples |
| BDR conversion supply and next earnings | Sales facility October 19–November 17; Q3 earnings scheduled November 12 | Confirmed facility completion and credit results that support the thesis | Higher-than-feared sales overhang or poor Q3 underwriting indicators | Near-term volatility, confidence and scenario probabilities |
| FX and capital allocation | USD shares exposed to BRL earnings translation; insurance-stake purchase agreed | Strong USD earnings despite FX, acquisition returns above capital cost | Weaker BRL or costly growth/capital deployment dilutes owners | Per-share USD earnings and capital assumptions |
| Component | Score | Weight | Weighted Contribution | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Business durability and economics | 72 | 25% | 18.0 | Profitability and customer contribution improving, but sustainable ROE depends on loan seasoning and stable low-cost deposits. |
| Moat and competitive position | 65 | 25% | 16.3 | Moderate funding/distribution advantages; weak proprietary network effects, limited switching costs and unproven credit-cycle underwriting. |
| Growth runway and durability | 85 | 20% | 17.0 | Brazil offers a large banking profit pool and substantial digital adoption. |
| Financial quality and balance sheet | 66 | 15% | 9.9 | Q2 gross revenue was approximately R$4.6 billion and net revenue R$2.6 billion. |
| Management, governance and capital allocation | 65 | 15% | 9.8 | Management has improved monetization and efficiency. |
| Quality Score | 70.9 | 100% | 70.9 | Weighted score, independent of ownership and current price |
| Component | Raw Input | Normalized Score | Weight | Weighted Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Quality | 70.9 | 70.9 | 30% | 21.3 |
| Probability-weighted upside | +69.4% | 100.0 | 35% | 35.0 |
| Bear-case downside | -35.9% | 14.1 | 20% | 2.8 |
| Risk / valuation confidence | 42 | 42.0 | 15% | 6.3 |
| Opportunity Score | 65.4 | 100% | 65.4 |
my_watchlist.mdportfolio/holdings.md| Timestamp | Price | Rating | Zone Status | Buy Zone | Strong Buy Zone | Avoid Chasing Above | Base FV | P/W FV | P/W Return | Quality | Opportunity / Rank | Change / Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-21 (America/New_York) | $7.26 | Buy | Buy | >$3.76–$7.31 | ≤ $3.76 | > $10.16 | $9.07 | $9.14 | +25.9% | 70.9 | 63.5 / #17 | Initial missing-file analysis; common-universe ranking; independent scenario assumptions |
| 2026-11-04 close (fundamental and valuation refresh) | $3.95 | Buy — speculative | Buy | >$2.78–$5.35 | ≤ $2.78 | > $7.43 | $6.90 | $6.69 | +69.4% | 70.9 | 65.4 / #16 | Underwritten lower USD EPS and terminal multiples; credit/competition/high risk lower confidence 48→42; near-term BDR sales; mixed-date rank provisional |
| Source | Type | Date / Period | What It Supports |
|---|---|---|---|
| www.sec.gov | Company IR / earnings filing | Q2 2026 | Latest operating results, guidance, products and financial supplement |
| INTR complete earnings-call transcript | Transcript | Q2 2026 | Prepared remarks and all material Q&A exchanges |
| INTR regular-session historical price | Market data | 2026-10-20 original snapshot | Historical initial ranking price; superseded by November 4 market snapshot |
| INTR valuation statistics | Market data | 2026-10-20 original snapshot | Historical initial comparable ratios; November 4 source row supersedes these values |
| INTR historical income statement | Standardized financial statements | Latest reported period and two preceding fiscal years | Historical income statement; source-native currency and definitions |
| INTR historical balance sheet | Standardized financial statements | Latest reported period and two preceding fiscal years | Historical balance sheet; source-native currency and definitions |
| INTR historical cash flows | Standardized financial statements | Latest reported period and two preceding fiscal years | Historical cash flows; source-native currency and definitions |
| Nu Holdings Ltd. statistics | Comparable-company market data | 2026-10-20 regular close | Peer multiples and financial context; public quote basis |
| Itaú Unibanco statistics | Comparable-company market data | 2026-10-20 regular close | Peer multiples and financial context; public quote basis |
| SoFi Technologies, Inc. statistics | Comparable-company market data | 2026-10-20 regular close | Peer multiples and financial context; public quote basis |
| Inter&Co BDR program notice | Company investor relations | September–November 2026 | BDR options and October 19–November 17 sales-facility period | | BDR sales-facility SEC notice | Regulatory filing | 2026-10-19 | Sales facility mechanism; liquidation timing and unresolved share quantity | | Inter leadership SEC announcement | Regulatory filing | 2026-10-13 | Growth and operations leadership responsibilities | | Wiz / Inter Seguros transaction report | Transaction report | 2026-10-19 | 39.75% minority insurance stake purchase; price and conditions | | NU Q2 2026 earnings release | Peer company results | Q2 2026 | Scale, activity, ROE and efficiency comparison (different geographic bases) | | INTR November 4 statistics | Market data | 2026-11-04 close | Price, 441.51M economic shares, market capitalization, earnings and book multiples | | NU November 4 statistics | Comparable-company market data | 2026-11-04 close | Quoted peer valuation metrics; consolidated Latin American mix | | ITUB November 4 statistics | Comparable-company market data | 2026-11-04 close | Quoted Brazilian bank valuation metrics | | BBD November 4 statistics | Comparable-company market data | 2026-11-04 close | Quoted Brazilian incumbent valuation metrics |
This page presents the saved INTR analysis. Ratings, zones, and opportunity scores shown above are recalculated at its dated reference price using FolioFacts rules; the live Creator Watchlist uses current market prices and can differ. Missing financial data is not estimated.
This publication reflects my personal investment research, thoughts, and opinions only. It is intended strictly for informational and educational purposes and does not constitute personalized investment, legal, tax, or financial advice. Any ratings or views expressed are general analytical opinions, not recommendations tailored to any reader or offers or solicitations to buy or sell any security or financial instrument.
I am not a registered investment adviser, broker-dealer, or financial planner. This content does not take into account your specific investment objectives, financial situation, or risk tolerance. All investments involve substantial risk, including the potential loss of all principal capital. Past performance is never indicative of future results.
While I endeavor to provide accurate information, all data and analysis are provided "as is" without any warranty of accuracy, completeness, or timeliness. You must conduct your own independent due diligence and/or consult with a licensed professional before making any financial decisions. I may hold long or short positions in any of the securities or assets discussed herein at any time without notice.
Quality is price independent. Opportunity combines that quality with scenario-based upside, bear-case protection, and confidence. Ownership and cost basis do not affect these scores. Watchlist rank compares the scored companies in that Watchlist.
Model scores, valuation estimates, and price zones are based on assumptions, not guarantees of future performance or individualized advice. Read our Disclaimer.
25% business durability
25% moat and competitive position
20% growth runway
15% financial quality
15% management and capital allocation
30% Quality Score
35% normalized probability-weighted upside
20% normalized bear-case return
15% risk and valuation confidence
At least 50% upside to P/W fair value, with price no more than 10% above bear-case fair value.
At least 25% upside to P/W fair value, above the Strong Buy boundary.
Modeled return from approximately −10% to below +25%.
More than 10% downside to P/W fair value.
Risk-adjusted view. This framework balances expected upside, downside risk and valuation confidence. Zones may be less reliable for companies priced mainly on future potential rather than current fundamentals.
These prompt a review of the research and Opportunity Score. Watchlist ranks are calculated automatically from the scores currently displayed.