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Price snapshot: 2026-11-03 · Research: 2026-10-22 · Saved analysis, not live market data
Ratings and fair values are independent, dated research opinions—not personalized investment advice. Disclaimer
The reference price is below the probability-weighted fair value.
Dashed marker: reference price $297.20. Scenario values are present fair values, not dated price targets.
$14 EPS × 13×; deal activity weakens, hiring costs pressure margins
Meaningful M&A/compensation downside$19 EPS × 16×; moderate advisory growth, recovering banker productivity
Growing franchise without peak-cycle extrapolation$24 EPS × 19×; sustained large-cap M&A boom, broadening revenue, operating leverage
Strong M&A and recruitment productivity must coincideFolioFacts zones calculated from the saved fair and bear values at the dated reference price. Live zones can change with research.
Evercore has spent the past decade building an advisory franchise capable of competing for transactions traditionally dominated by the largest global banks. The company combines high-value M&A advice with expanding capabilities in private capital, restructuring, capital markets, and institutional equities.
Reported FY totals, current FY quarters and cumulative YTD are grouped separately.
Scale within group: $4,000M
Scale within group: $1,600M
Scale within group: $3,600M
Completed FY, standalone current-year quarters and cumulative YTD. No TTM figures.
Each row covers a completed fiscal year. Scale within this group: $1,200M.
Each row covers an independent quarter; derived cash flow is labeled. Scale within this group: $660M.
YTD totals overlap the quarters above and must not be added to them. Scale within this group: $940M.
Each annual, quarter and YTD group uses a separate scale. SBC / FCF is a same-period comparison, not a literal employee cash payment. N/M means FCF is zero or negative (or SBC is negative); missing is not zero. Issuer FCF definitions may vary.
Only completed fiscal years and currently open fiscal-year quarters/YTD appear in charts. Standalone quarters and cumulative YTD are separate; missing is never zero. Legacy TTM rows remain in archival source text. The full financial profile below preserves definitions, accounting caveats, and period-end balance details.
This score uses the saved price and research fundamentals. Creator Watchlist calculates the current score and rank using verified market prices.
Watch the evidence behind the thesis, not just the ticker.
Recovery expands to sponsors and midcap deals
Transaction announcements and completions weaken
Affects: Revenue and normalized EPSHigher fees per mature banker
Compensation growth persistently exceeds revenue growth
Affects: Margins and QualitySustained new mandates and profitable integration
Integration costs exceed incremental fees
Affects: Earnings growthMore secondary and continuation-vehicle volume
Meaningful loss of business or pricing power
Affects: Growth and moatCosts normalize toward management targets
Persistently higher structural cost ratio
Affects: Base-case earningsLower net dilution and better repurchase execution
Buybacks consume cash without growing per-share value
Affects: Valuation confidenceBroad financing and transaction recovery
Credit tightening or prolonged macro uncertainty
Affects: Bear-case probabilityEvercore has spent the past decade building an advisory franchise capable of competing for transactions traditionally dominated by the largest global banks. The company combines high-value M&A advice with expanding capabilities in private capital, restructuring, capital markets, and institutional equities.
Its growth strategy has two components. First, it hires senior bankers with established relationships and industry expertise, giving them access to Evercore's global platform. Second, it increases the revenue opportunities available to those bankers by expanding its product capabilities and geographic reach.
This creates a potentially attractive cycle: more bankers and services lead to more client mandates, which improve Evercore's reputation and recruiting appeal.
The central challenge is that bankers are expensive before their revenue pipelines mature. If transaction activity disappoints, the company bears substantial compensation and infrastructure costs without receiving the expected fees.
The stock's valuation appears to discount the possibility that recent advisory earnings are near a cyclical peak. At 14.4 times trailing earnings, investors are not paying the premium typically associated with a rapidly growing, capital-light financial franchise.
There are three competing explanations for that valuation:
The thesis favors the first explanation over a multiyear horizon, while assigning meaningful probability to the second and third.
Evercore operates through two reporting segments: Investment Banking & Equities and Investment Management. The first accounts for the overwhelming majority of consolidated revenue.
| Business | What Evercore provides | Revenue model | Strategic importance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic advisory | M&A, divestitures, shareholder defense, strategic transactions | Retainers and transaction completion fees | Core earnings engine |
| Restructuring & liability management | Debt restructuring, recapitalizations, distressed situations | Advisory and transaction fees | Adds opportunities outside conventional M&A |
| Private Capital Advisory | PE secondary transactions, continuation vehicles, fundraising | Placement and advisory fees | Important structural growth business |
| Equity capital markets | Equity underwriting and capital raising | Underwriting fees | Diversifies revenue; market-sensitive |
| Equities | Institutional research, sales and agency execution | Trading commissions and research-related revenue | Supports corporate and institutional relationships |
| Investment Management | Wealth management and other investment interests | AUM-based fees and investment income | Small recurring-revenue component |
Consider a corporation considering a $20 billion acquisition.
Evercore may help determine the target's value, negotiate transaction terms, structure financing alternatives, assess strategic risks, and obtain board approval. The bank can receive an advisory fee tied partly to successful completion.
That makes the economics very different from lending. Evercore does not generally need to fund the $20 billion acquisition from its own balance sheet. Its financial exposure is primarily the cost of maintaining the professionals required to originate and execute the mandate.
However, successful advisory engagements can take months or years, and a canceled transaction can eliminate a substantial expected completion fee.
The business therefore combines low physical capital intensity with highly variable revenue recognition.
In Q2 2026, advisory revenue was approximately $776 million, underwriting revenue $97 million, and commissions $64 million. Wealth management fees contributed roughly $24 million.
Evercore also reports that more than 40% of adjusted revenue for the latest quarter came from activities it classifies as non-M&A. That broader internal definition includes several private-capital, restructuring, and capital-raising activities recorded within GAAP advisory revenue.
This distinction matters because Evercore is no longer simply a traditional M&A boutique. Nevertheless, most of its activities remain sensitive to transaction and capital-market conditions.
A very attractive capital-light operating model, with diversification improving but not eliminating cyclicality.
LSEG reports that global announced M&A value reached approximately $2.85 trillion in H1 2026, an all-time first-half high. Yet transaction counts declined to a six-year low.
This is particularly important for Evercore.
The industry is experiencing strength in high-value strategic transactions without a correspondingly broad recovery in activity across smaller transactions.
Large transactions generally require sophisticated advisers, specialized regulatory knowledge, and significant execution resources. Evercore is exceptionally well positioned in this category.
But concentration also means fewer enormous transactions can explain a disproportionately large share of an investment bank's quarterly fees.
Evercore's Q2 2026 shareholder presentation reports that the firm ranked first in advisory revenue among independent investment banks, and third among all firms, for the latest four-quarter period. It also reports being first among independent investment banks in global M&A league tables over three-, five-, and ten-year periods.
These are company-presented rankings using defined peer and transaction methodologies. They should not be interpreted as an independently verified percentage of the entire global investment-banking market.
A consistently defined public dataset for global market shares across every major advisory competitor is not available here. Relative advisory scale is therefore more informative than manufacturing a market-share percentage.
| Company / Platform | Primary Position | Relative Scale | Growth Direction | Investment Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Evercore | Leading independent strategic adviser | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Large-cap M&A franchise, senior relationships, advisory breadth |
| Goldman Sachs | Global diversified investment bank | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Lending, trading, financing and broader client ecosystem |
| JPMorgan | Global diversified investment bank | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Extensive corporate relationships and financing capabilities |
| PJT Partners | Independent advisory specialist | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Restructuring, strategic advisory, private capital |
| Houlihan Lokey | Independent advisory specialist | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Restructuring leadership and middle-market reach |
| Lazard | Global advisory and asset management | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Established international relationships, restructuring |
| Centerview Partners | Private independent adviser | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Prestigious large-cap strategic M&A franchise |
| Rothschild & Co | Private global advisory group | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Strong European and cross-border advisory network |
Evercore has opportunities to expand through international advisory coverage, private-equity secondary transactions, restructuring, underwriting and specialist industry teams.
European expansion is particularly interesting following the Robey Warshaw acquisition. The company is also investing in Frankfurt, Stockholm, Milan, and Paris.
A single dollar TAM would not be informative for these businesses. The addressable market changes with transaction values, deal activity, financing structures, and advisory fee rates. A more useful test is whether Evercore can consistently grow advisory revenue faster than the broader relevant fee pool.
Favorable long-term opportunity, with near-term benefits skewed toward firms able to win large strategic transactions.
| Competitor | Market Share | Positioning | Advantages vs. Company | Disadvantages vs. Company | Current Direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Goldman Sachs | Not comparable on a consistent global definition | Universal global investment bank | Financing capabilities, scale, corporate reach | Less-focused independent advisory positioning | Intense competition |
| JPMorgan | Not comparable | Universal global investment bank | Lending relationships, global breadth | Greater balance-sheet dependence | Intense competition |
| PJT Partners | Not comparable | Independent specialist | Strong restructuring and sponsor specialization | Smaller broad-based advisory revenue franchise | Growing specialist competition |
| Houlihan Lokey | Not comparable | Restructuring and midmarket specialist | Restructuring and middle-market depth | Less exposure to mega strategic transactions | Both expanding |
| Lazard | Not comparable | Global advisory and asset management | Established international footprint and asset management | Weaker recent advisory growth/profitability | Competition across regions |
| Centerview | Not disclosed; private | Elite large-cap strategic adviser | Elite boardroom relationships and focused strategic advice | Narrower public/private capital capabilities | Direct large-deal rival |
| Rothschild & Co | Not disclosed; private | Cross-border independent adviser | European network and cross-border experience | Less U.S. strategic-advisory scale | Global competition |
Evercore's strongest moat is reputation combined with accumulated client relationships. Successful engagements improve credibility with executives and boards, which can generate repeat mandates and referrals.
Scale also matters. A firm with deep expertise across industries and transaction types is better equipped to advise clients on increasingly complex deals.
The weaker part of the moat is employee dependence. Senior advisory bankers often personally own the relationships that produce revenue. Unlike a software platform, their economic value is not permanently embedded in the company.
There are meaningful switching costs during a live engagement, but less friction when a board selects an adviser for its next major transaction.
Evercore has no comparable proprietary financing balance sheet to protect relationships against larger universal banks. It competes primarily through advice, reputation, relationships and execution.
Moat direction: Strengthening, supported by greater geographic and product breadth. The dependency on expensive human capital remains its principal structural weakness.
Evercore competes credibly with the largest banks in boardroom advisory while its independent structure and focus create advantages over diversified institutions. Employee dependence and limited balance-sheet relationships remain lasting weaknesses.
Financial reporting periods follow the issuer's fiscal year: completed FY rows plus standalone current-year quarters and cumulative H1/9M for FY2026. Revenue, FCF and SBC are flows; cash is a period-end balance. FCF = operating cash flow minus property/equipment capex from SEC company facts; quarterly FCF after Q1 and any quarterly SBC derived from YTD are visibly marked. Missing values are N/D, not zero. Unit: USD millions. Data extracted from SEC-tagged filings as of 2026-11-07. Company-specific FCF definitions and acquisition effects may require further reconciliation.
| Period | Revenue | Growth | Gross Margin | Operating Margin | FCF | FCF Margin | SBC | Diluted Shares | Cash | Debt |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | $2,426M | -12.2% | N/A | 14.9% | $438M | 18.1% | $515M | ~40M | $597M | $844M |
| FY2024 | $2,980M | +22.8% | N/A | 17.9% | $958M | 32.2% | $570M | ~42M | $873M | $923M |
| FY2025 | $3,857M | +29.4% | N/A | 20.8% | $1,182M | 30.7% | $675M | ~42M | $1,426M | $1,155M |
| Q1 FY2026 | $1,400.469 | N/D | N/D | N/D | −$228.966 (derived: CFO - capex) | -16.3% | $195.777 | 41.85 | $985.987 | N/D |
| Q2 FY2026 | $998.497 | N/D | N/D | N/D | $514.788 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | 51.6% | $219.594 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | 41.134 | $1,256.599 | N/D |
| H1 FY2026 | $2,398.966 | N/D | N/D | N/D | $285.822 (derived: CFO - capex) | 11.9% | $415.371 | 41.491 | $1,256.599 | N/D |
| Q3 FY2026 | $1,176.877 | N/D | N/D | N/D | $640.754 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | 54.4% | $196.69 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | 40.922 | $1,226.344 | N/D |
| 9M FY2026 | $3,575.843 | N/D | N/D | N/D | $926.576 (derived: CFO - capex) | 25.9% | $612.061 | 41.3 | $1,226.344 | N/D |
Investment banks do not report a conventional product-style gross margin, so operating margin is the more relevant profitability measure. Debt includes leases.
| Q2 result | 2025 | 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| GAAP revenue | $833.8M | $990.2M | +18.8% |
| GAAP operating income | $150.4M | $146.6M | -2.5% |
| GAAP operating margin | 18.0% | 14.8% | -3.2 pp |
| GAAP diluted EPS | $2.36 | $2.32 | -1.7% |
| Adjusted diluted EPS | $2.42 | $2.91 | +20.2% |
Evercore's first-half revenue grew 56%, and its first-half GAAP operating income grew 82%. That is excellent performance.
However, Q2 offers a different picture. Revenue increased, but GAAP operating income fell slightly. A significant portion of this pressure was associated with compensation and non-compensation expenses, together with acquisition-related and other charges.
Management's adjusted results exclude certain Robey Warshaw acquisition-related compensation and transaction costs. Although useful for comparison, these adjustments cannot all be dismissed as economically irrelevant. Acquiring talent and advisory businesses can create recurring economic costs even when some accounting expenses are labeled acquisition-related.
The next earnings release must clarify whether Q2's weaker GAAP profitability was principally a timing issue or an emerging structural pressure.
This is one of the most important valuation considerations.
Trailing free cash flow of $1.626 billion looks extremely strong against a $10.49 billion market capitalization.
But trailing SBC was approximately $761 million. A simple conservative cross-check is:
$1.626B − $0.761B = $0.865B
This produces a rough 12.1 times FCF-less-SBC multiple, compared with the headline 6.45 times reported FCF.
FCF less SBC is not an official accounting measure or a precise estimate of distributable cash, but it illustrates why conventional investment-bank cash-flow multiples can be misleading.
The economic effects of employee equity awards and the resulting need for share repurchases should be considered alongside reported cash flow.
Evercore reported approximately $1.26 billion of cash at June 30, 2026. The standardized debt total, including lease obligations, was approximately $1.09 billion.
The balance sheet does not currently appear to be the key risk in the investment thesis. Fee cyclicality, compensation requirements and shareholder dilution deserve more attention.
Financial direction: Improving, with mixed recent margin signals. The longer-term trend is strong, but Q2 demonstrates why trailing earnings should not be extrapolated without normalization.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Price Snapshot | $297.20 — 2026-11-03 regular-session close, America/New_York |
| Market Capitalization | $10.49B |
| Enterprise Value | $10.32B |
| Trailing P/E | 14.42× |
| Forward P/E, data provider | 14.92× |
| Price / Sales | 2.23× |
| EV / Sales | 2.19× |
| Price / reported FCF | 6.45× |
| Price / FCF less SBC, approximate | 12.1× |
The share price represents approximately 14.4 times the last twelve months' GAAP diluted earnings of $17.71.
That is a reasonable multiple for a growing financial services company. The question is whether recent earnings reflect sustainable earning power or a particularly favorable transaction environment.
Same market-data provider; October 22, 2026 closing-price snapshot. Valuation multiples use each company's latest available reported period.
| Company | Relevance | Public / Private | TTM P/E | Forward P/E | EV / Sales | Growth / Margin / Risk Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Evercore (EVR) | Subject company | Public | 14.4× | 14.9× | 2.19× | Large advisory franchise; concentrated deal exposure |
| PJT Partners (PJT) | Direct independent peer | Public | 23.2× | 18.4× | 3.19× | Restructuring and advisory specialization |
| Houlihan Lokey (HLI) | Direct specialist peer | Public | 22.4× | 17.7× | 3.59× | Midmarket and restructuring diversification |
| Moelis (MC) | Direct advisory peer | Public | 17.9× | 15.2× | 2.86× | M&A cyclicality; banker economics |
| Perella Weinberg (PWP) | Direct advisory peer | Public | 43.0× | 11.0× | 1.83× | Low trailing profits distort P/E |
| Lazard (LAZ) | Diversified advisory anchor | Public | 22.6× | 10.8× | 1.37× | Asset management and international exposure |
| Centerview Partners | Direct private competitor | Private | N/A | N/A | N/A | Large-cap board advisory relationships |
| Rothschild & Co | Direct private competitor | Private | N/A | N/A | N/A | European/cross-border private advisory franchise |
Lazard's October 22 results introduce a different reporting-period cutoff. PWP's trailing multiple is also distorted by comparatively low profits. These should not be averaged mechanically with the others.
Evercore trades at a discount to PJT, HLI and Moelis on trailing earnings, despite having significantly greater advisory revenue than the specialist public peers.
Some of this discount is deserved because of Evercore's exposure to large transaction fees and uncertain operating leverage. However, the magnitude looks potentially attractive if banker productivity and earnings continue growing.
Comparable takeaway: EVR's apparent valuation discount offers upside if margins normalize, but an unadjusted peer average would overstate the precision of comparisons across different transaction mixes.
2027 normalized diluted EPS and an appropriate earnings multiple drive each 12–18-month scenario.
| Scenario | Key Assumptions | Fair Value | Probability | Probability Rationale | Return From Price Snapshot |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | $14 EPS × 13×; deal activity weakens, hiring costs pressure margins | $182 | 25% | Meaningful M&A/compensation downside | -38.8% |
| Base | $19 EPS × 16×; moderate advisory growth, recovering banker productivity | $304 | 50% | Growing franchise without peak-cycle extrapolation | +2.3% |
| Bull | $24 EPS × 19×; sustained large-cap M&A boom, broadening revenue, operating leverage | $456 | 25% | Strong M&A and recruitment productivity must coincide | +53.4% |
| Probability-Weighted | Weighted across all scenarios | $311.50 | 100% | Balanced cycle and execution outcomes | +4.8% |
The scenario probabilities reflect a meaningful chance that the current M&A expansion continues, balanced against the possibility of a cyclical slowdown and persistent compensation pressure.
The moderate $19 base-case earnings assumption avoids annualizing the exceptionally strong first quarter of 2026. The bull case requires both strong market activity and successful conversion of current hiring investments into higher sustained earnings.
These estimates imply roughly 22% probability-weighted upside, but also approximately 29% downside in the bear case.
That distribution supports a positive research outlook without justifying an aggressive entry at the current price.
John Weinberg has overseen the expansion of Evercore into a larger and broader advisory platform.
The firm has demonstrated strong execution in senior banker recruitment, global expansion, and shareholder capital returns.
Management announced on October 18 that Nigel Dawn and Naveen Nataraj will become co-presidents effective January 1, 2027. Weinberg will remain chairman and CEO for at least three years. This adds leadership depth without an immediate CEO transition.
Evercore returned approximately $823 million to shareholders during H1 2026, principally through repurchases and dividends.
It repurchased about 2.3 million shares at an average price of $324.60, substantially above the October 22 stock price of $255.39.
This doesn't establish that the repurchases were irrational when authorized, but it highlights their sensitivity to price and timing.
More importantly, large repurchases coexist with substantial stock compensation. Investors should judge the program by its effect on fully diluted per-share economics, not simply the total dollars spent buying stock.
The quarterly dividend is $0.89, equivalent to $3.56 annually, or about 1.4% at the current share price.
Strong strategic execution and thoughtful succession planning, offset by the need to demonstrate consistently attractive returns on hiring and repurchases.
Analyzed call: Q2 2026 earnings call, July 29, 2026 · Research snapshot: 2026-10-22
The Q2 2026 earnings call contained important challenges concerning margins, hiring costs, revenue visibility and the breadth of the M&A recovery. The table below covers the material analyst exchanges, including relevant follow-ups.
| Analyst / Firm | Core Question | Management Response | Research Read-Through |
|---|---|---|---|
| Steven Chubak / Wolfe Research | Why are non-compensation costs rising so quickly? Will talent recruitment become more expensive? | CFO highlighted investments, technology, hiring and temporary expenses. CEO emphasized selective recruiting based on talent quality and expected ROI. | Cost discipline and future banker productivity remain critical. |
| James Yaro / Goldman Sachs | Is M&A recovery broadening beyond large-cap deals? Can margins return to historical levels? | Management said sponsor and midcap dialogue is improving but stopped short of declaring a broad recovery. The CFO described a normalized historical adjusted margin nearer 24.5–25%. | Avoid projecting peak margins simply because revenue grows. |
| Brennan Hawken / BMO | Can H2 revenue exceed an exceptional H1? How much of Q2 costs were one-time? | Management did not provide revenue guidance. It said backlogs remain strong but comparisons are difficult. Temporary expenses totaled double-digit millions without precise disclosure. | Backlog is encouraging but does not provide reliable quarterly earnings visibility. |
| Neil Iliff / Citizens | How is AI influencing buyer and seller behavior, especially in software? | Management said software deal dialogue is recovering and AI is driving strategic acquisitions and restructuring considerations. | AI is an advisory opportunity, not necessarily a direct operating-cost benefit. |
| Mike Brown / UBS | Is European expansion and the Robey Warshaw acquisition working? | Management reported smooth integration and investments across several European markets and restructuring capabilities. | Geographic expansion looks promising but its profitability must be demonstrated. |
| Jim Mitchell / Seaport | Is the strong ECM quarter structural or mainly market-driven? | Management acknowledged favorable markets while pointing to improved hiring, backlog and an ambition to reach the top ten in underwriting. | Some revenue diversification is structural, but underwriting remains cyclical. |
| Ryan Kenny / Morgan Stanley | Would renewed rate increases materially impair M&A? | Management believes rates are not the principal near-term driver, while acknowledging large increases could strain sponsor portfolios. | Financing conditions remain a downside risk despite management's confidence. |
| Alex Bond / KBW | Can Private Capital Advisory maintain momentum if industry secondaries slow? | Management described healthy continuation-vehicle and secondary activity and confidence in its competitive position. | An attractive opportunity, but the claimed share advantage lacks directly comparable public measurements. |
| Nathan Stein / Deutsche Bank | Are non-compensation expenses structurally higher? What drove credit-loss provisions? | CFO described headcount, data, technology and other costs, alongside episodic items. The credit-loss component was not fully quantified. | Expense transparency and cost normalization warrant monitoring. |
| Gabriel Angelini / Bank of America | Will Evercore pursue costly group recruitment or large team acquisitions? | CEO emphasized selective individual hiring rather than broad lift-outs. | Reduces some integration risk, but competition for senior bankers remains expensive. |
The most consequential exchanges were about cost normalization and future margin potential.
Management expresses confidence in deal activity and banker recruitment, but declined to provide specific revenue guidance. It also pushed back against using the most profitable historical periods as the baseline for normalized operating margins.
That is an important admission for valuation. EVR should not receive a premium earnings multiple simply because revenue is growing quickly. It needs to demonstrate that the broader platform can convert incremental fees into sustainable per-share earnings.
| Source | Type | Date / Period | What It Supports |
|---|---|---|---|
| Evercore Q2 2026 Earnings Release | Company IR | July 29, 2026 | Results, advisory fees, capital returns and adjusted results |
| Evercore Q2 2026 Shareholder Presentation | Company IR | Q2 2026 | Competitive positioning, banker headcount, strategy and expansion |
| Q2 2026 Earnings Call Transcript | Transcript | July 29, 2026 | Management commentary and analyst questions |
| Evercore Form 10-Q | Regulatory filing | June 30, 2026 | Accounting, financial position, expenses and disclosures |
| Evercore FY2025 Form 10-K | Regulatory filing | FY2025 | Historical financials, risks, governance and business economics |
| LSEG State of Global M&A 2026 | Industry | H1 2026 | Global deal value and concentration |
| EVR Market Statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 price snapshot | Price, multiples, capital structure, FCF, SBC |
| EVR Financial History | Market data | FY2023–TTM June 2026 | Revenue, margins and earnings history |
| EVR Cash Flow History | Market data | FY2023–TTM June 2026 | Free cash flow and stock compensation |
| PJT statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 comparison snapshot | Public peer valuation comparisons |
| HLI statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 comparison snapshot | Public peer valuation comparisons |
| PWP statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 comparison snapshot | Public peer valuation comparisons |
| MC statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 comparison snapshot | Public peer valuation comparisons |
| LAZ statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 comparison snapshot | Public peer valuation comparisons |
| Evercore Leadership Announcement | Company IR | October 18, 2026 | Succession and governance |
| SEC XBRL company facts — EVR | Regulatory filing (as tagged) | FY2026, through 2026-09-30 | Current-year standalone-quarter and year-to-date source facts for FCF, SBC, revenue and other reported metrics |
Evercore is one of the leading independent investment banks, specializing in advising corporations, private equity firms, and institutional clients on mergers, acquisitions, restructurings, and capital raising.
Unlike Goldman Sachs or JPMorgan, Evercore doesn't need a massive lending or trading balance sheet to generate substantial profits. Its most important assets are its senior bankers, relationships, reputation, and ability to win high-value advisory mandates.
The investment opportunity: Evercore offers exposure to a potential multiyear expansion in global M&A activity, supported by its growing advisory franchise. But the same factors that make the business attractive—transaction-driven fees and operating leverage—also create considerable earnings volatility.
One important timing consideration: Evercore will report Q3 2026 earnings on October 28, 2026, so the latest reported results available for this analysis are Q2 2026.
Current Review: 2026-10-28
Previous Review: 2026-10-22
Update Trigger: Competitor relevance and analyst-Q&A correction
| Area | Previous View | Current View | Investment Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Competition | Preceding operating and comparable-company classifications | Company-specific rivals reviewed; relevant comparisons retained | Corrects the competitive comparison; does not by itself re-underwrite the valuation |
| Analyst questions | Prior source-linked Q&A summaries | Complete questions and sentence-form management answers; all 10 existing rows retained | Improves readability while preserving the recorded exchange meaning |
| Valuation and scores | Approved operating/price snapshots, scenarios, scores and decisions | Preserved | No price refresh, rerank or change to valuation assumptions in this correction pass |
Thesis: No new fundamental thesis determination is made in this correction pass. The prior investment decision is preserved; the corrected competitive scope should govern the next substantive review.
| Metric | Current View |
|---|---|
| Price Snapshot | $297.20 — 2026-11-03 regular-session close, America/New_York |
| Rating / Zone Status | Hold / Watch |
| Bear / Base / Bull Fair Value | $182 / $304 / $456 |
| Scenario Probabilities | 25% / 50% / 25% |
| Probability-Weighted Fair Value | $311.50 |
| Probability-Weighted Expected Return | +4.8% |
| Bear-Case Return | -38.8% |
| Strong Buy Zone | ≤ $200.20 |
| Buy Zone | > $200.20 to $249.20 |
| Avoid Chasing Above | $346.11 |
| Quality Score / Tier | 78.6 / B |
| Opportunity Score / Rank | 56.4 / #33 of 76 |
| Risk Level | Medium; valuation confidence 65/100 |
| Tracking / Ownership | Primary Watchlist / No position recorded |
Decision rationale: At $255.39, EVR is trading at an interesting valuation, but it is slightly above the $249.20 Buy threshold. A decline into the low-to-mid $240s would create a better entry margin without requiring more optimistic fundamentals.
These are independent, 12–18-month scenario estimates, using assumptions for 2027 earnings, not management price targets or consensus forecasts. Price returns exclude dividends.
Evercore has spent the past decade building an advisory franchise capable of competing for transactions traditionally dominated by the largest global banks. The company combines high-value M&A advice with expanding capabilities in private capital, restructuring, capital markets, and institutional equities.
Its growth strategy has two components. First, it hires senior bankers with established relationships and industry expertise, giving them access to Evercore's global platform. Second, it increases the revenue opportunities available to those bankers by expanding its product capabilities and geographic reach.
This creates a potentially attractive cycle: more bankers and services lead to more client mandates, which improve Evercore's reputation and recruiting appeal.
The central challenge is that bankers are expensive before their revenue pipelines mature. If transaction activity disappoints, the company bears substantial compensation and infrastructure costs without receiving the expected fees.
The stock's valuation appears to discount the possibility that recent advisory earnings are near a cyclical peak. At 14.4 times trailing earnings, investors are not paying the premium typically associated with a rapidly growing, capital-light financial franchise.
There are three competing explanations for that valuation:
The thesis favors the first explanation over a multiyear horizon, while assigning meaningful probability to the second and third.
Evercore operates through two reporting segments: Investment Banking & Equities and Investment Management. The first accounts for the overwhelming majority of consolidated revenue.
| Business | What Evercore provides | Revenue model | Strategic importance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strategic advisory | M&A, divestitures, shareholder defense, strategic transactions | Retainers and transaction completion fees | Core earnings engine |
| Restructuring & liability management | Debt restructuring, recapitalizations, distressed situations | Advisory and transaction fees | Adds opportunities outside conventional M&A |
| Private Capital Advisory | PE secondary transactions, continuation vehicles, fundraising | Placement and advisory fees | Important structural growth business |
| Equity capital markets | Equity underwriting and capital raising | Underwriting fees | Diversifies revenue; market-sensitive |
| Equities | Institutional research, sales and agency execution | Trading commissions and research-related revenue | Supports corporate and institutional relationships |
| Investment Management | Wealth management and other investment interests | AUM-based fees and investment income | Small recurring-revenue component |
Consider a corporation considering a $20 billion acquisition.
Evercore may help determine the target's value, negotiate transaction terms, structure financing alternatives, assess strategic risks, and obtain board approval. The bank can receive an advisory fee tied partly to successful completion.
That makes the economics very different from lending. Evercore does not generally need to fund the $20 billion acquisition from its own balance sheet. Its financial exposure is primarily the cost of maintaining the professionals required to originate and execute the mandate.
However, successful advisory engagements can take months or years, and a canceled transaction can eliminate a substantial expected completion fee.
The business therefore combines low physical capital intensity with highly variable revenue recognition.
In Q2 2026, advisory revenue was approximately $776 million, underwriting revenue $97 million, and commissions $64 million. Wealth management fees contributed roughly $24 million.
Evercore also reports that more than 40% of adjusted revenue for the latest quarter came from activities it classifies as non-M&A. That broader internal definition includes several private-capital, restructuring, and capital-raising activities recorded within GAAP advisory revenue.
This distinction matters because Evercore is no longer simply a traditional M&A boutique. Nevertheless, most of its activities remain sensitive to transaction and capital-market conditions.
A very attractive capital-light operating model, with diversification improving but not eliminating cyclicality.
LSEG reports that global announced M&A value reached approximately $2.85 trillion in H1 2026, an all-time first-half high. Yet transaction counts declined to a six-year low.
This is particularly important for Evercore.
The industry is experiencing strength in high-value strategic transactions without a correspondingly broad recovery in activity across smaller transactions.
Large transactions generally require sophisticated advisers, specialized regulatory knowledge, and significant execution resources. Evercore is exceptionally well positioned in this category.
But concentration also means fewer enormous transactions can explain a disproportionately large share of an investment bank's quarterly fees.
Evercore's Q2 2026 shareholder presentation reports that the firm ranked first in advisory revenue among independent investment banks, and third among all firms, for the latest four-quarter period. It also reports being first among independent investment banks in global M&A league tables over three-, five-, and ten-year periods.
These are company-presented rankings using defined peer and transaction methodologies. They should not be interpreted as an independently verified percentage of the entire global investment-banking market.
A consistently defined public dataset for global market shares across every major advisory competitor is not available here. Relative advisory scale is therefore more informative than manufacturing a market-share percentage.
| Company / Platform | Primary Position | Relative Scale | Growth Direction | Investment Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Evercore | Leading independent strategic adviser | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Large-cap M&A franchise, senior relationships, advisory breadth |
| Goldman Sachs | Global diversified investment bank | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Lending, trading, financing and broader client ecosystem |
| JPMorgan | Global diversified investment bank | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Extensive corporate relationships and financing capabilities |
| PJT Partners | Independent advisory specialist | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Restructuring, strategic advisory, private capital |
| Houlihan Lokey | Independent advisory specialist | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Restructuring leadership and middle-market reach |
| Lazard | Global advisory and asset management | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Established international relationships, restructuring |
| Centerview Partners | Private independent adviser | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Prestigious large-cap strategic M&A franchise |
| Rothschild & Co | Private global advisory group | Not quantified in this comparison | Not specified in this comparison | Strong European and cross-border advisory network |
Evercore has opportunities to expand through international advisory coverage, private-equity secondary transactions, restructuring, underwriting and specialist industry teams.
European expansion is particularly interesting following the Robey Warshaw acquisition. The company is also investing in Frankfurt, Stockholm, Milan, and Paris.
A single dollar TAM would not be informative for these businesses. The addressable market changes with transaction values, deal activity, financing structures, and advisory fee rates. A more useful test is whether Evercore can consistently grow advisory revenue faster than the broader relevant fee pool.
Favorable long-term opportunity, with near-term benefits skewed toward firms able to win large strategic transactions.
Evercore's customers are primarily corporate boards, management teams, financial sponsors, institutions, and wealthy investors.
Traditional customer acquisition metrics such as subscription churn or customer lifetime value do not adequately describe this business.
The relevant indicators are banker productivity, repeat mandates, deal win rates, average fee sizes, and the ability of senior hires to generate incremental revenue.
| Indicator | Q2 2026 | Q2 2025 | Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| Advisory and underwriting transaction fees earned | 296 | 245 | +21% |
| Transaction fees of at least $1 million | 132 | 111 | +19% |
| Advisory revenue | $775.6M | $697.7M | +11% |
| Underwriting revenue | $97.1M | $32.2M | +201% |
| Investment-banking senior managing directors | 188 | 159 | Approximately +18% |
The discrepancy between the 21% increase in fee-generating transactions and 11% advisory-revenue growth illustrates how mix and fee sizes influence results. Underwriting revenue, meanwhile, benefited from a particularly favorable quarter.
More than 50 investment-banking SMDs were still ramping as of Q2. If these bankers mature into productive advisers, Evercore can increase revenue without proportionally expanding every support function.
But there is no automatic guarantee of that outcome. A senior banker must generate enough incremental fees to justify compensation guarantees, deferred-equity replacement awards, teams, travel and infrastructure.
Strong revenue-generation potential, but incremental returns on hiring remain an important assumption rather than a certainty.
| Competitor | Market Share | Positioning | Advantages vs. Company | Disadvantages vs. Company | Current Direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Goldman Sachs | Not comparable on a consistent global definition | Universal global investment bank | Financing capabilities, scale, corporate reach | Less-focused independent advisory positioning | Intense competition |
| JPMorgan | Not comparable | Universal global investment bank | Lending relationships, global breadth | Greater balance-sheet dependence | Intense competition |
| PJT Partners | Not comparable | Independent specialist | Strong restructuring and sponsor specialization | Smaller broad-based advisory revenue franchise | Growing specialist competition |
| Houlihan Lokey | Not comparable | Restructuring and midmarket specialist | Restructuring and middle-market depth | Less exposure to mega strategic transactions | Both expanding |
| Lazard | Not comparable | Global advisory and asset management | Established international footprint and asset management | Weaker recent advisory growth/profitability | Competition across regions |
| Centerview | Not disclosed; private | Elite large-cap strategic adviser | Elite boardroom relationships and focused strategic advice | Narrower public/private capital capabilities | Direct large-deal rival |
| Rothschild & Co | Not disclosed; private | Cross-border independent adviser | European network and cross-border experience | Less U.S. strategic-advisory scale | Global competition |
Evercore's strongest moat is reputation combined with accumulated client relationships. Successful engagements improve credibility with executives and boards, which can generate repeat mandates and referrals.
Scale also matters. A firm with deep expertise across industries and transaction types is better equipped to advise clients on increasingly complex deals.
The weaker part of the moat is employee dependence. Senior advisory bankers often personally own the relationships that produce revenue. Unlike a software platform, their economic value is not permanently embedded in the company.
There are meaningful switching costs during a live engagement, but less friction when a board selects an adviser for its next major transaction.
Evercore has no comparable proprietary financing balance sheet to protect relationships against larger universal banks. It competes primarily through advice, reputation, relationships and execution.
Moat direction: Strengthening, supported by greater geographic and product breadth. The dependency on expensive human capital remains its principal structural weakness.
Evercore competes credibly with the largest banks in boardroom advisory while its independent structure and focus create advantages over diversified institutions. Employee dependence and limited balance-sheet relationships remain lasting weaknesses.
Financial reporting periods follow the issuer's fiscal year: completed FY rows plus standalone current-year quarters and cumulative H1/9M for FY2026. Revenue, FCF and SBC are flows; cash is a period-end balance. FCF = operating cash flow minus property/equipment capex from SEC company facts; quarterly FCF after Q1 and any quarterly SBC derived from YTD are visibly marked. Missing values are N/D, not zero. Unit: USD millions. Data extracted from SEC-tagged filings as of 2026-11-07. Company-specific FCF definitions and acquisition effects may require further reconciliation.
| Period | Revenue | Growth | Gross Margin | Operating Margin | FCF | FCF Margin | SBC | Diluted Shares | Cash | Debt |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2023 | $2,426M | -12.2% | N/A | 14.9% | $438M | 18.1% | $515M | ~40M | $597M | $844M |
| FY2024 | $2,980M | +22.8% | N/A | 17.9% | $958M | 32.2% | $570M | ~42M | $873M | $923M |
| FY2025 | $3,857M | +29.4% | N/A | 20.8% | $1,182M | 30.7% | $675M | ~42M | $1,426M | $1,155M |
| Q1 FY2026 | $1,400.469 | N/D | N/D | N/D | −$228.966 (derived: CFO - capex) | -16.3% | $195.777 | 41.85 | $985.987 | N/D |
| Q2 FY2026 | $998.497 | N/D | N/D | N/D | $514.788 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | 51.6% | $219.594 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | 41.134 | $1,256.599 | N/D |
| H1 FY2026 | $2,398.966 | N/D | N/D | N/D | $285.822 (derived: CFO - capex) | 11.9% | $415.371 | 41.491 | $1,256.599 | N/D |
| Q3 FY2026 | $1,176.877 | N/D | N/D | N/D | $640.754 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | 54.4% | $196.69 (derived: current YTD - prior YTD) | 40.922 | $1,226.344 | N/D |
| 9M FY2026 | $3,575.843 | N/D | N/D | N/D | $926.576 (derived: CFO - capex) | 25.9% | $612.061 | 41.3 | $1,226.344 | N/D |
Investment banks do not report a conventional product-style gross margin, so operating margin is the more relevant profitability measure. Debt includes leases.
| Q2 result | 2025 | 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| GAAP revenue | $833.8M | $990.2M | +18.8% |
| GAAP operating income | $150.4M | $146.6M | -2.5% |
| GAAP operating margin | 18.0% | 14.8% | -3.2 pp |
| GAAP diluted EPS | $2.36 | $2.32 | -1.7% |
| Adjusted diluted EPS | $2.42 | $2.91 | +20.2% |
Evercore's first-half revenue grew 56%, and its first-half GAAP operating income grew 82%. That is excellent performance.
However, Q2 offers a different picture. Revenue increased, but GAAP operating income fell slightly. A significant portion of this pressure was associated with compensation and non-compensation expenses, together with acquisition-related and other charges.
Management's adjusted results exclude certain Robey Warshaw acquisition-related compensation and transaction costs. Although useful for comparison, these adjustments cannot all be dismissed as economically irrelevant. Acquiring talent and advisory businesses can create recurring economic costs even when some accounting expenses are labeled acquisition-related.
The next earnings release must clarify whether Q2's weaker GAAP profitability was principally a timing issue or an emerging structural pressure.
This is one of the most important valuation considerations.
Trailing free cash flow of $1.626 billion looks extremely strong against a $10.49 billion market capitalization.
But trailing SBC was approximately $761 million. A simple conservative cross-check is:
$1.626B − $0.761B = $0.865B
This produces a rough 12.1 times FCF-less-SBC multiple, compared with the headline 6.45 times reported FCF.
FCF less SBC is not an official accounting measure or a precise estimate of distributable cash, but it illustrates why conventional investment-bank cash-flow multiples can be misleading.
The economic effects of employee equity awards and the resulting need for share repurchases should be considered alongside reported cash flow.
Evercore reported approximately $1.26 billion of cash at June 30, 2026. The standardized debt total, including lease obligations, was approximately $1.09 billion.
The balance sheet does not currently appear to be the key risk in the investment thesis. Fee cyclicality, compensation requirements and shareholder dilution deserve more attention.
Financial direction: Improving, with mixed recent margin signals. The longer-term trend is strong, but Q2 demonstrates why trailing earnings should not be extrapolated without normalization.
John Weinberg has overseen the expansion of Evercore into a larger and broader advisory platform.
The firm has demonstrated strong execution in senior banker recruitment, global expansion, and shareholder capital returns.
Management announced on October 18 that Nigel Dawn and Naveen Nataraj will become co-presidents effective January 1, 2027. Weinberg will remain chairman and CEO for at least three years. This adds leadership depth without an immediate CEO transition.
Evercore returned approximately $823 million to shareholders during H1 2026, principally through repurchases and dividends.
It repurchased about 2.3 million shares at an average price of $324.60, substantially above the October 22 stock price of $255.39.
This doesn't establish that the repurchases were irrational when authorized, but it highlights their sensitivity to price and timing.
More importantly, large repurchases coexist with substantial stock compensation. Investors should judge the program by its effect on fully diluted per-share economics, not simply the total dollars spent buying stock.
The quarterly dividend is $0.89, equivalent to $3.56 annually, or about 1.4% at the current share price.
Strong strategic execution and thoughtful succession planning, offset by the need to demonstrate consistently attractive returns on hiring and repurchases.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Price Snapshot | $297.20 — 2026-11-03 regular-session close, America/New_York |
| Market Capitalization | $10.49B |
| Enterprise Value | $10.32B |
| Trailing P/E | 14.42× |
| Forward P/E, data provider | 14.92× |
| Price / Sales | 2.23× |
| EV / Sales | 2.19× |
| Price / reported FCF | 6.45× |
| Price / FCF less SBC, approximate | 12.1× |
The share price represents approximately 14.4 times the last twelve months' GAAP diluted earnings of $17.71.
That is a reasonable multiple for a growing financial services company. The question is whether recent earnings reflect sustainable earning power or a particularly favorable transaction environment.
Same market-data provider; October 22, 2026 closing-price snapshot. Valuation multiples use each company's latest available reported period.
| Company | Relevance | Public / Private | TTM P/E | Forward P/E | EV / Sales | Growth / Margin / Risk Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Evercore (EVR) | Subject company | Public | 14.4× | 14.9× | 2.19× | Large advisory franchise; concentrated deal exposure |
| PJT Partners (PJT) | Direct independent peer | Public | 23.2× | 18.4× | 3.19× | Restructuring and advisory specialization |
| Houlihan Lokey (HLI) | Direct specialist peer | Public | 22.4× | 17.7× | 3.59× | Midmarket and restructuring diversification |
| Moelis (MC) | Direct advisory peer | Public | 17.9× | 15.2× | 2.86× | M&A cyclicality; banker economics |
| Perella Weinberg (PWP) | Direct advisory peer | Public | 43.0× | 11.0× | 1.83× | Low trailing profits distort P/E |
| Lazard (LAZ) | Diversified advisory anchor | Public | 22.6× | 10.8× | 1.37× | Asset management and international exposure |
| Centerview Partners | Direct private competitor | Private | N/A | N/A | N/A | Large-cap board advisory relationships |
| Rothschild & Co | Direct private competitor | Private | N/A | N/A | N/A | European/cross-border private advisory franchise |
Lazard's October 22 results introduce a different reporting-period cutoff. PWP's trailing multiple is also distorted by comparatively low profits. These should not be averaged mechanically with the others.
Evercore trades at a discount to PJT, HLI and Moelis on trailing earnings, despite having significantly greater advisory revenue than the specialist public peers.
Some of this discount is deserved because of Evercore's exposure to large transaction fees and uncertain operating leverage. However, the magnitude looks potentially attractive if banker productivity and earnings continue growing.
Comparable takeaway: EVR's apparent valuation discount offers upside if margins normalize, but an unadjusted peer average would overstate the precision of comparisons across different transaction mixes.
2027 normalized diluted EPS and an appropriate earnings multiple drive each 12–18-month scenario.
| Scenario | Key Assumptions | Fair Value | Probability | Probability Rationale | Return From Price Snapshot |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | $14 EPS × 13×; deal activity weakens, hiring costs pressure margins | $182 | 25% | Meaningful M&A/compensation downside | -38.8% |
| Base | $19 EPS × 16×; moderate advisory growth, recovering banker productivity | $304 | 50% | Growing franchise without peak-cycle extrapolation | +2.3% |
| Bull | $24 EPS × 19×; sustained large-cap M&A boom, broadening revenue, operating leverage | $456 | 25% | Strong M&A and recruitment productivity must coincide | +53.4% |
| Probability-Weighted | Weighted across all scenarios | $311.50 | 100% | Balanced cycle and execution outcomes | +4.8% |
The scenario probabilities reflect a meaningful chance that the current M&A expansion continues, balanced against the possibility of a cyclical slowdown and persistent compensation pressure.
The moderate $19 base-case earnings assumption avoids annualizing the exceptionally strong first quarter of 2026. The bull case requires both strong market activity and successful conversion of current hiring investments into higher sustained earnings.
These estimates imply roughly 22% probability-weighted upside, but also approximately 29% downside in the bear case.
That distribution supports a positive research outlook without justifying an aggressive entry at the current price.
The Q2 2026 earnings call contained important challenges concerning margins, hiring costs, revenue visibility and the breadth of the M&A recovery. The table below covers the material analyst exchanges, including relevant follow-ups.
| Analyst / Firm | Core Question | Management Response | Research Read-Through |
|---|---|---|---|
| Steven Chubak / Wolfe Research | Why are non-compensation costs rising so quickly? Will talent recruitment become more expensive? | CFO highlighted investments, technology, hiring and temporary expenses. CEO emphasized selective recruiting based on talent quality and expected ROI. | Cost discipline and future banker productivity remain critical. |
| James Yaro / Goldman Sachs | Is M&A recovery broadening beyond large-cap deals? Can margins return to historical levels? | Management said sponsor and midcap dialogue is improving but stopped short of declaring a broad recovery. The CFO described a normalized historical adjusted margin nearer 24.5–25%. | Avoid projecting peak margins simply because revenue grows. |
| Brennan Hawken / BMO | Can H2 revenue exceed an exceptional H1? How much of Q2 costs were one-time? | Management did not provide revenue guidance. It said backlogs remain strong but comparisons are difficult. Temporary expenses totaled double-digit millions without precise disclosure. | Backlog is encouraging but does not provide reliable quarterly earnings visibility. |
| Neil Iliff / Citizens | How is AI influencing buyer and seller behavior, especially in software? | Management said software deal dialogue is recovering and AI is driving strategic acquisitions and restructuring considerations. | AI is an advisory opportunity, not necessarily a direct operating-cost benefit. |
| Mike Brown / UBS | Is European expansion and the Robey Warshaw acquisition working? | Management reported smooth integration and investments across several European markets and restructuring capabilities. | Geographic expansion looks promising but its profitability must be demonstrated. |
| Jim Mitchell / Seaport | Is the strong ECM quarter structural or mainly market-driven? | Management acknowledged favorable markets while pointing to improved hiring, backlog and an ambition to reach the top ten in underwriting. | Some revenue diversification is structural, but underwriting remains cyclical. |
| Ryan Kenny / Morgan Stanley | Would renewed rate increases materially impair M&A? | Management believes rates are not the principal near-term driver, while acknowledging large increases could strain sponsor portfolios. | Financing conditions remain a downside risk despite management's confidence. |
| Alex Bond / KBW | Can Private Capital Advisory maintain momentum if industry secondaries slow? | Management described healthy continuation-vehicle and secondary activity and confidence in its competitive position. | An attractive opportunity, but the claimed share advantage lacks directly comparable public measurements. |
| Nathan Stein / Deutsche Bank | Are non-compensation expenses structurally higher? What drove credit-loss provisions? | CFO described headcount, data, technology and other costs, alongside episodic items. The credit-loss component was not fully quantified. | Expense transparency and cost normalization warrant monitoring. |
| Gabriel Angelini / Bank of America | Will Evercore pursue costly group recruitment or large team acquisitions? | CEO emphasized selective individual hiring rather than broad lift-outs. | Reduces some integration risk, but competition for senior bankers remains expensive. |
The most consequential exchanges were about cost normalization and future margin potential.
Management expresses confidence in deal activity and banker recruitment, but declined to provide specific revenue guidance. It also pushed back against using the most profitable historical periods as the baseline for normalized operating margins.
That is an important admission for valuation. EVR should not receive a premium earnings multiple simply because revenue is growing quickly. It needs to demonstrate that the broader platform can convert incremental fees into sustainable per-share earnings.
| Driver | Current State | Positive Trigger / Catalyst | Negative Trigger / Falsifier | What It Changes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| M&A activity | Strong but concentrated | Recovery expands to sponsors and midcap deals | Transaction announcements and completions weaken | Revenue and normalized EPS |
| Senior banker productivity | More than 50 SMDs ramping | Higher fees per mature banker | Compensation growth persistently exceeds revenue growth | Margins and Quality |
| Europe | Expanded through Robey Warshaw and hiring | Sustained new mandates and profitable integration | Integration costs exceed incremental fees | Earnings growth |
| Private Capital Advisory | Management reports healthy activity | More secondary and continuation-vehicle volume | Meaningful loss of business or pricing power | Growth and moat |
| Non-compensation expenses | Elevated Q2 expense ratio | Costs normalize toward management targets | Persistently higher structural cost ratio | Base-case earnings |
| Equity compensation | Substantial SBC and repurchases | Lower net dilution and better repurchase execution | Buybacks consume cash without growing per-share value | Valuation confidence |
| Global financial conditions | Strong large-cap activity | Broad financing and transaction recovery | Credit tightening or prolonged macro uncertainty | Bear-case probability |
The most important immediate trigger is Q3 earnings on October 28. Particularly important: compensation ratio, non-compensation ratio, adjusted versus GAAP margin, and management commentary on backlog conversion.
| Component | Score | Weight | Weighted Contribution | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Business durability and economics | 75 | 25% | 18.75 | Attractive capital-light model, but highly cyclical fees and costly human capital |
| Moat and competitive position | 82 | 25% | 20.50 | Established large-deal reputation, relationships and advisory breadth |
| Growth runway and durability | 81 | 20% | 16.20 | Global advisory hiring, private capital and international expansion |
| Financial quality and balance sheet | 76 | 15% | 11.40 | Strong cash generation, but high SBC and quarterly margin variability |
| Management, governance and capital allocation | 78 | 15% | 11.70 | Execution and succession; repurchase timing and talent ROI matter |
| Quality Score | 100% | 78.6 / 100 | Tier B |
Evercore approaches Tier A through its established advisory reputation and growth prospects. Cyclicality, senior-employee dependence and the economic cost of compensation prevent a higher assessment.
| Component | Raw Input | Normalized Score | Weight | Weighted Contribution |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Quality | 78.6 | 78.6 | 30% | 23.6 |
| Probability-weighted upside | +4.8% | 59.6 | 35% | 20.9 |
| Bear-case downside | -38.8% | 11.2 | 20% | 2.2 |
| Risk / valuation confidence | 65/100 | 65.0 | 15% | 9.8 |
| Opportunity Score | 56.4 | 100% | 56.4 |
The displayed score uses unrounded intermediate inputs before final rounding. It is provisional until a common-date full-universe ranking refresh.
The relatively high Opportunity Score reflects Evercore's business quality and substantial scenario upside. The Hold / Watch recommendation is not contradictory: the price still lacks the 25% probability-weighted upside required to enter the Buy zone.
my_watchlist.md.portfolio/holdings.md.| Timestamp | Price | Rating | Zone Status | Buy Zone | Strong Buy Zone | Avoid Chasing Above | Base FV | P/W FV | P/W Return | Quality | Opportunity / Rank | Change / Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-10-22 16:00 EDT | $255.39 | Hold / Watch | Hold / Watch | > $200.20–$249.20 | ≤ $200.20 | $346.11 | $304 | $311.50 | +22.0% | 78.6 / B | 70.4 / provisional #3 | Initial research and approved primary-watchlist tracking |
Evercore is an impressive independent advisory franchise, and its current market valuation looks considerably more reasonable than its historical growth might suggest.
Its large-cap strategic-advisory position, expanding private capital capabilities, and opportunity to generate more revenue from an enlarged senior banker platform are particularly attractive.
The main hesitation is that the earnings recovery has been unusually strong while compensation and other operating costs remain significant. Until incremental profitability becomes more consistent, it is difficult to assign a high degree of confidence to a sustained $20-plus earnings-per-share trajectory.
At $255.39, maintain a Hold / Watch rating with a preference for buying below approximately $249, and a much more attractive risk/reward below $220. A fundamentally weaker Q3 report, rather than a general market selloff, would require revisiting the valuation before using those entry levels.
| Source | Type | Date / Period | What It Supports |
|---|---|---|---|
| Evercore Q2 2026 Earnings Release | Company IR | July 29, 2026 | Results, advisory fees, capital returns and adjusted results |
| Evercore Q2 2026 Shareholder Presentation | Company IR | Q2 2026 | Competitive positioning, banker headcount, strategy and expansion |
| Q2 2026 Earnings Call Transcript | Transcript | July 29, 2026 | Management commentary and analyst questions |
| Evercore Form 10-Q | Regulatory filing | June 30, 2026 | Accounting, financial position, expenses and disclosures |
| Evercore FY2025 Form 10-K | Regulatory filing | FY2025 | Historical financials, risks, governance and business economics |
| LSEG State of Global M&A 2026 | Industry | H1 2026 | Global deal value and concentration |
| EVR Market Statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 price snapshot | Price, multiples, capital structure, FCF, SBC |
| EVR Financial History | Market data | FY2023–TTM June 2026 | Revenue, margins and earnings history |
| EVR Cash Flow History | Market data | FY2023–TTM June 2026 | Free cash flow and stock compensation |
| PJT statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 comparison snapshot | Public peer valuation comparisons |
| HLI statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 comparison snapshot | Public peer valuation comparisons |
| PWP statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 comparison snapshot | Public peer valuation comparisons |
| MC statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 comparison snapshot | Public peer valuation comparisons |
| LAZ statistics | Market data | October 22, 2026 comparison snapshot | Public peer valuation comparisons |
| Evercore Leadership Announcement | Company IR | October 18, 2026 | Succession and governance |
| SEC XBRL company facts — EVR | Regulatory filing (as tagged) | FY2026, through 2026-09-30 | Current-year standalone-quarter and year-to-date source facts for FCF, SBC, revenue and other reported metrics |
This page presents the saved EVR analysis. Ratings, zones, and opportunity scores shown above are recalculated at its dated reference price using FolioFacts rules; the live Creator Watchlist uses current market prices and can differ. Missing financial data is not estimated.
This publication reflects my personal investment research, thoughts, and opinions only. It is intended strictly for informational and educational purposes and does not constitute personalized investment, legal, tax, or financial advice. Any ratings or views expressed are general analytical opinions, not recommendations tailored to any reader or offers or solicitations to buy or sell any security or financial instrument.
I am not a registered investment adviser, broker-dealer, or financial planner. This content does not take into account your specific investment objectives, financial situation, or risk tolerance. All investments involve substantial risk, including the potential loss of all principal capital. Past performance is never indicative of future results.
While I endeavor to provide accurate information, all data and analysis are provided "as is" without any warranty of accuracy, completeness, or timeliness. You must conduct your own independent due diligence and/or consult with a licensed professional before making any financial decisions. I may hold long or short positions in any of the securities or assets discussed herein at any time without notice.
Quality is price independent. Opportunity combines that quality with scenario-based upside, bear-case protection, and confidence. Ownership and cost basis do not affect these scores. Watchlist rank compares the scored companies in that Watchlist.
Model scores, valuation estimates, and price zones are based on assumptions, not guarantees of future performance or individualized advice. Read our Disclaimer.
25% business durability
25% moat and competitive position
20% growth runway
15% financial quality
15% management and capital allocation
30% Quality Score
35% normalized probability-weighted upside
20% normalized bear-case return
15% risk and valuation confidence
At least 50% upside to P/W fair value, with price no more than 10% above bear-case fair value.
At least 25% upside to P/W fair value, above the Strong Buy boundary.
Modeled return from approximately −10% to below +25%.
More than 10% downside to P/W fair value.
Risk-adjusted view. This framework balances expected upside, downside risk and valuation confidence. Zones may be less reliable for companies priced mainly on future potential rather than current fundamentals.
These prompt a review of the research and Opportunity Score. Watchlist ranks are calculated automatically from the scores currently displayed.