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Price snapshot: 2026-11-06 · Research: 2026-11-09 · Saved analysis, not live market data
Ratings and fair values are independent, dated research opinions—not personalized investment advice. Disclaimer
The reference price is above the probability-weighted fair value.
Dashed marker: reference price $342.37. Scenario values are present fair values, not dated price targets.
Starting owner FCF $115B; 5% annual growth for 10 years; 9.5% discount; 2.5% terminal growth
Mature hardware growth, regulatory or Services pressure and cost inflationStarting owner FCF $122.3B; 10% annual growth for 10 years; 9.0% discount; 3.0% terminal growth
Strong ecosystem and cash conversion, moderated by scale and costsStarting owner FCF $136B; 12% annual growth for 10 years; 8.5% discount; 3.0% terminal growth
Strong premium devices, AI-aided upgrades, durable high-margin ServicesFolioFacts zones calculated from the saved fair and bear values at the dated reference price. Live zones can change with research.
Apple's central advantage is an integrated device, operating-system and services relationship with consumers. Customers who buy an iPhone can subsequently purchase AirPods, Watch, Mac, iCloud storage and apps and can continue paying for services long after the original device sale. That repeat engagement supports pricing power, ecosystem retention and extraordinarily high absolute cash generation. Apple's more-than-2.5-billion active device installed base provides broad distribution for new services and AI.
Reported FY totals, current FY quarters and cumulative YTD are grouped separately.
Scale within group: $480B
Completed FY, standalone current-year quarters and cumulative YTD. No TTM figures.
Each row covers a completed fiscal year. Scale within this group: $140B.
Each annual, quarter and YTD group uses a separate scale. SBC / FCF is a same-period comparison, not a literal employee cash payment. N/M means FCF is zero or negative (or SBC is negative); missing is not zero. Issuer FCF definitions may vary.
Only completed fiscal years and currently open fiscal-year quarters/YTD appear in charts. Standalone quarters and cumulative YTD are separate; missing is never zero. Legacy TTM rows remain in archival source text. The full financial profile below preserves definitions, accounting caveats, and period-end balance details.
This score uses the saved price and research fundamentals. Creator Watchlist calculates the current score and rank using verified market prices.
Watch the evidence behind the thesis, not just the ticker.
Sustained positive upgrade trends beyond initial launch
Normalizing units and weakening price acceptance
Affects: Revenue/owner-FCF growthDurable double-digit Services growth with margin defense
Regulatory/licensing hit or gaming weakness
Affects: Long-run margin and moatIdentifiable upgrade acceleration or profitable paid AI access
Higher recurring costs with little attributable sales
Affects: DCF cash-flow assumptionsRecovery toward high-40s without one-offs
Persistent memory inflation or price elasticity
Affects: Near-term FCF and confidenceStable premium adoption with broader product strength
Local handset competition and demand reversal
Affects: Growth resilienceEconomically attractive repurchases, rational funding
Expensive buybacks and rising AI costs without ROI
Affects: Per-share compoundingApple's central advantage is an integrated device, operating-system and services relationship with consumers. Customers who buy an iPhone can subsequently purchase AirPods, Watch, Mac, iCloud storage and apps and can continue paying for services long after the original device sale. That repeat engagement supports pricing power, ecosystem retention and extraordinarily high absolute cash generation. Apple's more-than-2.5-billion active device installed base provides broad distribution for new services and AI.
The central investment debate is the growth rate that this mature, exceptionally large business can sustain relative to an almost $5 trillion equity valuation. FY2026's 21% iPhone growth is excellent but may reflect an unusually favorable product and upgrade cycle. Services have high gross margins, but portions of that revenue depend on app distribution rules, search licensing and other business arrangements subject to legal or competitive changes. Siri AI could deepen loyalty and encourage upgrades, yet it also adds R&D and inference costs before monetization is established.
Apple need not double unit shipments to grow profit. A growing installed base, rising services engagement, mix toward premium products and disciplined operating expense could compound cash flow per share. Conversely, if the hardware cycle normalizes, Services slows and gross margin compresses, the currently high stock multiple could contract even if Apple remains an excellent business.
Apple designs and sells iPhone, Mac, iPad, wearables and related accessories, alongside the App Store, digital subscriptions, cloud services, advertising, payment services and support. It reaches consumers through its online and physical stores, carrier distribution and third-party resellers. Hardware is mainly transactional; service models include subscriptions, commissions, licensing and advertising, so not all Services revenue is contracted or recurring.
| Business | FY2026 revenue | YoY growth | Economic role |
|---|---|---|---|
| iPhone | $254.1B | +21.2% | 53% of sales; anchor for the ecosystem and its upgrade cycle |
| Services | $123.3B | +13.0% | 26% of sales, about 40% of gross profit |
| Mac | $37.9B | +12.5% | Computer ecosystem and Apple silicon differentiation |
| iPad | $27.9B | -0.3% | Education, work and consumer tablet category |
| Wearables, Home & Accessories | $35.6B | -0.3% | Companion devices, health features and home accessories |
Apple reports geographic operating segments. Greater China generated approximately $82.4B in FY2026, up 28% but still exposed to domestic competition and geopolitical uncertainty. The Americas and Europe are large mature markets, while India and other emerging markets provide longer-term installed-base potential. The release and filings, not an additive market-size estimate, underpin these observations.
Apple's devices enable its services economics. The mix of durable Services gross profit and premium hardware matters more than gross product-unit growth alone. Its dependence on the iPhone replacement cycle remains material.
Smartphones and PCs are large, mature markets: industry revenue can grow from premium mix and upgrades without comparable increases in units. Apple competes for both new consumers and replacement customers, and for downstream engagement through app stores, cloud, payments and subscriptions. Summing smartphone, digital-service and AI markets would double-count overlapping customer expenditure.
The primary comparable dimensions are platform reach, premium positioning and monetization rather than an unsupported single cross-product market-share number. The table uses the template's qualitative competitive-position fallback, since no consistently sourced current cross-market share set is asserted here.
| Company / Platform | Primary Position | Relative Scale | Growth Direction | Investment Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apple / iOS | Premium smartphones and tightly integrated consumer devices | More than 2.5B active Apple devices globally across product types, not unique users or smartphone share | FY2026 iPhone revenue +21.2% | Installed base supports hardware upgrades and cross-selling |
| Alphabet / Android | Licensed and first-party mobile ecosystem | Broad global mobile distribution; not directly comparable to Apple's installed-device count | Competitive AI and search deployment | Distribution, default services and agent interfaces can compete with Apple |
| Samsung / Galaxy | Major Android handset and foldable supplier | Significant global handset vendor; no unverified percent-share estimate used | Folding-device and premium competition | Direct hardware alternative to iPhone and Duo |
| Microsoft / Windows | PC ecosystem and productivity applications | Broad enterprise PC/software distribution; not same market as iPhone | Consumer/enterprise AI software competition | Mac and general-purpose device/software overlap |
Apple's premium-mix strategy can support revenue and margins without leading global device units. The competitive assessment relies on Apple's reported product and installed-base figures; a provider-consistent, same-period quantitative market-share comparison would be a separate research requirement rather than an invented precise figure.
The most important question is not the total addressable size of consumer electronics, but whether Apple preserves its share of premium consumer spending and controls a valuable distribution relationship as AI agents and platform regulation evolve.
| Competitor | Market Share | Positioning | Advantages vs. Company | Disadvantages vs. Company | Current Direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Samsung Electronics | N/D: no consistent current share set used | Android premium handsets, foldables and wearables | Broad form factors and manufacturing integration | Apple offers tighter iOS/device/services integration | Competition on foldable and premium hardware |
| Alphabet / Google | N/D: Android OS and search are different markets | Android OS, Pixel, search, cloud and AI assistants | Search, AI models and broad Android distribution | Apple controls the iOS user/device experience | Agent and search interface competition |
| Microsoft | N/D: overlapping PC/software markets | Windows PCs, enterprise tools and AI software | Enterprise relationships and productivity ecosystem | Apple controls Mac hardware, OS and silicon | AI and computer-platform rivalry |
| Huawei and other Chinese OEMs | N/D: geographically differentiated | Handsets, wearables and domestic platform ecosystems | Local distribution and market relevance in China | Apple brand and cross-device services ecosystem | Material Greater China competition |
Moat: Wide, presently stable. Integrated software and hardware, custom silicon, accessories, familiar user experience, switching costs and brand loyalty reinforce each other. Potential erosion points are competing consumer agents that become the principal customer interface, changes to app-store distribution/commission economics, and high pricing that weakens hardware accessibility.
Apple is difficult to displace as an integrated premium ecosystem, but no hardware vendor is immune to replacement cycles, new form factors or changes in how users access software and information.
USD billions except margins and diluted shares. FY2026 is the most recently completed fiscal year; therefore the standard history resets to completed annual rows only. No TTM SBC/FCF rows or obsolete FY2026 interim rows are included. FCF = cash from operations less cash property-and-equipment purchases. Cash for FY2026 means cash plus marketable securities; for prior years the combined total is not reproduced here.
| Period | Revenue | Growth | Gross Margin | Operating Margin | FCF | FCF Margin | SBC | Diluted Shares | Cash | Debt |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2024 | $391.0B | N/D | 46.2% | 31.5% | $108.8B | 27.8% | $11.7B | 15.41B | N/D | N/D |
| FY2025 | $416.2B | +6.4% | 46.9% | 32.0% | $98.8B | 23.7% | $12.9B | 15.00B | N/D | N/D |
| FY2026 | $478.8B | +15.1% | 48.8% | 33.0% | $136.1B | 28.4% | $13.8B | 14.72B | ~$137B | ~$80B |
SBC / FCF (matching completed fiscal years): FY2024 10.7%; FY2025 13.0%; FY2026 10.1%. These percentages are derived from disclosed annual cash-flow statement figures, not an additional issuer-reported metric. FY2026 operating cash flow was $145.1B and cash capital spending $9.0B; FY2025 comparable figures were $111.5B and $12.7B. Annual working-capital changes affect cash conversion, and FCF is not necessarily a smooth growth series. Diluted shares are fiscal-year weighted averages, whereas the 14.53B approximate DCF share denominator reflects period-end shares.
Financial direction: Strong but cyclical. FY2026 revenue rose 15.1%, net income 18.0% and diluted EPS 20.4%; FCF increased about 38% from a weaker 2025 base. FY2026 product gross margin was 39.3% and Services margin 76.2%. These economics support financial resilience but are not grounds to assume similar FCF growth every year. A reported fourth-quarter gross margin of 47.9% included approximately one percentage point in tariff refunds. FY2027 Q1 guidance for 45–46% gross margin and 7–10% revenue growth reflects higher memory costs and Siri AI deployment costs.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Price Snapshot | $342.37 regular close, 2026-11-06 |
| Market Capitalization | Approximately $4.98T |
| Enterprise Value | Approximately $4.92T (simplified equity less approximately $57B net cash) |
| Trailing P/E | Approximately 38.1x FY2026 diluted EPS |
| Price / Sales | Approximately 10.4x FY2026 sales |
| Price / Free Cash Flow | Approximately 36.6x FY2026 FCF |
| Free Cash Flow Yield | Approximately 2.7% |
Market-cap, EV and multiples are approximate dated research checks, not current live website figures. The simplified EV excludes finer non-operating and lease adjustments.
| Company | Relevance | Public / Private | Valuation Metric 1 | Valuation Metric 2 | Growth / Margin / Risk Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apple | Integrated consumer hardware/software and high-margin Services | Public | 38.1x FY2026 EPS | 36.6x FY2026 FCF | Highly profitable; hardware replacement cycles and Services rules |
| Samsung Electronics | Direct handset, foldable and wearable operating rival | Public | Not normalized in same-date dataset | Not normalized in same-date dataset | Semiconductor and display operations materially change the consolidated multiple |
| Alphabet | Direct OS, search, apps, AI distribution competitor; secondary valuation anchor | Public | Not normalized in same-date dataset | Not normalized in same-date dataset | Advertising and cloud make the conglomerate economics different |
| Microsoft | Direct PC/software and AI interface overlap; secondary valuation anchor | Public | Not normalized in same-date dataset | Not normalized in same-date dataset | Enterprise subscriptions and cloud capex differ greatly from hardware mix |
Comparable takeaway: No diversified public peer duplicates Apple's combination of hardware, proprietary operating systems, services, device loyalty and buyback program. A simplistic peer-multiple mean would be unreliable; an owner-cash-flow DCF better frames the risk.
The approved scenario model uses a 10-year growing owner-cash-flow DCF. Starting owner cash flow is cash FCF less annual SBC (SBC treated as an economic cost). FY2026 disclosed FCF was $136.1B and SBC $13.8B, producing approximately $122.3B base starting cash flow. Add approximately $57B net cash and divide by about 14.53B period-end shares. The forecast, discount and terminal-growth rates below are analytical judgments, not management guidance; future buybacks are not separately counted again.
| Scenario | Key Assumptions | Fair Value | Probability | Probability Rationale | Return From Price Snapshot |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | Starting owner FCF $115B; 5% annual growth for 10 years; 9.5% discount; 2.5% terminal growth | $143 | 25% | Mature hardware growth, regulatory or Services pressure and cost inflation | -58.2% |
| Base | Starting owner FCF $122.3B; 10% annual growth for 10 years; 9.0% discount; 3.0% terminal growth | $251 | 50% | Strong ecosystem and cash conversion, moderated by scale and costs | -26.7% |
| Bull | Starting owner FCF $136B; 12% annual growth for 10 years; 8.5% discount; 3.0% terminal growth | $357 | 25% | Strong premium devices, AI-aided upgrades, durable high-margin Services | +4.3% |
| Probability-Weighted | 0.25 × $143 + 0.50 × $251 + 0.25 × $357 = $250.5 | $251 | 100% | Subjective scenario weights; approximate rounded figures | -26.7% |
A reverse DCF at the reference price, holding the base cash-flow start, 9% discount rate and 3% terminal rate, requires around 14% owner-cash-flow growth over a decade. A second check assumes FY2026 EPS of $8.98 grows 12% annually for three years to about $12.62: 25x, 27x and 30x exit P/E values imply approximately $316, $341 and $379, excluding dividends. A successful company can still deliver weak investment returns if the multiple contracts.
The illustrative approved entry framework was Strong Buy at or below $200, Buy from $200 to $235, Hold from $235 to $285, and Avoid above $285. Those historical analytical ranges are not price-derived live zones; FolioFacts owns current zone calculations.
John Ternus assumed the CEO role in September 2026. The September quarter was his first earnings call as CEO; the transition increases the importance of product and capital-allocation execution. FY2026 R&D reached $45.8B, up 32%, including AI investment. The company returned substantial cash through repurchases and dividends; the cash-flow statement shows $86.4B in repurchase cash outflows and $15.7B in dividend-related payments in FY2026. The share count fell, but at a high earnings multiple buyback price matters. Management ended FY2026 with approximately $137B cash and marketable securities and $80B debt and no longer targets a mechanical net-cash-neutral policy.
Capital allocation remains supported by substantial cash generation. Under new leadership, the balance of product investment, AI costs, pricing and buybacks deserves monitoring. Quality is not an argument to ignore how much Apple pays to retire its own shares.
Analyzed call: Q4 FY2026 call, 2026-11-02 · Research snapshot: 2026-11-09
The following paraphrases cover material questions raised during the complete November 2, 2026 fiscal-Q4 earnings-call Q&A; they are not verbatim transcript quotations.
| Analyst / Firm | Core Question | Management Response | Research Read-Through |
|---|---|---|---|
| Michael Ng / Goldman Sachs | Why did the standard iPhone 18 not launch alongside the Pro and Duo, and are component or product priorities involved? How is iCloud+ expanding as a service and could AI access increase paid attachment? | Ternus did not discuss unreleased roadmaps; he highlighted the existing iPhone 17, Air and 17e lineup. He said cloud-services revenue hit a record, iCloud+ plans now bundle more services, and expanded access to server-based Siri AI features is a future paid option. | Product cadence was not explained; AI-related Services monetization has potential but no proven pricing or attachment rate. |
| Erik Woodring / Morgan Stanley | How does Apple compete with consumer AI agents that may bypass its services relationship, and can new offerings offset App Store/search and regulatory pressure? | Ternus described privacy-first Siri AI as initially request-driven with room for more agent capabilities. Parekh identified an approximately four-point FX headwind in recent Services growth, mobile gaming weakness, App Store business-model changes and December Services guidance of 8–9%; management cited the installed base and new services as offsets. | The ecosystem distribution thesis remains plausible; agent competition and licensing/app economics are not resolved. |
| Amit Daryanani / Evercore | Could personal AI agents displace the phone as the customer relationship, and how much of the December gross-margin decline stems from memory, mix and Siri inference? | Ternus positioned iPhone as the private personal-context hub. Parekh said most underlying sequential margin pressure was memory; Ternus described unprecedented costs, pricing offsets and shrinking inventory relief. Parekh said Siri cloud inference is a Services cost and some bundled revenue is deferred across device life. | AI presents retention benefits and recognized cost headwinds; gross-margin deterioration is not solely a mix or one-time effect. |
| Ben Reitzes / Melius Research | Does ending the net-cash-neutral target imply more debt-financed repurchases or acquisitions, and can Services reaccelerate with new AI or subscription offerings? | Parekh emphasized financing flexibility while continuing to invest in operations and return excess cash, without targeting net debt. He highlighted installed-base expansion, paying accounts, new service bundles and emerging-market uptake without forecasting an acceleration. | Cash discipline remains important; a stronger long-run Services trajectory has not been quantified. |
| Wamsi Mohan / Bank of America | Is Apple changing procurement or pricing as memory suppliers prioritize AI buyers, and how does Siri inference mix between device and cloud affect infrastructure spending? | Operations cited long supplier relationships and a $33B increase in manufacturing purchase obligations; Parekh acknowledged price rises. The mix of on-device and cloud processing is too early to forecast, as are future inference requirements. | Component commitments and unknown cloud unit economics reduce near-term margin certainty. |
| Samik Chatterjee / JPMorgan | What has Duo demand revealed, when will supply balance, and are companywide supply constraints worsening? | Khan reported strong initial Duo response but no timetable for balance. Advanced-node constraints have started easing, while December Mac and iPad constraints may persist mainly because of memory. | Strong demand is promising but constrained shipments obscure normalized volume and margin economics. |
| Krish Sankar / TD Cowen | Can the company secure memory availability and quantify margin inflation, and how can integrated Siri compete with app-based agents? | Khan emphasized purchase obligations; Parekh attributed roughly a point of sequential underlying margin deterioration to memory after offsets and warned of further costs. Ternus described Siri's current request-led architecture and privacy focus, not demonstrated superior agent monetization. | Memory headwinds are already visible; no proof yet that Siri becomes a differentiated revenue engine. |
| David Vogt / UBS | How much of guided hardware revenue growth is price versus volume, how elastic is demand, and will R&D growth moderate? | Parekh declined detailed price-volume decomposition and said it was too early to assess elasticity after increases. December operating expense is guided to grow 11–13% with continued AI R&D investment. | Premium pricing helps offset costs, but elasticity and long-run incremental AI returns are still uncertain. |
| Richard Kramer / Arete Research | Will increasingly shared iOS/macOS features lead to a unified operating system, and what explains China's 28% annual rebound? | Ternus reiterated product-specific platforms rather than an announced OS merger. He attributed China gains to iPhone and Mac demand, product success and installed-base/upgrader records, without projecting repeatable 28% growth. | China execution is encouraging; the rebound should not be annualized without proof. |
| Ben Bollin / Cleveland Research | How important are trade-ins, financing and subsidies after product price increases, and when can Mac/iPad supply catch demand? | Ternus pointed to upgrade/affordability programs, while Khan expected December Mac/iPad constraints driven by memory and gave no guidance beyond the quarter. | Affordability programs could sustain demand; elevated prices and supply limitations remain thesis risks. |
Compared with a normal product-cycle discussion, the current call emphasized memory cost inflation, price increases, new purchase obligations and the uncertain inference economics of Siri AI. Management was confident about demand and the ecosystem but did not quantify AI monetization, elasticity or the duration of supply constraints. These uncertainties reinforce the existing Avoid judgment at a demanding reference-price multiple rather than overturning the approved $251 base valuation.
| Source | Type | Date / Period | What It Supports |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apple FY2026 Form 10-K | SEC filing | FY2026, filed 2026-11-03 | Revenue by product and region, margins, share counts, CFO, capex, SBC, liabilities, R&D, legal risks |
| Apple Q4 FY2026 earnings release | Company IR | 2026-11-02 | Quarterly results, tariff refunds and management updates |
| Apple Q4 FY2026 investor call transcript | Third-party call transcript / original paraphrases | 2026-11-02 | Management outlook, installed base, services, entire material analyst Q&A |
| Apple investor stock price | Company IR / third-party market price feed | 2026-11-06 | Dated regular-session $342.37 research reference; not a bulk data redistribution |
Initial analysis — no previous review available.
Current review: 2026-11-09
Previous review: None
Update trigger: Initial analysis and approved On the Radar tracking request
| Area | Previous view | Current view | Investment impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| Operating results | No canonical AAPL research file | FY2026 revenue $478.8B (+15.1%), net income $132.2B (+18.0%), diluted EPS $8.98 (+20.4%) | Confirms substantial scale and near-term earnings growth |
| Revenue mix | No canonical breakdown | iPhone $254.1B (+21.2%); Services $123.3B (+13.0%) | Hardware cycles still matter; services add high-margin repeat economics |
| Cash conversion | No canonical analysis | FY2026 CFO $145.1B; capex $9.0B; FCF $136.1B; SBC $13.8B | Durable cash generation, but current-cycle FCF should not be assumed permanent |
| Near-term outlook | No prior assessment | December-quarter revenue growth guide 7–10%; gross margin 45–46% | Memory prices and Siri AI costs limit near-term margin |
| Valuation | No prior canonical valuation | Bear/base/bull $143/$251/$357; probability-weighted approximately $251 | High-quality business, unfavorable prospective return at reference price |
Thesis: Initial. Apple has an exceptional ecosystem and financial engine, but at the November 6 close its valuation requires sustained growth with little margin for adverse outcomes.
| Metric | Current view |
|---|---|
| Price Snapshot | $342.37, 2026-11-06 close |
| Bear / Base / Bull Fair Value | $143 / $251 / $357 |
| Scenario Probabilities | 25% / 50% / 25% |
| Probability-Weighted Fair Value | $251 (rounded from $250.5) |
| Quality Score / Tier | 89.8 / A |
| Risk Level | Moderate business risk; elevated valuation risk |
| Valuation Confidence | 65/100 (Moderate) |
| Tracking / Ownership | On the Radar / No holding recorded |
| Research-Date Investment Rating | Avoid |
Decision rationale: At roughly 38 times FY2026 earnings and 36.6 times FY2026 free cash flow, Apple's quality is already highly priced. The approved base case is about 27% below the reference share price; rating reflects valuation for a new purchase, not a personalized instruction to sell an existing holding.
Apple's central advantage is an integrated device, operating-system and services relationship with consumers. Customers who buy an iPhone can subsequently purchase AirPods, Watch, Mac, iCloud storage and apps and can continue paying for services long after the original device sale. That repeat engagement supports pricing power, ecosystem retention and extraordinarily high absolute cash generation. Apple's more-than-2.5-billion active device installed base provides broad distribution for new services and AI.
The central investment debate is the growth rate that this mature, exceptionally large business can sustain relative to an almost $5 trillion equity valuation. FY2026's 21% iPhone growth is excellent but may reflect an unusually favorable product and upgrade cycle. Services have high gross margins, but portions of that revenue depend on app distribution rules, search licensing and other business arrangements subject to legal or competitive changes. Siri AI could deepen loyalty and encourage upgrades, yet it also adds R&D and inference costs before monetization is established.
Apple need not double unit shipments to grow profit. A growing installed base, rising services engagement, mix toward premium products and disciplined operating expense could compound cash flow per share. Conversely, if the hardware cycle normalizes, Services slows and gross margin compresses, the currently high stock multiple could contract even if Apple remains an excellent business.
Apple designs and sells iPhone, Mac, iPad, wearables and related accessories, alongside the App Store, digital subscriptions, cloud services, advertising, payment services and support. It reaches consumers through its online and physical stores, carrier distribution and third-party resellers. Hardware is mainly transactional; service models include subscriptions, commissions, licensing and advertising, so not all Services revenue is contracted or recurring.
| Business | FY2026 revenue | YoY growth | Economic role |
|---|---|---|---|
| iPhone | $254.1B | +21.2% | 53% of sales; anchor for the ecosystem and its upgrade cycle |
| Services | $123.3B | +13.0% | 26% of sales, about 40% of gross profit |
| Mac | $37.9B | +12.5% | Computer ecosystem and Apple silicon differentiation |
| iPad | $27.9B | -0.3% | Education, work and consumer tablet category |
| Wearables, Home & Accessories | $35.6B | -0.3% | Companion devices, health features and home accessories |
Apple reports geographic operating segments. Greater China generated approximately $82.4B in FY2026, up 28% but still exposed to domestic competition and geopolitical uncertainty. The Americas and Europe are large mature markets, while India and other emerging markets provide longer-term installed-base potential. The release and filings, not an additive market-size estimate, underpin these observations.
Apple's devices enable its services economics. The mix of durable Services gross profit and premium hardware matters more than gross product-unit growth alone. Its dependence on the iPhone replacement cycle remains material.
Smartphones and PCs are large, mature markets: industry revenue can grow from premium mix and upgrades without comparable increases in units. Apple competes for both new consumers and replacement customers, and for downstream engagement through app stores, cloud, payments and subscriptions. Summing smartphone, digital-service and AI markets would double-count overlapping customer expenditure.
The primary comparable dimensions are platform reach, premium positioning and monetization rather than an unsupported single cross-product market-share number. The table uses the template's qualitative competitive-position fallback, since no consistently sourced current cross-market share set is asserted here.
| Company / Platform | Primary Position | Relative Scale | Growth Direction | Investment Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apple / iOS | Premium smartphones and tightly integrated consumer devices | More than 2.5B active Apple devices globally across product types, not unique users or smartphone share | FY2026 iPhone revenue +21.2% | Installed base supports hardware upgrades and cross-selling |
| Alphabet / Android | Licensed and first-party mobile ecosystem | Broad global mobile distribution; not directly comparable to Apple's installed-device count | Competitive AI and search deployment | Distribution, default services and agent interfaces can compete with Apple |
| Samsung / Galaxy | Major Android handset and foldable supplier | Significant global handset vendor; no unverified percent-share estimate used | Folding-device and premium competition | Direct hardware alternative to iPhone and Duo |
| Microsoft / Windows | PC ecosystem and productivity applications | Broad enterprise PC/software distribution; not same market as iPhone | Consumer/enterprise AI software competition | Mac and general-purpose device/software overlap |
Apple's premium-mix strategy can support revenue and margins without leading global device units. The competitive assessment relies on Apple's reported product and installed-base figures; a provider-consistent, same-period quantitative market-share comparison would be a separate research requirement rather than an invented precise figure.
The most important question is not the total addressable size of consumer electronics, but whether Apple preserves its share of premium consumer spending and controls a valuable distribution relationship as AI agents and platform regulation evolve.
Apple does not disclose a conventional SaaS customer acquisition cost, churn, lifetime value or Services ARPU series. The disclosed installed base exceeds 2.5B active devices; management also described more than 1.5B paid subscriptions, which are subscription counts rather than unique paying people. These metrics indicate engagement but are not a cohort revenue forecast.
Products earned a 39.3% gross margin in FY2026 versus Services' 76.2%. Services earned approximately $93.9B of gross profit, around 40% of consolidated gross profit from roughly 26% of sales. Nevertheless, different Services categories have very different economics: app commissions, advertising/licensing, paid subscriptions and payment services should not be treated as equally recurring or equally protected.
Apple's efficient distribution to its installed base is the moat, but the investment case needs sustained engagement and profit contribution rather than an unsupported extrapolation from subscriptions or device counts.
| Competitor | Market Share | Positioning | Advantages vs. Company | Disadvantages vs. Company | Current Direction |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Samsung Electronics | N/D: no consistent current share set used | Android premium handsets, foldables and wearables | Broad form factors and manufacturing integration | Apple offers tighter iOS/device/services integration | Competition on foldable and premium hardware |
| Alphabet / Google | N/D: Android OS and search are different markets | Android OS, Pixel, search, cloud and AI assistants | Search, AI models and broad Android distribution | Apple controls the iOS user/device experience | Agent and search interface competition |
| Microsoft | N/D: overlapping PC/software markets | Windows PCs, enterprise tools and AI software | Enterprise relationships and productivity ecosystem | Apple controls Mac hardware, OS and silicon | AI and computer-platform rivalry |
| Huawei and other Chinese OEMs | N/D: geographically differentiated | Handsets, wearables and domestic platform ecosystems | Local distribution and market relevance in China | Apple brand and cross-device services ecosystem | Material Greater China competition |
Moat: Wide, presently stable. Integrated software and hardware, custom silicon, accessories, familiar user experience, switching costs and brand loyalty reinforce each other. Potential erosion points are competing consumer agents that become the principal customer interface, changes to app-store distribution/commission economics, and high pricing that weakens hardware accessibility.
Apple is difficult to displace as an integrated premium ecosystem, but no hardware vendor is immune to replacement cycles, new form factors or changes in how users access software and information.
USD billions except margins and diluted shares. FY2026 is the most recently completed fiscal year; therefore the standard history resets to completed annual rows only. No TTM SBC/FCF rows or obsolete FY2026 interim rows are included. FCF = cash from operations less cash property-and-equipment purchases. Cash for FY2026 means cash plus marketable securities; for prior years the combined total is not reproduced here.
| Period | Revenue | Growth | Gross Margin | Operating Margin | FCF | FCF Margin | SBC | Diluted Shares | Cash | Debt |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2024 | $391.0B | N/D | 46.2% | 31.5% | $108.8B | 27.8% | $11.7B | 15.41B | N/D | N/D |
| FY2025 | $416.2B | +6.4% | 46.9% | 32.0% | $98.8B | 23.7% | $12.9B | 15.00B | N/D | N/D |
| FY2026 | $478.8B | +15.1% | 48.8% | 33.0% | $136.1B | 28.4% | $13.8B | 14.72B | ~$137B | ~$80B |
SBC / FCF (matching completed fiscal years): FY2024 10.7%; FY2025 13.0%; FY2026 10.1%. These percentages are derived from disclosed annual cash-flow statement figures, not an additional issuer-reported metric. FY2026 operating cash flow was $145.1B and cash capital spending $9.0B; FY2025 comparable figures were $111.5B and $12.7B. Annual working-capital changes affect cash conversion, and FCF is not necessarily a smooth growth series. Diluted shares are fiscal-year weighted averages, whereas the 14.53B approximate DCF share denominator reflects period-end shares.
Financial direction: Strong but cyclical. FY2026 revenue rose 15.1%, net income 18.0% and diluted EPS 20.4%; FCF increased about 38% from a weaker 2025 base. FY2026 product gross margin was 39.3% and Services margin 76.2%. These economics support financial resilience but are not grounds to assume similar FCF growth every year. A reported fourth-quarter gross margin of 47.9% included approximately one percentage point in tariff refunds. FY2027 Q1 guidance for 45–46% gross margin and 7–10% revenue growth reflects higher memory costs and Siri AI deployment costs.
John Ternus assumed the CEO role in September 2026. The September quarter was his first earnings call as CEO; the transition increases the importance of product and capital-allocation execution. FY2026 R&D reached $45.8B, up 32%, including AI investment. The company returned substantial cash through repurchases and dividends; the cash-flow statement shows $86.4B in repurchase cash outflows and $15.7B in dividend-related payments in FY2026. The share count fell, but at a high earnings multiple buyback price matters. Management ended FY2026 with approximately $137B cash and marketable securities and $80B debt and no longer targets a mechanical net-cash-neutral policy.
Capital allocation remains supported by substantial cash generation. Under new leadership, the balance of product investment, AI costs, pricing and buybacks deserves monitoring. Quality is not an argument to ignore how much Apple pays to retire its own shares.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| Price Snapshot | $342.37 regular close, 2026-11-06 |
| Market Capitalization | Approximately $4.98T |
| Enterprise Value | Approximately $4.92T (simplified equity less approximately $57B net cash) |
| Trailing P/E | Approximately 38.1x FY2026 diluted EPS |
| Price / Sales | Approximately 10.4x FY2026 sales |
| Price / Free Cash Flow | Approximately 36.6x FY2026 FCF |
| Free Cash Flow Yield | Approximately 2.7% |
Market-cap, EV and multiples are approximate dated research checks, not current live website figures. The simplified EV excludes finer non-operating and lease adjustments.
| Company | Relevance | Public / Private | Valuation Metric 1 | Valuation Metric 2 | Growth / Margin / Risk Context |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apple | Integrated consumer hardware/software and high-margin Services | Public | 38.1x FY2026 EPS | 36.6x FY2026 FCF | Highly profitable; hardware replacement cycles and Services rules |
| Samsung Electronics | Direct handset, foldable and wearable operating rival | Public | Not normalized in same-date dataset | Not normalized in same-date dataset | Semiconductor and display operations materially change the consolidated multiple |
| Alphabet | Direct OS, search, apps, AI distribution competitor; secondary valuation anchor | Public | Not normalized in same-date dataset | Not normalized in same-date dataset | Advertising and cloud make the conglomerate economics different |
| Microsoft | Direct PC/software and AI interface overlap; secondary valuation anchor | Public | Not normalized in same-date dataset | Not normalized in same-date dataset | Enterprise subscriptions and cloud capex differ greatly from hardware mix |
Comparable takeaway: No diversified public peer duplicates Apple's combination of hardware, proprietary operating systems, services, device loyalty and buyback program. A simplistic peer-multiple mean would be unreliable; an owner-cash-flow DCF better frames the risk.
The approved scenario model uses a 10-year growing owner-cash-flow DCF. Starting owner cash flow is cash FCF less annual SBC (SBC treated as an economic cost). FY2026 disclosed FCF was $136.1B and SBC $13.8B, producing approximately $122.3B base starting cash flow. Add approximately $57B net cash and divide by about 14.53B period-end shares. The forecast, discount and terminal-growth rates below are analytical judgments, not management guidance; future buybacks are not separately counted again.
| Scenario | Key Assumptions | Fair Value | Probability | Probability Rationale | Return From Price Snapshot |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | Starting owner FCF $115B; 5% annual growth for 10 years; 9.5% discount; 2.5% terminal growth | $143 | 25% | Mature hardware growth, regulatory or Services pressure and cost inflation | -58.2% |
| Base | Starting owner FCF $122.3B; 10% annual growth for 10 years; 9.0% discount; 3.0% terminal growth | $251 | 50% | Strong ecosystem and cash conversion, moderated by scale and costs | -26.7% |
| Bull | Starting owner FCF $136B; 12% annual growth for 10 years; 8.5% discount; 3.0% terminal growth | $357 | 25% | Strong premium devices, AI-aided upgrades, durable high-margin Services | +4.3% |
| Probability-Weighted | 0.25 × $143 + 0.50 × $251 + 0.25 × $357 = $250.5 | $251 | 100% | Subjective scenario weights; approximate rounded figures | -26.7% |
A reverse DCF at the reference price, holding the base cash-flow start, 9% discount rate and 3% terminal rate, requires around 14% owner-cash-flow growth over a decade. A second check assumes FY2026 EPS of $8.98 grows 12% annually for three years to about $12.62: 25x, 27x and 30x exit P/E values imply approximately $316, $341 and $379, excluding dividends. A successful company can still deliver weak investment returns if the multiple contracts.
The illustrative approved entry framework was Strong Buy at or below $200, Buy from $200 to $235, Hold from $235 to $285, and Avoid above $285. Those historical analytical ranges are not price-derived live zones; FolioFacts owns current zone calculations.
The following paraphrases cover material questions raised during the complete November 2, 2026 fiscal-Q4 earnings-call Q&A; they are not verbatim transcript quotations.
| Analyst / Firm | Core Question | Management Response | Research Read-Through |
|---|---|---|---|
| Michael Ng / Goldman Sachs | Why did the standard iPhone 18 not launch alongside the Pro and Duo, and are component or product priorities involved? How is iCloud+ expanding as a service and could AI access increase paid attachment? | Ternus did not discuss unreleased roadmaps; he highlighted the existing iPhone 17, Air and 17e lineup. He said cloud-services revenue hit a record, iCloud+ plans now bundle more services, and expanded access to server-based Siri AI features is a future paid option. | Product cadence was not explained; AI-related Services monetization has potential but no proven pricing or attachment rate. |
| Erik Woodring / Morgan Stanley | How does Apple compete with consumer AI agents that may bypass its services relationship, and can new offerings offset App Store/search and regulatory pressure? | Ternus described privacy-first Siri AI as initially request-driven with room for more agent capabilities. Parekh identified an approximately four-point FX headwind in recent Services growth, mobile gaming weakness, App Store business-model changes and December Services guidance of 8–9%; management cited the installed base and new services as offsets. | The ecosystem distribution thesis remains plausible; agent competition and licensing/app economics are not resolved. |
| Amit Daryanani / Evercore | Could personal AI agents displace the phone as the customer relationship, and how much of the December gross-margin decline stems from memory, mix and Siri inference? | Ternus positioned iPhone as the private personal-context hub. Parekh said most underlying sequential margin pressure was memory; Ternus described unprecedented costs, pricing offsets and shrinking inventory relief. Parekh said Siri cloud inference is a Services cost and some bundled revenue is deferred across device life. | AI presents retention benefits and recognized cost headwinds; gross-margin deterioration is not solely a mix or one-time effect. |
| Ben Reitzes / Melius Research | Does ending the net-cash-neutral target imply more debt-financed repurchases or acquisitions, and can Services reaccelerate with new AI or subscription offerings? | Parekh emphasized financing flexibility while continuing to invest in operations and return excess cash, without targeting net debt. He highlighted installed-base expansion, paying accounts, new service bundles and emerging-market uptake without forecasting an acceleration. | Cash discipline remains important; a stronger long-run Services trajectory has not been quantified. |
| Wamsi Mohan / Bank of America | Is Apple changing procurement or pricing as memory suppliers prioritize AI buyers, and how does Siri inference mix between device and cloud affect infrastructure spending? | Operations cited long supplier relationships and a $33B increase in manufacturing purchase obligations; Parekh acknowledged price rises. The mix of on-device and cloud processing is too early to forecast, as are future inference requirements. | Component commitments and unknown cloud unit economics reduce near-term margin certainty. |
| Samik Chatterjee / JPMorgan | What has Duo demand revealed, when will supply balance, and are companywide supply constraints worsening? | Khan reported strong initial Duo response but no timetable for balance. Advanced-node constraints have started easing, while December Mac and iPad constraints may persist mainly because of memory. | Strong demand is promising but constrained shipments obscure normalized volume and margin economics. |
| Krish Sankar / TD Cowen | Can the company secure memory availability and quantify margin inflation, and how can integrated Siri compete with app-based agents? | Khan emphasized purchase obligations; Parekh attributed roughly a point of sequential underlying margin deterioration to memory after offsets and warned of further costs. Ternus described Siri's current request-led architecture and privacy focus, not demonstrated superior agent monetization. | Memory headwinds are already visible; no proof yet that Siri becomes a differentiated revenue engine. |
| David Vogt / UBS | How much of guided hardware revenue growth is price versus volume, how elastic is demand, and will R&D growth moderate? | Parekh declined detailed price-volume decomposition and said it was too early to assess elasticity after increases. December operating expense is guided to grow 11–13% with continued AI R&D investment. | Premium pricing helps offset costs, but elasticity and long-run incremental AI returns are still uncertain. |
| Richard Kramer / Arete Research | Will increasingly shared iOS/macOS features lead to a unified operating system, and what explains China's 28% annual rebound? | Ternus reiterated product-specific platforms rather than an announced OS merger. He attributed China gains to iPhone and Mac demand, product success and installed-base/upgrader records, without projecting repeatable 28% growth. | China execution is encouraging; the rebound should not be annualized without proof. |
| Ben Bollin / Cleveland Research | How important are trade-ins, financing and subsidies after product price increases, and when can Mac/iPad supply catch demand? | Ternus pointed to upgrade/affordability programs, while Khan expected December Mac/iPad constraints driven by memory and gave no guidance beyond the quarter. | Affordability programs could sustain demand; elevated prices and supply limitations remain thesis risks. |
Compared with a normal product-cycle discussion, the current call emphasized memory cost inflation, price increases, new purchase obligations and the uncertain inference economics of Siri AI. Management was confident about demand and the ecosystem but did not quantify AI monetization, elasticity or the duration of supply constraints. These uncertainties reinforce the existing Avoid judgment at a demanding reference-price multiple rather than overturning the approved $251 base valuation.
| Driver | Current State | Positive Trigger / Catalyst | Negative Trigger / Falsifier | What It Changes |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| iPhone replacement cycle | FY2026 iPhone +21%; premium mix strong | Sustained positive upgrade trends beyond initial launch | Normalizing units and weakening price acceptance | Revenue/owner-FCF growth |
| Services economics | FY2026 +13%; December guide +8–9%; 76.2% FY2026 gross margin | Durable double-digit Services growth with margin defense | Regulatory/licensing hit or gaming weakness | Long-run margin and moat |
| AI / Siri | Rollout begun; monetization and inference mix unproven | Identifiable upgrade acceleration or profitable paid AI access | Higher recurring costs with little attributable sales | DCF cash-flow assumptions |
| Gross margin | September 47.9% aided by tariff refunds; December 45–46% outlook | Recovery toward high-40s without one-offs | Persistent memory inflation or price elasticity | Near-term FCF and confidence |
| Greater China | FY2026 +28% | Stable premium adoption with broader product strength | Local handset competition and demand reversal | Growth resilience |
| Capital allocation | Large buybacks and cash balances | Economically attractive repurchases, rational funding | Expensive buybacks and rising AI costs without ROI | Per-share compounding |
| Component | Score | Weight | Weighted Contribution | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Business durability and economics | 94 | 25% | 23.50 | Ecosystem reach, repeat services and exceptionally high profits |
| Moat and competitive position | 96 | 25% | 24.00 | Product/OS/silicon integration, brand and switching costs |
| Growth runway and durability | 78 | 20% | 15.60 | Services and AI opportunities offset by extraordinary size and hardware cycles |
| Financial quality and balance sheet | 90 | 15% | 13.50 | $136.1B FY2026 FCF, high margins and net cash; cyclical working capital |
| Management, governance and capital allocation | 88 | 15% | 13.20 | Strong historical capital returns with new-CEO execution and buyback-price uncertainty |
| Quality Score | 89.8 | 100% | 89.80 | Price-independent business quality |
Live Opportunity Score, zone status and shared ranks are computed by FolioFacts from current verified prices and the approved fundamental inputs; they are not stored in this research file.
portfolio/holdings.md.ontheradar.md, not the Primary Watchlist.portfolio/holdings.md.| Timestamp | Price | Rating | Zone Status | Buy Zone | Strong Buy Zone | Avoid Chasing Above | Base FV | P/W FV | P/W Return | Quality | Opportunity / Rank | Change / Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-09 (research date) | $342.37 (Nov 6 close) | Avoid | FolioFacts only | FolioFacts only | FolioFacts only | FolioFacts only | $251 | $251 | -26.7% | 89.8 | FolioFacts only | Initial research and approved On the Radar addition; durable ecosystem but high valuation |
Disclaimer: This publication reflects my personal investment research, thoughts, and opinions only. It is intended strictly for informational and educational purposes and does not constitute personalized investment, legal, tax, or financial advice, nor does it represent a recommendation or solicitation to buy, sell, or hold any security or financial instrument.
I am not a registered investment adviser, broker-dealer, or financial planner. This content does not take into account your specific investment objectives, financial situation, or risk tolerance. All investments involve substantial risk, including the potential loss of all principal capital. Past performance is never indicative of future results.
While I endeavor to provide accurate information, all data and analysis are provided "as is" without any warranty of accuracy, completeness, or timeliness. You must conduct your own independent due diligence and/or consult with a licensed professional before making any financial decisions. I may hold long or short positions in any of the securities or assets discussed herein at any time without notice.
| Source | Type | Date / Period | What It Supports |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apple FY2026 Form 10-K | SEC filing | FY2026, filed 2026-11-03 | Revenue by product and region, margins, share counts, CFO, capex, SBC, liabilities, R&D, legal risks |
| Apple Q4 FY2026 earnings release | Company IR | 2026-11-02 | Quarterly results, tariff refunds and management updates |
| Apple Q4 FY2026 investor call transcript | Third-party call transcript / original paraphrases | 2026-11-02 | Management outlook, installed base, services, entire material analyst Q&A |
| Apple investor stock price | Company IR / third-party market price feed | 2026-11-06 | Dated regular-session $342.37 research reference; not a bulk data redistribution |
This page presents the saved AAPL analysis. Ratings, zones, and opportunity scores shown above are recalculated at its dated reference price using FolioFacts rules; the live Creator Watchlist uses current market prices and can differ. Missing financial data is not estimated.
This publication reflects my personal investment research, thoughts, and opinions only. It is intended strictly for informational and educational purposes and does not constitute personalized investment, legal, tax, or financial advice. Any ratings or views expressed are general analytical opinions, not recommendations tailored to any reader or offers or solicitations to buy or sell any security or financial instrument.
I am not a registered investment adviser, broker-dealer, or financial planner. This content does not take into account your specific investment objectives, financial situation, or risk tolerance. All investments involve substantial risk, including the potential loss of all principal capital. Past performance is never indicative of future results.
While I endeavor to provide accurate information, all data and analysis are provided "as is" without any warranty of accuracy, completeness, or timeliness. You must conduct your own independent due diligence and/or consult with a licensed professional before making any financial decisions. I may hold long or short positions in any of the securities or assets discussed herein at any time without notice.
Quality is price independent. Opportunity combines that quality with scenario-based upside, bear-case protection, and confidence. Ownership and cost basis do not affect these scores. Watchlist rank compares the scored companies in that Watchlist.
Model scores, valuation estimates, and price zones are based on assumptions, not guarantees of future performance or individualized advice. Read our Disclaimer.
25% business durability
25% moat and competitive position
20% growth runway
15% financial quality
15% management and capital allocation
30% Quality Score
35% normalized probability-weighted upside
20% normalized bear-case return
15% risk and valuation confidence
At least 50% upside to P/W fair value, with price no more than 10% above bear-case fair value.
At least 25% upside to P/W fair value, above the Strong Buy boundary.
Modeled return from approximately −10% to below +25%.
More than 10% downside to P/W fair value.
Risk-adjusted view. This framework balances expected upside, downside risk and valuation confidence. Zones may be less reliable for companies priced mainly on future potential rather than current fundamentals.
These prompt a review of the research and Opportunity Score. Watchlist ranks are calculated automatically from the scores currently displayed.